Episode 89: Hypersonic Strike: Insider Perspective

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John "Slick" Baum: Welcome to
the Aerospace Advantage podcast.

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I'm your host, John "Slick"
Baum. This week, we're going to

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talk about one of the most
exciting developments in combat

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air power: hypersonics, the
ability to fly at over five

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times the speed of sound. Now,
we've known how to do this for

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decades. I mean, think about the
X-15 at the National Air and

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Space Museum here in DC, and the
Air Force Museum in Dayton. They

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flew in the 1960s and were
beyond incredible. But that was

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a long time ago. And the reality
is that America took its eye off

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of that hypersonics ball for way
too long. The 1970s, 80s, 90s,

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and even the 2000s saw a random
set of programs that failed out,

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had irregular funding and
inconsistent objectives. This

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was a lethal combination that
ravaged our hypersonic talent

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pool, burned through time and
saw us barely tread water. And

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the advantages of flying so fast
are obvious from a military

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perspective. It allows
commanders to rapidly strike

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targets, and traditional
defenses really don't work

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against things that are flying
that fast. Our adversaries,

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especially China, get this and
that's why they've invested so

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much to develop their own
hypersonic technology. And it's

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worked. The lead we used to have
doesn't exist anymore. So that's

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the crux of today's episode.
We're in a hypersonic race with

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countries like China. The focus
is on weapons. And we don't want

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to come in second because if you
think developing hypersonic tech

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is tough, inventing defenses
against something so fast is

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even harder. Our assets in the
Pacific like our bases, ships,

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space downlink stations and
logistic lines would be

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incredibly vulnerable. There's
no good plan B for losing this

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race. Now, we covered this
earlier in the spring with

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hypersonics experts, Dr. Mark
Lewis and Dr. Dick Hallion. But

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we wanted to continue the
conversation and learn more from

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some folks who are directly
involved with working the

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program.

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So with that, let me introduce
Eric Knutson. He is the director

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at Skunk Works Advanced Systems.

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Eric Knutson: Thank you much.
It's a it's an honor to be with

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you today.

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John "Slick" Baum: We also have
Brian Schappacher. Brian is the

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Air Launch Rapid Response
Weapon's deputy program manager.

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Brian Schappacher: Yeah, I
really appreciate being on here,

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you know, in this industry you
usually don't get to talk about

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your work. So this is super
exciting for me.

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John "Slick" Baum: And also
Arlen Kostival, vehicle systems

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engineer.

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Arlen Kostival: Yeah, thanks
Slick. Excited to be here, and

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looking forward to the
opportunity to have this

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conversation.

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John "Slick" Baum: They're part
of Lockheed Martin's team

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developing hypersonic
technology, including the

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hypersonic Air Launch Rapid
Response Weapon, or ARRW for

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short. That missile has made a
lot of news lately. It's

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launched off of a B-52. It has
executed two successful flights

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and is in line for a bunch more
testing on the way to hopefully

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join its operational inventory.
And we're really excited about

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the recent wins here with the
latest test flights. But it's

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also important to emphasize the
program has experienced its fair

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share of challenges. So the
bottom line here is, this tech

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is really tough. And we're
asking a lot of people to

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rapidly innovate on some of the
hardest airborne applications

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we've looked at in decades. So,
I'm talking about everything

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from aerodynamics to materials
and propulsion. So everything is

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on the line here, the high,
ultra high varsity level. So

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again, gentlemen, thank you for
being here. So let's kick this

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thing off and put your project
into context. I've got to ask

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this question. Why should we
care about hypersonics? I know

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that I tried to explain this in
the introduction. But why do you

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think it's so important that we
win this race? And Brian, we'll

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get started with you.

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Brian Schappacher: Sure. I mean,
you know, the technological

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advantage that America and our
allies have enjoyed for many,

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many decades is being eroded at
an alarming rate. Really,

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hypersonics is the game changer
there, they really decrease our

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response time and strike
scenarios. That reduces the time

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our adversaries have to counter
and react, you know, it gives a

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bigger element of surprise, I
think the biggest thing that it

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provides is a significant
deterrence, you're less likely

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to, your adversaries are less
likely to engage when you know

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that, you know, we have these
capabilities.

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Arlen Kostival: Yeah, I'll just
jump in on that. I think Brian

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made some good points, I want to
highlight two important factors

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that I think makes this
capability an important tool in

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our warfighters' toolbox. One is
the speed, right? And so when

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you're talking about
hypersonics, you're talking

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velocities in the miles per
second range. And that's very,

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very hard to defend against. So
you know that that is a core

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component of this capability.
But speed alone is not enough.

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And I think you also have to
factor in the maneuverability of

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these types of systems. So I
like to think about it like I'm

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playing baseball. Traditional
ballistic missile type systems,

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that's a bit like hitting the
high fly ball to center field.

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You know, it's gonna pop way up,
there are plenty of time to

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track the trajectory and start
to plan your catch for when it's

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come back down, a little bit
easier to defend against even if

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they're traveling very, very
quickly. But hypersonic is a

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little bit more like smashing a
line drive to center field, with

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a ball that's capable of making
a hard left turn once it clears

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that second baseman, and go and
find some open space out there

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in that field. That's that's
what we're really talking about

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when we call these capabilities
game changers, if they really

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start to change how you interact
with the system and make it very

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hard to defend against. So I
think Dr. Lewis and Dr. Hallion

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hit the nail on the head in your
podcast earlier in the year, one

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of the quotes that I took away
from that was, you know, this is

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a tactical capability that can
produce strategic results, kind

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of like Brian was mentioning.

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John "Slick" Baum: So Brian,
I've got to ask you, frankly,

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what is at stake regarding being
the hypersonic leader or the

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victim of hypersonic strike. I
mean, it ties to our core

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security issues in a way that we
have not considered in decades.

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Brian Schappacher: It's really
important to be first and to be

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ahead of this, you know, we have
to have the technological

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advantage. So that isn't, so we
aren't a victim, right, we need

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to be ahead and have the
deterrence capabilities.

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John "Slick" Baum: Yeah. And
that makes total sense. And, you

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know, that has to provide you
and your team with a lot of

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motivation as you lean into this
effort. So let's wind back the

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clock, I've got to ask the
question of where were you when

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you first started hearing about
the United States' desire to get

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back in hypersonics? And what
were your first impressions?

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Eric, we'll get started with
you.

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Eric Knutson: So for me, it
wasn't so much of a  case of the

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United States getting back into
hypersonics. It was really the

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turning point, when the
technology to support

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hypersonics became a reality, we
had the opportunity to work with

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some luminaries out there that
were key to make that happen.

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People like Steve Walker, Dave
Walker, Chris Clay, and James

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Weber that kept the fire alive,
so that we could create these

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technologies. Those technologies
and tests began to work. And

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that's what inspired AFRL and
DARPA to go ahead and release

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some demonstration contracts, so
we could prove them in flight.

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Brian Schappacher: Yeah, and I
can, I can remember, when I

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really first kind of started to
hear about hypersonics, it was

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probably 2017 or 2018. And I was
on an airplane headed out to a

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flight test for the conventional
cruise missile program I was on

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at the time. And I typically
would buy kind of both Popular

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Science and Popular Mechanics
just to have something to read

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on the airplane. But I remember
seeing this article, it had this

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really exaggerated picture of,
you know, this vehicle that it

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looked like it was halfway to
the moon, you know, flying way

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above the Earth, but it's all
about hypersonics. And I

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remember, you know, reading
through the article and

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thinking, Man, this is, this is
really cool. The US, we

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absolutely have to lead in this.
But I'm also an engineer, and

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very quickly, my thoughts
switch. You know, the

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engineering mind came out and
you know, heat right? This this

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thing, you're showing this
picture of this thing in space,

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and then it's going to be, you
know, hitting a target on Earth,

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there's a massive amount of heat
that has to be dealt with,

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there's a thermal protection
system, you know, I think to the

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Space Shuttle, where they have
these really heavy tiles on

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there to protect against heat.
You know, that's much too heavy

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for you know, missile that's
gonna go on an aircraft or

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something. So I kind of became a
skeptic. But you know, as you're

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around the office, you sometimes
hear those conversations around

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the water cooler and people
talking about you know, that,

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hey, they're working on this new
hypersonics thing. And when you

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don't get a lot of details, it
started to make it a little bit

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of a mystery. And I kind of knew
that that's something that I

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wanted to do one day. So when I
had the opportunity to come on

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to a hypersonic program, Air
Launched Rapid Response Weapon

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in particular, I certainly
jumped at that opportunity.

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Arlen Kostival: Yeah, and then,
you know, for me, I was actually

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in fifth grade, when the DOD set
out on a course to develop what

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they called at the time a prompt
global strike capability, just

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kind of setting the stage there,
right. And so you know, if you

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track through the history books,
this was kind of a research

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project for me, but the Army was
flying the the first advanced

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hypersonic weapon or HW
prototype, you know, as I'm

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graduating high school, and then
I started my career at Lockheed

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Martin working in the FAB
ballistic missile defense area

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and dabbled in strategic
ballistic missile defense

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systems. I really got my first
exposure to hypersonics in the

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2019 timeframe, when I started
supporting some concepts,

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architecture, trade studies for
how we were going to launch one

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of these hypersonic missiles off
of an Army launcher. And at the

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time, I learned very quickly
that that was going to be the

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same missile that they were
deploying on the Navy platforms.

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So I got really excited about
the opportunity to get involved

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in a very fast paced and intense
development effort. And right

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from the start, because of that
commonality with deploying the

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same missile on two different
platforms for two different

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services. I knew that we were
getting into something really

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special here.

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John "Slick" Baum: Yeah, no. And
I just want to point out for our

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audience, if they didn't realize
it already, I mean, we have

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folks that have spent, that have
been thinking about this problem

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since before they started their
adult professional lives. So I

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mean, obviously, we've got some
really dedicated professionals,

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and I really appreciate you all
sharing your thoughts. And you

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know, one of the things that I
was thinking about is what

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really differentiated our
nation's approach to hypersonics

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this time was a willingness to
pursue multiple programs

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concurrently, you know, to
basically develop a number of

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pathways and see which way works
best. So can you help people

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understand that there really
isn't a single or one way to

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create a hypersonic weapon?
Eric, we'll get started with

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you.

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Eric Knutson: Yeah, sure. So
we've mentioned before, we're

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talking about the Falcon series
that Brian, I think was talking

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about growing up upon, but it
was always single tracked, even

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going back to the '60s when
we're first doing hypersonics in

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flight. Because the importance
of hypersonics is a

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differentiator, it became
obvious that we really needed to

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make sure that we didn't have a
single point failure. So there

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were two paths that were
established early on, one being

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a boost glide, the other being
an air breather. The difference

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between the two was really the
complexity, and the initial

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thought was boost glide is
something that you just really

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have to accelerate really fast,
and then let it cruise. How hard

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can that be? The alternative is
can we actually get a ramjet,

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scramjet to perform, to give us
that sustained performance and

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acceleration as we go to our
endpoint. And the conventional

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thinking was a ramjet or
scramjet, that's gonna be really

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hard. We'll keep that in the
wings. But let's go primarily

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after a boost glide. It was
probably about one month after

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that decision was made that the
scramjet was proven out in a

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free jet wind tunnel. And now we
had two real viabilities. And so

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that's what was carried forward
by the Air Force and by DARPA,

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and continues to this day
successfully.

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Brian Schappacher: And I can
probably jump on that a little

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bit to to even say, work in
ARRW, which is a boost glide

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hypersonic, you know, I know a
little more about the boost

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glide side of things. But even
then, the US has invested in a

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whole portfolio across there.
You have air launched and ship

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launched, you have the Navy
pursuing a hypersonic boost

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glide, you have the Army, you
have the Air Force. So you know,

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we've made sure as a country
that we are covering all of our

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bases with hypersonics. I guess
would be one good way to put it.

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Arlen Kostival: Yeah, and
another key element of

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diversifying your portfolio is
not just boost glide versus air

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breather, like like Eric
mentioned. You know, certainly

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we're doing a lot to get those
boost type systems into the

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hands of the warfighter as fast
as we can. But you also have to

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look at different gliding body
technologies, which is kind of

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the pointy bit on the front end,
right. And you know, one of the

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really cool things when you look
back through the history of

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experimenting and developing
this technology, you know, we

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actually saw the second flight
of the hypersonic test vehicle,

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or HTV, that came out of the
Falcon study, you know, so

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that's what happened the same
year that we had the first Army

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hypersonic advanced hypersonic
weapon, HW, so we're actually

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seeing two different viability
technologies tested at the same

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time there, and those who've
continued on different

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trajectories for their
development. So yeah, it's not

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just the platform, or the
missile, but also, you know, the

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end effector, or the glide body
that you differentiate

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capabilities in.

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John "Slick" Baum: And I really
do appreciate that background,

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gentlemen, we're making a lot of
people really smart on

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hypersonics with this podcast,
so thanks for that background.

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So Brian, what's the genesis of
ARRW, your program? What's the

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actual requirement? Who created
it? And when did the effort kick

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off?

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Brian Schappacher: Sure. So as
Eric kind of mentioned, you

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know, Lockheed Martin, as a
company has really been in

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hypersonics, for at least 60
years in various, or at least in

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areas that help develop
technologies that support

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hypersonics. So if you think
about it, you know, launching a

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satellite into space that
requires hypersonic speeds to

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break, you know, to break the
Earth's gravitational pull, so

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you can get into space. So
there's experiences from

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launching satellites that we can
take even into the hypersonic

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realm, to understand you know,
especially thermal and some of

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those issues that you have to
deal with. But for a more recent

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example, from the ARRW program,
and where they came from, they

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can really trace their history
back to Tactical Boost Glide

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around the 2016 timeframe, that
was a joint effort with Lockheed

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Martin and DARPA really to
develop a hypersonic boost glide

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technology. So once that, you
know, really started to look to

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be viable, that's where the Air
Force jumped in and said, hey,

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you know, this is this is a good
launching point for us to have a

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hypersonic missile for
ourselves. So they used TBG,

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basically, as a launching point
for ARRW. ARRW's goal as a

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program here was to put all the
pieces together. So we needed

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the glider, a payload,
algorithms to fly it a booster,

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and a factory to build it all to
make it be the first production

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hypersonics product that we have
out there.

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Arlen Kostival: And then, so I
just want to jump in here with a

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little bit of background about
the Conventional Prompt Strike,

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or CPS and Long Range Hypersonic
Weapon or LRHW programs that I

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support, which were, you know,
part of that portfolio of boost

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glide systems that Brian talked
about earlier. So for us, the

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trade studies really began in
the 2014 timeframe with the

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government and starting to, you
know, assess the viability of

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different design approaches, and
balancing those with, you know,

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schedules for operational
readiness and elements like

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that. And then, you know, we
really turned into the program

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of record with a development
contract awarded in 2018, that

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gave us the opportunity to start
operationalizing this capability

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for both the Army and the Navy,
which we're very excited about.

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John "Slick" Baum: Yeah, no, I
appreciate that. And it's made

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me think about, you know, how
many other efforts were launched

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around this timeframe. I mean,
you guys are just one of many,

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right?

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Brian Schappacher: Absolutely.
And the US, you know, really

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invested in hypersonic
technologies for all the armed

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forces simultaneously. So you
have ground launched and air

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launched and sea launch, short
range, long range, medium range,

299
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boost glide, air breathing, but
it goes further than that, as

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well. It's not just entire
weapon systems. It's also an

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investment in technologies that
will enable you know, this and

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future generations of hypersonic
products that, you know. Things

303
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like advanced materials,
sensors, engines, boosters, all

304
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the things that you would need
to continue moving hypersonics

305
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forward to go, you know,
continuously, faster and higher

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and better.

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John "Slick" Baum: So speaking
as a former requirements

308
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officer, I can tell you that I
know one of the keys for a

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00:15:56,850 --> 00:15:59,460
program's success is clear,
having consistent requirements.

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So do you feel like you have
that from the government?

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Eric Knutson: I would say we
definitely have had clear and

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00:16:04,020 --> 00:16:06,990
consistent requirements. For
these technology demonstrators,

313
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they start off really with a few
key pillars of what they want to

314
00:16:11,010 --> 00:16:13,950
attain. And they stuck to that.
And you know, the tough part is

315
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really, as engineers,
technologists, hypersonic nerds

316
00:16:18,690 --> 00:16:22,770
is the desire is always more and
more data. We want to get all

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that stuff that we can get on
the ground. So it's really

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having the ability to contain
oneself to the data stream that

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one has available to them, so
that you only get the data that

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you can use rather than going
overboard, but requirements

321
00:16:36,270 --> 00:16:38,310
wise, it's been consistent.

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00:16:39,990 --> 00:16:41,670
Brian Schappacher: Yeah, I'll
second that as well. From the

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ARRW perspective, you know, our
customer understood, the only

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way that we were going to move
as fast as we work to develop

325
00:16:48,300 --> 00:16:51,540
this product was to have those
clear requirements upfront. So

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they did a very good job of
establishing what they called

327
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key performance parameters. And
that's basically, this is what a

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00:16:57,240 --> 00:17:01,590
hypersonic missile, a tactical
hypersonic system, has to do.

329
00:17:02,070 --> 00:17:04,920
And here they are, and they were
laid out up front and haven't

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changed, so we've been able to
really move with the speed that

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we need to, to get to early
operational capability, which

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is, which is the goal here.

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Arlen Kostival: And then first,
CPS and LRHW, I talked about

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00:17:16,890 --> 00:17:20,610
that trade study phase that we
went through from 2014 to 2018.

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And I think we had a fantastic
partnership with the government

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00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:27,090
there to study the trade offs
between requirements and how

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00:17:27,090 --> 00:17:30,630
that affected schedule for
operational readiness, right. So

338
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I think we've had a fantastic
partnership with the Army and

339
00:17:33,750 --> 00:17:37,080
the Navy, and very clear
requirements. I also want to

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00:17:37,080 --> 00:17:39,900
highlight that I think it's
important not just to have a

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00:17:39,900 --> 00:17:43,050
clear set of requirements, but
also a good tone and culture

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00:17:43,410 --> 00:17:47,010
around the urgency, right. And
so what that has looked like for

343
00:17:47,010 --> 00:17:52,500
us, is that our customers have
been very understanding of risks

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00:17:52,500 --> 00:17:56,280
associated with going fast. And
we see that, you know, in our

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day to day lives working on
these development programs, and

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in terms of you know, needing to
take some smart risks to get

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things going concurrently,
because we have fallen behind a

348
00:18:05,580 --> 00:18:08,520
little bit. And we're now
working very hard to catch up.

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John "Slick" Baum: Yeah, and I
want to jump on some of that you

350
00:18:10,340 --> 00:18:13,340
said Arlen is, you know, tone
and culture. And really what

351
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that boils down to is people
right, which is obviously the

352
00:18:16,520 --> 00:18:19,370
key component here, because you
all have been given one of the

353
00:18:19,370 --> 00:18:22,520
hardest tech problems that you
know, the United States has seen

354
00:18:22,520 --> 00:18:26,720
in a long time. So on the human
level, even, how do you begin? I

355
00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:29,450
mean, this just seems
overwhelming. And how did you

356
00:18:29,450 --> 00:18:32,690
break it down into a manageable
set of tasks, and you each have

357
00:18:32,690 --> 00:18:34,850
a unique perspective on this. So
Eric, let's get started with

358
00:18:34,850 --> 00:18:35,150
you.

359
00:18:35,130 --> 00:18:38,107
Eric Knutson: Yeah, excellent
observation. It really does come

360
00:18:38,169 --> 00:18:41,705
down to the people. We're
creating something that doesn't

361
00:18:41,767 --> 00:18:45,179
exist. There's no manual,
there's no education that you

362
00:18:45,241 --> 00:18:48,963
can get. You're creating afresh.
And it's not something new,

363
00:18:49,025 --> 00:18:53,057
we've all had opportunity in the
past to work X-7, -117, the U-2,

364
00:18:53,119 --> 00:18:56,717
SR-71. These were daunting
problems. The key to success in

365
00:18:56,779 --> 00:19:00,501
all these is to keep it simple.
What are the few things that

366
00:19:00,563 --> 00:19:04,409
you're really trying to achieve?
Don't try and boil the ocean,

367
00:19:04,471 --> 00:19:08,069
don't try invent everything
here. If something exists that

368
00:19:08,131 --> 00:19:12,101
solves the problem, let that be
part of the system. Focus on the

369
00:19:12,163 --> 00:19:15,947
key elements. And that's truly
what we've done in hypersonics

370
00:19:16,009 --> 00:19:19,793
or whether it was material for a
boost glide, how can we heal

371
00:19:19,855 --> 00:19:23,577
that heat? Whether it was how do
we get the airflow down the

372
00:19:23,639 --> 00:19:27,485
inlet per scramjet and keep that
inlet started? Let's focus on

373
00:19:27,547 --> 00:19:28,850
that. Keep it simple.

374
00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:33,100
Brian Schappacher: Yeah, and
this this is something Lockheed

375
00:19:33,100 --> 00:19:35,890
Martin, I mean, not even
specific to the ARRW program,

376
00:19:35,890 --> 00:19:39,520
but but it predates us in fact.
But Lockheed Martin recognized

377
00:19:39,550 --> 00:19:44,350
many years ago that you know,
it's very hard to have all of

378
00:19:44,350 --> 00:19:48,640
the experts you need co located
in one place for development. So

379
00:19:48,640 --> 00:19:51,880
they started as, or we started
as a as a corporation, rolling

380
00:19:51,880 --> 00:19:55,000
out tools that would allow you
know, if you have an expert in

381
00:19:55,000 --> 00:19:58,660
one part of the country and
another expert on the complete

382
00:19:58,660 --> 00:20:01,540
opposite end of the country,
they wanted rollout tools. So

383
00:20:01,540 --> 00:20:04,810
those those folks could
collaborate together and work

384
00:20:04,810 --> 00:20:08,260
together and not have to go and
colocate. So those were in

385
00:20:08,260 --> 00:20:13,480
place. When we started to work
on the ARRW program, I learned

386
00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:16,300
very quickly that there's just
no way that you're going to get

387
00:20:16,510 --> 00:20:20,020
all the experts on to one
Lockheed Martin campus to go and

388
00:20:20,020 --> 00:20:23,710
work this problem. But because
we had those tools in place, we

389
00:20:23,710 --> 00:20:26,680
didn't have to, we just, you
know, we had somebody, we have

390
00:20:26,680 --> 00:20:29,080
folks, you know, spread all
across the country, I think we

391
00:20:29,080 --> 00:20:31,240
have seven different Lockheed
Martin sites that are that are

392
00:20:31,240 --> 00:20:33,460
working this program all
together collaboratively,

393
00:20:33,460 --> 00:20:37,150
because we have all of those
tools in place. And really, that

394
00:20:37,150 --> 00:20:40,240
was one interesting thing with
COVID. You know, before COVID

395
00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:43,330
even made it popular to work in
these distributed virtual teams,

396
00:20:43,360 --> 00:20:46,030
ARRW was already doing it
because we had to, we had no

397
00:20:46,030 --> 00:20:48,280
other choice. That was the only
way we were going to get there.

398
00:20:49,020 --> 00:20:50,820
Arlen Kostival: And it's a
really good question in terms of

399
00:20:50,820 --> 00:20:53,460
how you break down a complex
problem like this. Being a

400
00:20:53,460 --> 00:20:55,740
systems engineer, I like to
think about it in terms of just

401
00:20:55,740 --> 00:20:58,890
following our standard
development cycle. We often call

402
00:20:58,890 --> 00:21:02,070
that the systems engineering V,
where you start at requirements

403
00:21:02,070 --> 00:21:05,010
and you break it down into
architecture, trade studies, and

404
00:21:05,280 --> 00:21:07,680
you go do some design, and work
your way back up and

405
00:21:07,680 --> 00:21:10,800
implementation and operations.
What makes this challenge

406
00:21:10,800 --> 00:21:14,190
particularly unique, though, is
the pace, right. We're trying to

407
00:21:14,220 --> 00:21:16,560
do something that would
typically take us five to 10

408
00:21:16,590 --> 00:21:20,160
years to mature to operational
readiness. We're trying to solve

409
00:21:20,160 --> 00:21:24,090
that problem in less than half
that time. So I think there's a

410
00:21:24,090 --> 00:21:27,030
few keys to success to doing
that, effectively. One, we're

411
00:21:27,030 --> 00:21:29,370
using a lot of model based
engineering tools. So I'm trying

412
00:21:29,370 --> 00:21:32,100
to work more in that, in the
digital world, to take advantage

413
00:21:32,100 --> 00:21:35,190
of that speed that comes with
digital communications and

414
00:21:35,190 --> 00:21:38,550
digital engineering. I mentioned
already, partnering very closely

415
00:21:38,550 --> 00:21:40,920
with your government
counterparts to establish clear

416
00:21:40,920 --> 00:21:45,030
requirements that are consistent
upfront has been huge. And then

417
00:21:45,060 --> 00:21:48,450
for Lockheed Martin, you know,
we've invested in a 65,000

418
00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:52,050
square foot factory in Cortland,
Alabama, it's becoming our

419
00:21:52,050 --> 00:21:55,440
production center for these
vehicles. And, you know, getting

420
00:21:55,440 --> 00:21:58,770
that started early, I think has
been really effective for us to

421
00:21:58,800 --> 00:22:01,290
think about, you know,
delivering vehicles before we've

422
00:22:01,290 --> 00:22:02,970
ever even finished the design
for them.

423
00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:06,150
John "Slick" Baum: Sure, again,
you're just continuing to make

424
00:22:06,150 --> 00:22:08,820
me think about this problem. And
I do want to keep focusing on

425
00:22:08,820 --> 00:22:11,310
people. And I don't want to
sound crass, but I'm a fighter

426
00:22:11,310 --> 00:22:14,280
pilot, so I'll try to try to
come off as cleanly as I can

427
00:22:14,280 --> 00:22:17,490
here. But you know, the folks
that delivered the X-15, I'm

428
00:22:17,490 --> 00:22:19,710
talking about the engineers in
the workforce, I mean, they're

429
00:22:19,710 --> 00:22:23,190
obviously largely dead. And the
government's on again, off

430
00:22:23,190 --> 00:22:26,820
again, approach to hypersonics
was really brutal on the experts

431
00:22:26,820 --> 00:22:30,240
in this workforce, you know,
over the decades after that. So

432
00:22:30,330 --> 00:22:33,360
how did you cultivate a new
bench of talent to to take this

433
00:22:33,390 --> 00:22:34,320
this project on?

434
00:22:34,000 --> 00:22:37,270
Eric Knutson: So Slick, like a
like a fighter pilot, although

435
00:22:37,270 --> 00:22:40,000
at some point, they may not
exist, what they touched and did

436
00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:43,450
lives on. And that's very much
the case with the hypersonic

437
00:22:43,450 --> 00:22:47,590
community of the 1960s. They
provided those little puzzle

438
00:22:47,590 --> 00:22:51,580
pieces that would form the
entire picture eventually. What

439
00:22:51,580 --> 00:22:55,540
it took was the computing
resources, the modeling and

440
00:22:55,540 --> 00:22:59,230
simulation, to stitch those all
together. But ultimately, you're

441
00:22:59,230 --> 00:23:02,230
absolutely right, it comes back
to the people. This is not a

442
00:23:02,230 --> 00:23:05,620
case where you can bring folks
in that are miles deep in their

443
00:23:05,620 --> 00:23:09,580
specialty, and they stay within
that box. This takes a unique

444
00:23:09,580 --> 00:23:13,750
set of individuals that can go
beyond their their comfort zone,

445
00:23:14,350 --> 00:23:17,770
they can operate without a
safety net, that can cross into

446
00:23:17,770 --> 00:23:20,890
all the disciplines that they
affect, to a great risk, take on

447
00:23:20,890 --> 00:23:24,250
that challenge, and put forth a
solution that we can go and

448
00:23:24,250 --> 00:23:24,880
test.

449
00:23:26,820 --> 00:23:35,910
Arlen Kostival: programs that
have been pretty effective. One,

450
00:23:37,140 --> 00:23:44,850
we're pairing younger employees
with folks from more established

451
00:23:44,850 --> 00:23:48,300
heritage programs that are doing
ballistics and ballistic missile

452
00:23:48,300 --> 00:23:51,450
defense to try and train those
skills for how you do missile

453
00:23:51,450 --> 00:23:54,030
development, not just for
hypersonic technology, but

454
00:23:54,090 --> 00:23:56,490
booster platforms as well. We've
also got some really good

455
00:23:56,490 --> 00:23:59,400
partnerships with like local
high schools and universities.

456
00:23:59,850 --> 00:24:03,420
And you know, in particular,
it's not just the design talent,

457
00:24:03,420 --> 00:24:06,210
but it's also manufacturing and
operations. We're trying to

458
00:24:06,210 --> 00:24:10,200
cultivate a good bench of folks
who are able to actually

459
00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:13,140
manufacture and test these
because they're not simple

460
00:24:13,380 --> 00:24:17,670
systems to manufacture either.
And then, you know, another

461
00:24:17,700 --> 00:24:20,100
element that's been really
important for us is the

462
00:24:20,100 --> 00:24:22,380
partnership that we've had, like
I've talked about, with our

463
00:24:22,380 --> 00:24:26,820
customers. We've had a lot of
Navy and Army and OSD senior

464
00:24:26,820 --> 00:24:30,870
leaders come down and visit our
factory, talk to our workforce

465
00:24:30,900 --> 00:24:34,050
and really inspire them and
motivate them to want to face

466
00:24:34,050 --> 00:24:36,240
this challenge. I think that's
been really effective.

467
00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:39,540
Brian Schappacher: And just to
add on to that, you know, as a

468
00:24:39,540 --> 00:24:42,570
corporation, really Lockheed
Martin has invested like well

469
00:24:42,570 --> 00:24:47,220
over $100 million in not just
internally but in suppliers and

470
00:24:47,220 --> 00:24:51,000
universities as Arlen said. So
we've been investing all over

471
00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:54,540
the place and developing that
bench that is needed to continue

472
00:24:54,540 --> 00:24:56,670
to move tech hypersonic
technology forward.

473
00:24:57,120 --> 00:24:59,310
John "Slick" Baum: Awesome.
Well, okay, so now you you all

474
00:24:59,310 --> 00:25:01,830
have your team, you've got your
requirements, and you've broken

475
00:25:01,830 --> 00:25:03,570
down the initial task. What's
next?

476
00:25:03,870 --> 00:25:06,150
Eric Knutson: Yeah, the next
step is really how you approach

477
00:25:06,150 --> 00:25:09,090
the problem, we tend to approach
it in the scientific approach,

478
00:25:09,120 --> 00:25:12,720
we will look at the systematic
observations and measurements,

479
00:25:12,750 --> 00:25:16,050
the experiments and formulation
testing and modification of our

480
00:25:16,050 --> 00:25:19,740
hypothesis. And as we go through
all of that, there's no doubt

481
00:25:19,770 --> 00:25:22,200
that something's not going to
work the way we expect it to.

482
00:25:22,230 --> 00:25:25,830
We're not going to have all the
data, and having the wherewithal

483
00:25:25,830 --> 00:25:29,670
and the readiness to lay out the
alternative approaches, and

484
00:25:29,700 --> 00:25:32,070
re-attack and modify our
hypothesis so that we can

485
00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:34,890
ultimately get to something that
works. But really it's just

486
00:25:34,890 --> 00:25:36,690
focusing on a scientific
approach.

487
00:25:36,990 --> 00:25:39,960
Brian Schappacher: And from ARRW
standpoint, we've really, really

488
00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:43,170
had to leverage digital
transformation and digital

489
00:25:43,170 --> 00:25:46,680
simulation models to move this
move this forward, you know. We

490
00:25:46,680 --> 00:25:50,160
develop these super complex
simulation models. So we were

491
00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:54,120
able to take a digital design of
the ARRW missile and stick it on

492
00:25:54,120 --> 00:25:58,380
a digital model of a B-52, and
fly missions all over the world,

493
00:25:58,380 --> 00:26:01,920
before we ever even built our
first component, You know, from

494
00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:05,250
those simulation models, you
start with scale, you know,

495
00:26:05,250 --> 00:26:07,500
scaled models that you would
bring to a wind tunnel, and

496
00:26:07,500 --> 00:26:12,570
actually collect some real data
on your, you know, your

497
00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:16,560
potential design that you are
going to move forward with. That

498
00:26:16,560 --> 00:26:19,260
includes hypersonic wind tunnel
strength as those exist as well.

499
00:26:19,260 --> 00:26:22,410
So you can collect hypersonic
data while you're sitting on the

500
00:26:22,410 --> 00:26:26,010
ground, then, you know, the next
step is really to start building

501
00:26:26,250 --> 00:26:28,860
hardware and developing software
that's going to control that

502
00:26:28,860 --> 00:26:31,560
hardware. We have very high
levels of simulation that we

503
00:26:31,560 --> 00:26:33,840
call our hardware in the loop,
that's kind of our graduation

504
00:26:33,840 --> 00:26:37,290
exercise where you actually
bring the real missile hardware

505
00:26:37,290 --> 00:26:40,140
and you set it up on a bench and
you make everything work

506
00:26:40,140 --> 00:26:43,020
together. And then you know,
we're, as we move into the

507
00:26:43,020 --> 00:26:44,970
flight test stage of the
program, you're constantly

508
00:26:44,970 --> 00:26:48,270
collecting that data that would
improve your simulation models,

509
00:26:48,270 --> 00:26:52,620
because it is way cheaper to
simulate, to simulate your

510
00:26:52,620 --> 00:26:54,690
flight or simulate your missile
than it is to go ahead and

511
00:26:54,690 --> 00:26:57,930
actually do a flight test. So we
rely very, very heavily on those

512
00:26:57,930 --> 00:26:58,800
digital models.

513
00:26:58,890 --> 00:27:01,050
John "Slick" Baum: Now,
obviously, this all sounds like

514
00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:04,830
you've got a plan, but I'm sure
that there were some challenges

515
00:27:04,830 --> 00:27:07,620
along the way. So can you
highlight what maybe some of

516
00:27:07,620 --> 00:27:09,930
your biggest challenges were
during this period and how you

517
00:27:09,930 --> 00:27:10,440
tackle them?

518
00:27:11,040 --> 00:27:14,370
Eric Knutson: The challenges
were constant and unrelenting.

519
00:27:14,400 --> 00:27:16,980
It'd be really easy to complain
about, well, I can't get wind

520
00:27:16,980 --> 00:27:20,400
tunnels, I can't get funds, I
can't get people, all these

521
00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:24,690
things are common challenges.
But the real challenge that we

522
00:27:24,690 --> 00:27:29,610
face is moving on, We cannot sit
here and expect to have 110%

523
00:27:29,610 --> 00:27:32,310
answers to every question. But
we need to be comfortable with

524
00:27:32,310 --> 00:27:36,720
saying, Okay, I've got my 80 or
90%. Let's move on. That's

525
00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:38,400
probably the biggest challenge
we face.

526
00:27:40,370 --> 00:27:42,260
Brian Schappacher: Yeah, and I
don't know that we as ARRW that

527
00:27:42,260 --> 00:27:45,410
we have, you know, we have the
secret formula. But I know the

528
00:27:45,410 --> 00:27:49,730
dedicated team is is a huge part
of how we could tackle these.

529
00:27:49,970 --> 00:27:52,190
And I'll just give one quick
example. You know, COVID,

530
00:27:52,190 --> 00:27:54,680
obviously has impacted
everybody. But in particular,

531
00:27:54,680 --> 00:27:57,740
when we were going out to do a
wind tunnel test, we had a whole

532
00:27:57,740 --> 00:28:01,970
team of engineers going out to
do that test. But COVID struck,

533
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:06,320
and everybody except for one
person was was either infected

534
00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:08,750
with COVID or had to go into
isolation and was not able to

535
00:28:08,750 --> 00:28:12,650
work. But instead of taking the
massive schedule hit that that

536
00:28:12,650 --> 00:28:15,350
would have been the one
remaining engineer, he said, You

537
00:28:15,350 --> 00:28:18,290
know what, I'm just gonna do it
and pulled double and triple

538
00:28:18,290 --> 00:28:21,890
duty, double shifts, triple
shifts, whatever it took to get

539
00:28:21,890 --> 00:28:24,830
it done. So we didn't have to
cancel that test. And I think if

540
00:28:24,830 --> 00:28:28,490
we didn't have people that were
dedicated like that, we just, we

541
00:28:28,490 --> 00:28:29,270
just couldn't get there.

542
00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:33,020
Arlen Kostival: You know,
communication, I think is one of

543
00:28:33,020 --> 00:28:35,960
the hardest challenges that we
face in trying to establish a

544
00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:39,050
really complicated system like
this very quickly. Brian

545
00:28:39,050 --> 00:28:41,930
mentioned that COVID obviously
made that a whole different

546
00:28:41,930 --> 00:28:45,830
ballgame. And I want to give a
shout out to kind of the unsung

547
00:28:45,830 --> 00:28:50,090
heroes of of that consequence,
right? So there were days for me

548
00:28:50,090 --> 00:28:52,730
and for a lot of folks on our
program where we would start

549
00:28:52,730 --> 00:28:55,910
some of our meetings at 7am.
And, you know, we're working

550
00:28:55,910 --> 00:28:58,490
from home, and we're just tied
to our computers and our phones

551
00:28:58,490 --> 00:29:01,250
until nine o'clock at night.
Meanwhile, you know, for me, my

552
00:29:01,250 --> 00:29:04,400
wife was bringing meals and
taking care of the house chores.

553
00:29:04,430 --> 00:29:07,820
And you know, can't thank her
enough for that support. And I

554
00:29:07,820 --> 00:29:10,370
know for a fact that there are
tons of examples like that all

555
00:29:10,370 --> 00:29:13,370
across my program of folks who
are extremely dedicated to this

556
00:29:13,370 --> 00:29:16,640
mission working very hard. But
the pace of communications makes

557
00:29:16,640 --> 00:29:19,220
it really challenging to make
sure that you're keeping in sync

558
00:29:19,220 --> 00:29:21,350
with everybody as you're as
you're moving fast.

559
00:29:21,470 --> 00:29:23,720
John "Slick" Baum: Yeah, no, and
I really appreciate that that

560
00:29:23,720 --> 00:29:26,870
point, Arlen and, you know,
brings me to to another thought

561
00:29:26,870 --> 00:29:29,630
that you know, obviously the
missile itself isn't just one

562
00:29:29,630 --> 00:29:31,970
thing. So let's talk about
integration. It's the sum of

563
00:29:31,970 --> 00:29:34,760
many components and independent
systems. So how did you guys

564
00:29:34,790 --> 00:29:36,680
bring all that these different
pieces together?

565
00:29:36,770 --> 00:29:38,750
Eric Knutson: And that is
definitely a challenge.

566
00:29:38,780 --> 00:29:42,560
Hypersonics is a strange beast
in that everything, absolutely

567
00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:45,920
everything, affects everything
else. So we early on had to

568
00:29:45,920 --> 00:29:50,450
create our analysis tools that
considered thermodynamics,

569
00:29:50,450 --> 00:29:54,560
aerodynamic structures and
stresses, all as one, as one

570
00:29:54,560 --> 00:29:58,910
closed loop. In many ways, what
we created soon became known as

571
00:29:58,910 --> 00:30:01,520
digital engineering. is
something that had to be created

572
00:30:01,520 --> 00:30:04,400
long before digital engineering
was possible in order for

573
00:30:04,400 --> 00:30:09,230
hypersonics to work. So it's all
about the entirety, you can't

574
00:30:09,230 --> 00:30:12,410
have an engine developed
independent of an inlet,

575
00:30:12,740 --> 00:30:15,770
independent of an airframe,
because they all affect the

576
00:30:15,770 --> 00:30:18,770
airflow. And this just runs
throughout hypersonics.

577
00:30:19,550 --> 00:30:21,710
Brian Schappacher: And I
mentioned previously about our

578
00:30:21,740 --> 00:30:24,560
distributed workforce and
grabbing experts, wherever they

579
00:30:24,560 --> 00:30:27,980
are. Well, that also means
you're developing the subsystems

580
00:30:27,980 --> 00:30:30,770
and major subsystems and
different parts of the country.

581
00:30:30,800 --> 00:30:33,800
So we took the approach on on
ARRW to really divide the

582
00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:36,740
missile up into three major
subsystems. So you do all that

583
00:30:36,740 --> 00:30:40,760
integration from the minor
subsystems into one major

584
00:30:40,760 --> 00:30:43,730
subsystem. And then you bring,
once you once you get all those

585
00:30:43,730 --> 00:30:46,910
fully integrated, you can bring
all three pieces together, and

586
00:30:46,910 --> 00:30:48,710
really test how the whole system
works.

587
00:30:48,690 --> 00:30:51,067
Arlen Kostival: And Slick, I
think you touched on a really

588
00:30:51,124 --> 00:30:54,576
important point there, right,
it's more than just the missile

589
00:30:54,633 --> 00:30:58,143
system. We like to think about
hypersonics as being, you know,

590
00:30:58,199 --> 00:31:01,426
the vehicles themselves, but
there's a whole lot of other

591
00:31:01,482 --> 00:31:04,652
infrastructure you have to
develop to make these systems

592
00:31:04,709 --> 00:31:07,596
tactically capable. Weapon
control system, launcher

593
00:31:07,652 --> 00:31:11,049
platforms, canister systems,
logistics, training, readiness,

594
00:31:11,105 --> 00:31:14,275
all of these need to come
together and mesh perfectly as

595
00:31:14,332 --> 00:31:17,615
you integrate at the system
level for customers to be able

596
00:31:17,671 --> 00:31:21,068
to take these capabilities and
actually deploy them. And you

597
00:31:21,124 --> 00:31:24,521
know, there again, communication
to ensure that everybody is

598
00:31:24,577 --> 00:31:27,691
passing clean requirements
across interfaces is really,

599
00:31:27,747 --> 00:31:28,710
really important.

600
00:31:29,110 --> 00:31:31,300
John "Slick" Baum: Yeah,
absolutely. And I do want to

601
00:31:31,300 --> 00:31:33,850
focus on one thing I mean, you
know, I know I'm a knuckle

602
00:31:33,850 --> 00:31:36,220
dragger fighter pilot here. But
you know, the propulsion piece

603
00:31:36,220 --> 00:31:39,520
is so interesting to me. And
it's obviously a huge element

604
00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:42,070
in, you know, the successful
piece of a hypersonic missile.

605
00:31:42,070 --> 00:31:43,930
So how did you approach the
challenge? And it because I

606
00:31:43,930 --> 00:31:46,780
think it's really important for
our listeners to understand that

607
00:31:46,780 --> 00:31:50,230
there's such a huge difference
between propulsion for subsonic

608
00:31:50,230 --> 00:31:52,690
and supersonic flight versus
what's required for your

609
00:31:52,690 --> 00:31:54,010
challenge of hypersonic flight.

610
00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:56,610
Eric Knutson: Oh, absolutely.
It's all about energy and energy

611
00:31:56,610 --> 00:31:59,730
management, whether it's a boost
glide, or an air breathing

612
00:31:59,730 --> 00:32:02,970
system, it all starts off with
getting boosted up to an

613
00:32:02,970 --> 00:32:06,450
incredible velocity. So a lot of
similarity there. And it comes

614
00:32:06,450 --> 00:32:10,110
down to how do I create that
energy and somehow deal with all

615
00:32:10,110 --> 00:32:14,490
the heat, and the shock and
vibration of that much energy

616
00:32:14,490 --> 00:32:17,940
being expended in a short period
of time. For the air breathing,

617
00:32:17,970 --> 00:32:21,960
it gets additionally, more
complicated, in that I need to

618
00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:25,350
have an inlet, and they talk
about the inlet in terms of

619
00:32:25,380 --> 00:32:28,710
being started. Air has to be
able to flow down that inlet and

620
00:32:28,710 --> 00:32:31,680
get to a ramjet, or scramjet. If
you go back to something like

621
00:32:31,680 --> 00:32:36,120
the SR-71, they saw that by
having kind of a probe that

622
00:32:36,120 --> 00:32:41,070
would move almost three feet,
aft and forward, so that they

623
00:32:41,070 --> 00:32:44,340
could keep the shockwaves where
they need to be. That was over a

624
00:32:44,340 --> 00:32:48,360
couple Mach speed range. Now
you're getting up into

625
00:32:48,360 --> 00:32:52,140
hypersonics. So huge ranges that
you have to cover. And you need

626
00:32:52,140 --> 00:32:54,540
to be able to do that without
having all sorts of moving

627
00:32:54,540 --> 00:32:57,960
parts. So it became much more of
a challenge. I don't know,

628
00:32:57,960 --> 00:33:00,540
Brian, tell us a little bit
about how it affected the boost

629
00:33:00,540 --> 00:33:00,840
glide.

630
00:33:00,870 --> 00:33:03,390
Brian Schappacher: Well, I think
about it from just the size of

631
00:33:03,390 --> 00:33:07,140
the booster too. You hit on it.
From a boost glide, that's where

632
00:33:07,140 --> 00:33:10,260
all the energy is coming from is
from the booster to get there,

633
00:33:10,260 --> 00:33:13,350
to get to your target. But then
you think of an ARRW, that's got

634
00:33:13,350 --> 00:33:16,920
to go on an airplane, well, you
know, an airplane can't carry an

635
00:33:16,950 --> 00:33:19,620
unlimited amount of weight. So
you really have to balance that

636
00:33:19,770 --> 00:33:23,490
booster and how much thrust and
how much you need to get out of

637
00:33:23,490 --> 00:33:26,040
a booster, versus what the
airplane can carry as well to

638
00:33:26,040 --> 00:33:28,890
ensure that you're still able to
meet your mission, and

639
00:33:28,890 --> 00:33:31,650
obviously, you know, do it at
hypersonic speeds.

640
00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:32,980
John "Slick" Baum: Well, yeah, I
mean, you talked about

641
00:33:33,010 --> 00:33:35,410
obviously, energy management and
building up energy and

642
00:33:35,410 --> 00:33:39,130
dissipating energy, obviously a
huge challenge. And I know I'm

643
00:33:39,130 --> 00:33:41,620
not spoiling anything for our
listeners, because I'm sure

644
00:33:41,620 --> 00:33:44,590
everybody has seen Top Gun 2
now, I'm just, you know, excited

645
00:33:44,590 --> 00:33:47,860
that Maverick can punch out at
Mach 10 and still walk into a

646
00:33:47,860 --> 00:33:50,830
bar and get a drink. So, but
back on focus here, I want to

647
00:33:51,100 --> 00:33:53,950
ask you what else is really
unique to a hypersonic system

648
00:33:53,950 --> 00:33:55,330
that we might not know about.

649
00:33:55,000 --> 00:33:58,030
Brian Schappacher: So one area
that comes to my mind is all of

650
00:33:58,030 --> 00:34:01,030
your subsystem, we talked about
the system being made up of a

651
00:34:01,030 --> 00:34:05,380
bunch of subsystems, well, each
of those have a specific job to

652
00:34:05,380 --> 00:34:07,780
do, but when it comes to
hypersonics, they have to do it

653
00:34:07,780 --> 00:34:11,020
so much faster. You know, you
may, in a more traditional

654
00:34:11,020 --> 00:34:13,900
cruise missile, you may not
worry so much about the time it

655
00:34:13,900 --> 00:34:17,770
takes for a subsystem to
initialize or be ready to do its

656
00:34:17,770 --> 00:34:21,790
job. But in hypersonics you
don't. Time is really not a

657
00:34:21,790 --> 00:34:25,750
luxury that you have because
everything happens so fast.

658
00:34:25,780 --> 00:34:28,810
Something else that that's
unique is the plasma layer. So

659
00:34:28,810 --> 00:34:31,660
when you're going that fast and
you're heating the air around

660
00:34:31,660 --> 00:34:34,900
and creating these massive
amounts of pressure and heat as

661
00:34:34,900 --> 00:34:37,270
you're flying through the
atmosphere, you're actually

662
00:34:37,270 --> 00:34:41,620
super heating it and creating
plasma. And understanding you

663
00:34:41,620 --> 00:34:45,280
know, your control strategy and
how you're actually going to fly

664
00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:48,340
through that or how your
electronic systems are going to

665
00:34:48,460 --> 00:34:51,310
operate through that, those are
those are definitely challenges

666
00:34:51,310 --> 00:34:54,550
that your your design has to
handle for sure. Something else

667
00:34:54,550 --> 00:34:58,210
that's probably unique to is is
Paschen's law, or Paschen's

668
00:34:58,210 --> 00:35:01,420
curve. This is something
Freidrich Paschen discovered,

669
00:35:01,420 --> 00:35:05,110
that as you reduce the pressure
on a gas, the voltage required

670
00:35:05,110 --> 00:35:08,650
for electricity to actually arc
between two conductors, that

671
00:35:08,650 --> 00:35:11,980
voltage decreases as well. And
when you start getting into the

672
00:35:11,980 --> 00:35:15,610
hypersonic realm where we know
that we're flying higher, where

673
00:35:15,610 --> 00:35:19,090
the atmosphere, there's less
pressure, that voltage starts to

674
00:35:19,090 --> 00:35:22,390
come down. And depending on how
you design your system, or

675
00:35:22,390 --> 00:35:24,820
choose your components, you may
start to be affected by that,

676
00:35:25,150 --> 00:35:28,870
where you know, everything,
everything in the world today is

677
00:35:28,870 --> 00:35:31,210
smaller and closer together, you
think of your cell phones are

678
00:35:31,210 --> 00:35:34,150
getting smaller and smaller.
Well, that means the little

679
00:35:34,210 --> 00:35:37,360
electrical components inside of
there are getting more compact,

680
00:35:37,360 --> 00:35:39,790
and your pins are getting closer
together. Well, that may not

681
00:35:39,790 --> 00:35:42,700
work if you're in an area where
where Paschens Lawn comes into

682
00:35:42,700 --> 00:35:45,520
play. So you just have to be
very careful with your design

683
00:35:45,520 --> 00:35:48,250
and just understand all of those
effects as you're as you're

684
00:35:48,250 --> 00:35:48,790
going through.

685
00:35:49,350 --> 00:35:51,570
Arlen Kostival: And Slick, I
think it's really important that

686
00:35:51,570 --> 00:35:55,230
you mentioned the hypersonic
system, right? So I think when

687
00:35:55,230 --> 00:35:58,230
you look outside of just the
missiles, and the launchers and

688
00:35:58,920 --> 00:36:02,190
control stuff, it's also really
important to pay attention to

689
00:36:02,190 --> 00:36:04,620
the fact that you need a very
robust intelligence

690
00:36:04,620 --> 00:36:07,620
infrastructure to be able to
make good use of these systems.

691
00:36:07,620 --> 00:36:11,820
And in a tactical scenario, you
need really fast, credible,

692
00:36:11,820 --> 00:36:15,570
reliable info on potential
targets. And that's, you know, I

693
00:36:15,570 --> 00:36:19,440
think, impact outside of just
the Army, Air Force, Navy

694
00:36:19,470 --> 00:36:22,440
environment that that we're
seeing with the creation of this

695
00:36:22,440 --> 00:36:24,810
capability from an operational
standpoint as well.

696
00:36:25,020 --> 00:36:26,700
John "Slick" Baum: I really
appreciate it because, you know,

697
00:36:26,700 --> 00:36:29,460
again, these are the experts
that we're discussing this stuff

698
00:36:29,460 --> 00:36:32,790
with, and you all have, we've
really been talking up to this

699
00:36:32,790 --> 00:36:36,450
point about the concept and
getting to the phase of having

700
00:36:36,450 --> 00:36:39,480
something real. So when did you
really think you were turning

701
00:36:39,480 --> 00:36:41,670
the corner from a science
project to something that was

702
00:36:41,670 --> 00:36:44,190
really going to be able to be
built and flown? And I don't

703
00:36:44,190 --> 00:36:46,290
mean, as you know, to sound
insulting would say, but, you

704
00:36:46,290 --> 00:36:48,660
know, I have to think that
there's a window where you're

705
00:36:48,660 --> 00:36:51,180
literally, you know, studying
how you'll overcome some of

706
00:36:51,180 --> 00:36:53,550
these challenges, and then
you'll start, you start to see

707
00:36:53,550 --> 00:36:55,950
it come together into real
physical being.

708
00:36:56,250 --> 00:36:59,160
Eric Knutson: It's interesting,
you know, as a pilot, one of the

709
00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:02,640
monitors that we wear is, it's
hours of sheer boredom

710
00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:07,320
interrupted by moments of
absolute terror. In hypersonics,

711
00:37:07,350 --> 00:37:10,800
if something goes wrong, it goes
wrong really, really fast. So

712
00:37:10,800 --> 00:37:14,100
it's a little bit opposite. It's
every moment is sheer terror.

713
00:37:14,280 --> 00:37:18,030
Everything has to be done just
properly. And it's when you can

714
00:37:18,030 --> 00:37:21,990
get everything to work together
as design, that you start to see

715
00:37:21,990 --> 00:37:25,470
that that turn. And for me, that
kind of happened, as we were

716
00:37:25,470 --> 00:37:29,190
going through numerous
tunneltests and various ground

717
00:37:29,190 --> 00:37:33,180
tests, where we proved out, yes,
we can actually predict what's

718
00:37:33,180 --> 00:37:37,890
going to happen. And as the
these became a majority, and

719
00:37:37,890 --> 00:37:41,700
then everything was predicted,
just as it turned out, it kind

720
00:37:41,700 --> 00:37:44,640
of gave us that satisfaction
that you know what, even though

721
00:37:44,640 --> 00:37:47,100
we cannot do everything on the
ground, our predictive

722
00:37:47,100 --> 00:37:50,430
capabilities are now such that I
think we can go and fly and fly

723
00:37:50,430 --> 00:37:51,300
successfully.

724
00:37:51,900 --> 00:37:53,280
Brian Schappacher: And I
remember this pretty

725
00:37:53,280 --> 00:37:55,800
specifically as well, you know,
I talked about computer models,

726
00:37:55,800 --> 00:37:59,040
and we spent so much of the
early days of the program in the

727
00:37:59,040 --> 00:38:02,670
computer models and making it
work on a computer screen. Well,

728
00:38:02,670 --> 00:38:06,390
as you mentioned, you know, Tom
Cruise went Mach 10 in a manned

729
00:38:06,390 --> 00:38:09,840
jet on a on a computer screen.
But  that's a whole different

730
00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,000
ballgame when you bring it off
the screen and you actually

731
00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:14,580
bring the hardware together. So
the first time I witnessed a

732
00:38:14,580 --> 00:38:17,400
hardware in the loop test, this
is where we actually take all of

733
00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:20,250
the missile subsystems that
really make up an ARRW missile,

734
00:38:20,940 --> 00:38:24,150
we stick them on a bench and
plug them all in together. And

735
00:38:24,150 --> 00:38:29,430
we actually have them work
together to complete a simulated

736
00:38:29,430 --> 00:38:32,820
mission where every every
subsystem has to do its job,

737
00:38:33,060 --> 00:38:35,880
with its precise timing, seeing
that all come together and work

738
00:38:35,880 --> 00:38:38,160
you know, all these things that
are coming from all these

739
00:38:38,160 --> 00:38:40,560
various parts of the country all
coming together to one and

740
00:38:40,560 --> 00:38:43,800
actually working. That's when
that's when I knew that this is,

741
00:38:43,830 --> 00:38:44,880
Yep, this is gonna work.

742
00:38:45,300 --> 00:38:47,490
Arlen Kostival: And just real
quick, the the moment for me was

743
00:38:47,490 --> 00:38:50,070
the first time I walked out into
our factory in Cortland,

744
00:38:50,070 --> 00:38:54,360
Alabama, and I saw, you know,
major components of our first

745
00:38:54,360 --> 00:38:57,150
vehicles being worked on and
assembled by these incredibly

746
00:38:57,150 --> 00:39:00,030
dedicated people, you know, just
getting a chance to meet with

747
00:39:00,060 --> 00:39:03,060
with those technicians and
manufacturing engineers who had

748
00:39:03,060 --> 00:39:05,280
been bringing this stuff to life
while I've been sitting in

749
00:39:05,280 --> 00:39:08,820
Denver working on CAD models, it
was a really important moment.

750
00:39:08,820 --> 00:39:12,210
And that's what I knew when I
saw the passion in their faces

751
00:39:12,480 --> 00:39:14,400
as they were working on all this
stuff. That's when I knew that

752
00:39:14,400 --> 00:39:16,770
we were we were doing something
pretty big and we were on a

753
00:39:16,770 --> 00:39:17,790
pretty exciting mission.

754
00:39:18,330 --> 00:39:20,520
John "Slick" Baum: Alright, so
I've got to ask what's next? It

755
00:39:20,520 --> 00:39:23,400
sounds like you have an article.
Do you just hanging on a B-52

756
00:39:23,400 --> 00:39:26,070
and go launch it? Or is there a
big regiment of ground testing

757
00:39:26,070 --> 00:39:27,120
that has to be done first?

758
00:39:27,110 --> 00:39:29,145
Brian Schappacher: You're a
pilot, you know that. No, it's

759
00:39:29,197 --> 00:39:32,224
definitely not that simple.
Maybe it is in the movies, but

760
00:39:32,276 --> 00:39:35,564
not in real life. You know, from
from our standpoint, safety of

761
00:39:35,550 --> 00:40:09,660
I appreciate all of that to the
discussion. And it really cuts

762
00:39:35,616 --> 00:39:38,800
the aircrew is paramount. So
it's not just you know, Lockheed

763
00:39:38,852 --> 00:39:41,722
Martin obviously is very
concerned about safety. So our

764
00:39:41,775 --> 00:39:45,062
the range safety officers and so
are the aircraft community and

765
00:39:45,115 --> 00:39:48,037
so are the pilots. So we're,
there's all these different

766
00:39:48,089 --> 00:39:51,116
safety boards that want to
review your design, review your

767
00:39:51,169 --> 00:39:54,404
testing data, so you can prove
to them that this thing is safe

768
00:39:54,456 --> 00:39:57,744
to hang on an aircraft. And that
includes, you know, we have to

769
00:39:57,797 --> 00:40:00,928
do integration testing with an
aircraft, right, software and

770
00:40:00,980 --> 00:40:03,903
hardware integration testing
with the aircraft itself to

771
00:40:03,955 --> 00:40:06,721
check out how the two systems
interact. We have to do

772
00:40:06,773 --> 00:40:09,696
compatibility tests where we
make sure that that all the

773
00:40:09,748 --> 00:40:12,566
electrical systems on the
aircraft are not interfering

774
00:40:10,020 --> 00:40:26,910
to the important part of
innovation, that's learning

775
00:40:12,618 --> 00:40:15,802
with the missile, but also that
the missile isn't interfering

776
00:40:15,854 --> 00:40:19,142
with the aircraft. And once you
clear all of those hurdles, you

777
00:40:19,194 --> 00:40:22,064
are granted a limited flight
clearance, which really is

778
00:40:22,117 --> 00:40:24,570
you're okay to go ahead and test
at this point.

779
00:40:27,690 --> 00:40:32,550
through failure. You know,
obviously, Congress and others

780
00:40:32,550 --> 00:40:36,060
want to see immaculate results
from day one. But I think most

781
00:40:36,060 --> 00:40:38,130
of us would argue that it's
pretty unrealistic, especially

782
00:40:38,130 --> 00:40:40,380
for such a tough program, as our
listeners know, that you guys

783
00:40:40,380 --> 00:40:43,260
have an incredible feat in front
of you. So if your batting

784
00:40:43,260 --> 00:40:45,480
average is too high, it may be
safe to say that you're not

785
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:48,120
pushing up hard enough. And
leaders need to give programs

786
00:40:48,120 --> 00:40:50,850
top cover to allow for this
learning. And that's a hard

787
00:40:50,850 --> 00:40:52,830
task. So can you walk us through
your thoughts on that?

788
00:40:52,860 --> 00:40:57,360
Yeah, I mean, you know, we're
maturing technology, really

789
00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:01,170
quickly. And sometimes
challenges arise there. I think,

790
00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:04,320
I think SpaceX is a really good
example of a company that that

791
00:41:04,350 --> 00:41:07,230
does a lot of learning from,
from failure. I mean, if you, if

792
00:41:07,230 --> 00:41:09,810
you look at them in the
beginning, they, they were going

793
00:41:09,810 --> 00:41:12,990
to launch a payload into space,
and then land they're boosters

794
00:41:12,990 --> 00:41:16,170
back on a barge either in the
Atlantic or back on the launch

795
00:41:16,170 --> 00:41:19,560
pad that they they left from or
right next to it. So that can be

796
00:41:19,560 --> 00:41:23,670
reused. And, you know, they're
very, very well covered. They

797
00:41:23,670 --> 00:41:26,730
had some mishaps in the
beginning of their program as

798
00:41:26,730 --> 00:41:29,250
well, but look where they are
now. I mean, it's almost second

799
00:41:29,250 --> 00:41:31,950
nature. And I myself, as
somebody that lives in Central

800
00:41:31,950 --> 00:41:36,390
Florida, I mean, it's almost,
you see so many launches, all

801
00:41:36,390 --> 00:41:39,480
the time, it's almost second
nature now with how well they're

802
00:41:39,480 --> 00:41:41,790
doing, you don't even consider
all of the challenges that they

803
00:41:41,790 --> 00:41:44,490
had to go through in the
beginning. And hypersonics is

804
00:41:44,490 --> 00:41:46,800
definitely like that, you know,
where we really are pushing the

805
00:41:46,800 --> 00:41:50,100
envelope of what's possible at
an extremely rapid pace. So

806
00:41:50,100 --> 00:41:52,770
yeah, that opens yourself up to
the possibility that sometimes

807
00:41:52,770 --> 00:41:55,470
things aren't going to go
exactly as you planned them. I

808
00:41:55,470 --> 00:41:58,260
think from ARRW's standpoint,
our customer has been extremely

809
00:41:58,260 --> 00:42:01,800
supportive here. You know,
obviously, everybody, including

810
00:42:01,800 --> 00:42:04,530
our customer would have
preferred that we'd meet all of

811
00:42:04,530 --> 00:42:07,380
our objectives during every
single flight test. But you

812
00:42:07,380 --> 00:42:10,230
know, when we did have a less
than desired results, the

813
00:42:10,230 --> 00:42:12,990
approach from our customer
really was, you know, they come

814
00:42:12,990 --> 00:42:15,660
into the room and say, Okay,
what did we learn? How fast can

815
00:42:15,660 --> 00:42:19,440
we recover, and go try this
again. So the focus has been on

816
00:42:19,440 --> 00:42:22,110
learning from from day one. And
that's why, you know, a lot of

817
00:42:22,110 --> 00:42:25,260
these test missiles are very
highly instrumented, so we can

818
00:42:25,260 --> 00:42:29,460
collect as much data as
possible. So even if we don't

819
00:42:29,460 --> 00:42:33,360
get quite all of our objectives
complete, there is a ton of of

820
00:42:33,360 --> 00:42:37,080
data, and a ton of learning to
come out of that. Yeah, I

821
00:42:37,000 --> 00:42:38,710
John "Slick" Baum: couldn't
agree more. And you know, one of

822
00:42:38,710 --> 00:42:41,500
the things that's a lot tougher
for you is you have those

823
00:42:41,500 --> 00:42:43,990
requirements, I mean, that if a
company you were mentioning

824
00:42:43,990 --> 00:42:47,320
before, they had no requirements
to land something on a barge.

825
00:42:47,320 --> 00:42:49,330
They just did it, because it
made sense for their business

826
00:42:49,330 --> 00:42:52,570
model. And, you know, obviously,
you know, they can fail and keep

827
00:42:52,570 --> 00:42:55,180
failing, as long as they have
the bankroll to do it. And it's

828
00:42:55,180 --> 00:42:57,790
just a totally different
scenario. So you guys are really

829
00:42:57,790 --> 00:43:00,040
crushing it with the fact that
you do have stringent

830
00:43:00,040 --> 00:43:02,950
requirements, you know, for the
taxpayer, and you're being great

831
00:43:02,950 --> 00:43:06,040
stewards of all of that. So, you
know, I do want to fast forward

832
00:43:06,040 --> 00:43:08,710
to, you know, some main factors
that we'll be tracking, you

833
00:43:08,710 --> 00:43:11,830
know, as ARRW is meeting its
design objectives and thinking

834
00:43:11,830 --> 00:43:13,600
about launching potentially next
spring, right.

835
00:43:13,000 --> 00:43:23,800
Awesome. So I'm going to shake
things up on the Aerospace

836
00:43:13,590 --> 00:43:15,862
Brian Schappacher: Yeah, I mean,
we still have upcoming flight

837
00:43:15,915 --> 00:43:18,927
tests, we've completed our
booster test series, which was

838
00:43:18,980 --> 00:43:22,151
really all about, you know,
mainly focused on validating the

839
00:43:22,204 --> 00:43:25,375
performance of the booster. So
now we're moving into what we

840
00:43:24,490 --> 00:43:57,640
Advantage here because I have a
few questions that I really want

841
00:43:25,428 --> 00:43:28,546
call the all up round test
series, which is which is end to

842
00:43:28,599 --> 00:43:32,034
end, right. We're still going to
focus on booster performance, of

843
00:43:32,087 --> 00:43:35,205
course, but we're going to shift
some focus on to the, some

844
00:43:35,258 --> 00:43:38,112
additional focus on to the
glider performance. So yep,

845
00:43:38,165 --> 00:43:41,441
there are flight tests upcoming
for the for all up rounds, and

846
00:43:41,494 --> 00:43:44,824
you know, just keep an eye out
in the news. And as you see, you

847
00:43:44,877 --> 00:43:47,731
know, in the way that we've
structured our flight test

848
00:43:47,783 --> 00:43:51,060
program, you can think of each
subsequent flight tests being a

849
00:43:51,113 --> 00:43:54,442
little harder than the previous
one. So there are a lot of test

850
00:43:54,495 --> 00:43:57,402
points very early on in the
program, we worked with the

851
00:43:57,455 --> 00:44:00,679
customer and said, alright, you
have, here's all these things

852
00:44:00,732 --> 00:44:03,850
you have to do, you know, the
key performance parameters we

853
00:44:00,760 --> 00:44:12,010
to answer. So we're gonna go a
lightning round here. What are

854
00:44:03,903 --> 00:44:07,179
talked about. And here's all of
the different flight tests and

855
00:44:07,232 --> 00:44:10,562
test points and test objectives
that you're going to have to go

856
00:44:10,614 --> 00:44:13,997
through to prove to us that ARRW
works and ARRW is ready for the

857
00:44:12,100 --> 00:44:14,560
the things that keep you up at
night at this stage?

858
00:44:14,050 --> 00:44:17,168
warfighter. So as we said, we've
successfully completed the

859
00:44:14,560 --> 00:44:17,500
You know, it's not necessarily
the hypersonic elements that

860
00:44:17,221 --> 00:44:20,445
booster test series. And we're
about to move on to the all up

861
00:44:18,430 --> 00:44:33,700
keep me up at night. It's all
the basic stuff that you're

862
00:44:20,497 --> 00:44:23,193
round test series and just
continue to build off of

863
00:44:23,246 --> 00:44:26,100
everything that we learned in
the booster test series.

864
00:44:43,240 --> 00:44:46,720
including in the system, that's
off the shelf, that we know

865
00:44:46,720 --> 00:44:52,030
works, that fails. It's
overlooking the obvious that

866
00:44:52,030 --> 00:44:53,080
keeps me up at night.

867
00:44:54,400 --> 00:44:57,940
Yeah, and for ARRW, you know, we
have more more missiles to build

868
00:44:57,940 --> 00:45:01,360
and more flight tests to get
through and complete than we've

869
00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:03,880
had at any other time in this
program with the goal of

870
00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:07,120
reaching the early operational
capability in 2023. So there's,

871
00:45:07,360 --> 00:45:10,210
there's just a lot going on. And
it's an extremely aggressive

872
00:45:10,540 --> 00:45:13,570
schedule. So you know, that that
keeps me up at night, just

873
00:45:13,570 --> 00:45:16,900
making sure that we can meet all
of those commitments. But as I

874
00:45:16,900 --> 00:45:19,840
mentioned, the ARRW team that we
have, we still have that team.

875
00:45:19,870 --> 00:45:22,000
So we still have all those
dedicated people that want to

876
00:45:22,000 --> 00:45:23,890
see this through. So I'm
confident that we're gonna be

877
00:45:23,890 --> 00:45:24,460
able to get there.

878
00:45:24,000 --> 00:45:27,360
Arlen Kostival: Yes, like, it's
a funny question to ask

879
00:45:24,000 --> 00:45:31,440
Hey, you know, I do appreciate
the transparency answering that

880
00:45:27,360 --> 00:45:29,430
engineers, because they kind of
pay us to worry about all the

881
00:45:29,430 --> 00:45:32,250
things that are gonna go wrong,
right. But for me, it's the

882
00:45:32,250 --> 00:45:35,850
integration of the big elements
of this system that need to go

883
00:45:32,490 --> 00:45:38,520
question. Okay, so next
lightning question is looking

884
00:45:35,850 --> 00:45:39,150
together, right, to take a
missile and put it on a truck,

885
00:45:38,880 --> 00:45:51,090
back on everything that you've
accomplished so far? What are

886
00:45:39,180 --> 00:45:42,480
or put it on a boat or put it on
an airplane, have it talk

887
00:45:42,510 --> 00:45:45,870
effectively to those systems
have the fire control, you know,

888
00:45:45,870 --> 00:45:48,390
algorithms working properly. So
it's that little voice that's in

889
00:45:48,390 --> 00:45:49,950
the back of your head, that's,
you know, just kind of

890
00:45:49,950 --> 00:45:52,620
wondering, What if one of those
little details got missed and

891
00:45:51,090 --> 00:46:29,910
the biggest surprises and
lessons learned?

892
00:45:52,620 --> 00:45:56,130
what what could the consequences
be? But I will say that from all

893
00:45:56,130 --> 00:45:59,730
the ground testing that we've
done on CPS and LRHW, so far,

894
00:45:59,730 --> 00:46:03,390
I've been very impressed with a
demonstration of the the pieces

895
00:46:03,390 --> 00:46:06,750
of this system coming together.
And I have full faith in the

896
00:46:06,870 --> 00:46:09,090
technical strength of our
engineering team to solve these

897
00:46:09,090 --> 00:46:12,600
problems quickly. So very
excited to look, looking forward

898
00:46:12,600 --> 00:46:16,260
to an upcoming integrated system
test for LRHW, where we're going

899
00:46:16,260 --> 00:46:18,510
to be clicking all those pieces
together and watching them all

900
00:46:18,510 --> 00:46:18,960
work.

901
00:46:31,080 --> 00:46:33,930
Eric Knutson: Short answer,
there's no limit to what you can

902
00:46:33,930 --> 00:46:36,600
achieve, if you don't know that
it's impossible.

903
00:46:38,370 --> 00:46:40,110
Brian Schappacher: I like that,
Eric. I think for me, you know,

904
00:46:40,110 --> 00:46:42,780
we haven't really talked about
ARRW being designated a Section

905
00:46:42,780 --> 00:46:48,150
804 rapid development program,
but that basically, as part of

906
00:46:48,150 --> 00:46:50,580
the contract award was, hey,
you're agreeing that you're

907
00:46:50,580 --> 00:46:55,440
going to go really fast. So I
mean, we, Lockheed Martin had to

908
00:46:55,440 --> 00:46:58,770
learn how to do that. But beyond
that the industry did as well. I

909
00:46:58,770 --> 00:47:01,410
mean, I can think of times
where, you know, there may be a,

910
00:47:01,560 --> 00:47:03,630
I don't know, environmental
test, or some tests that you

911
00:47:03,630 --> 00:47:06,420
want to do, where the facility
you're gonna go to would say,

912
00:47:06,420 --> 00:47:09,720
hey, I need this information, 30
days ahead of when you're going

913
00:47:09,720 --> 00:47:13,410
to test well, on a Section 804
rapid development, that

914
00:47:13,410 --> 00:47:16,350
information may not be available
until 15 days before you need to

915
00:47:16,350 --> 00:47:21,600
test. So you know, going back to
that organization and saying,

916
00:47:21,600 --> 00:47:24,600
hey, well, can we give it to you
in 15 days? And having them,

917
00:47:25,200 --> 00:47:28,740
Well, I don't know, yes,
actually, you can. Let's work

918
00:47:28,740 --> 00:47:31,380
with you and make this happen.
But that whole world that had to

919
00:47:31,380 --> 00:47:34,470
be navigated as well was was was
a bit of a surprise to me.

920
00:47:35,230 --> 00:47:37,690
Arlen Kostival: Yeah. And then I
think for me, I've got three

921
00:47:37,690 --> 00:47:40,720
main lessons learned out of the
experience I've had for the last

922
00:47:40,720 --> 00:47:43,720
few years working on
hypersonics. One is that

923
00:47:43,720 --> 00:47:47,110
communication is extremely
important. And the pace and

924
00:47:47,110 --> 00:47:50,680
quality of your communication
tends to drive the pace and

925
00:47:50,680 --> 00:47:54,010
quality of your development. So
in general, areas that we've

926
00:47:54,010 --> 00:47:56,770
seen some challenges have been
areas where we can kind of see

927
00:47:56,770 --> 00:47:59,770
communication breakdowns. And
that's been very interesting to

928
00:47:59,770 --> 00:48:03,190
correlate. Taking risks is
something that I think, is a

929
00:48:03,190 --> 00:48:06,400
little uncomfortable for, I'll
say, the traditional aerospace

930
00:48:06,400 --> 00:48:09,850
development approach. And I
think we're learning that kind

931
00:48:09,850 --> 00:48:13,270
of a build, test, learn and
iterate approach can be very

932
00:48:13,270 --> 00:48:17,200
effective. And you can never
discount a very dedicated, very

933
00:48:17,200 --> 00:48:20,650
motivated team to solve some of
those late breaking problems

934
00:48:20,680 --> 00:48:23,980
very quickly with creative
solutions. And then the last

935
00:48:23,980 --> 00:48:26,350
main takeaway from me out of
this experience is on the

936
00:48:26,350 --> 00:48:30,940
personal side, I think I speak
for everybody on my program, in

937
00:48:30,940 --> 00:48:33,100
just saying that we've learned
how incredible our friends and

938
00:48:33,100 --> 00:48:36,250
family have been in supporting
us through some of the very

939
00:48:36,250 --> 00:48:39,220
long, very intense days that
it's taken to get towards

940
00:48:39,580 --> 00:48:42,190
milestones like flight tests,
and certainly want to give a

941
00:48:42,190 --> 00:48:43,630
shout out and thank you to all
of them.

942
00:48:45,970 --> 00:48:48,100
John "Slick" Baum: Absolutely. I
can't even imagine some of the

943
00:48:48,100 --> 00:48:51,250
long days and weeks that you all
have pulled as these milestones

944
00:48:51,250 --> 00:48:53,770
have come together. Alright, so
my last question, I'm going to

945
00:48:53,770 --> 00:48:57,580
ask you to pull out your crystal
ball here. So give our listeners

946
00:48:57,580 --> 00:49:00,520
an idea of of the future of this
program. So where do you want to

947
00:49:00,520 --> 00:49:03,610
be in a year, two years, or even
five years from now with this

948
00:49:03,610 --> 00:49:04,330
technology?

949
00:49:05,770 --> 00:49:07,330
Eric Knutson: I'll go ahead and
start. You know, the United

950
00:49:07,330 --> 00:49:10,450
States has waited long enough.
We spent a decade trying to get

951
00:49:10,450 --> 00:49:13,780
to where we're at. It's time to
get this into the warfighters

952
00:49:13,780 --> 00:49:17,170
hands, give them the tools that
gives them the advantage.

953
00:49:17,980 --> 00:49:19,480
Arlen Kostival: I'm just going
to play off of what Eric just

954
00:49:19,480 --> 00:49:22,330
said, right, like on that
thread. You know, the CPS and

955
00:49:22,360 --> 00:49:28,840
LRHW programs are excited to
move towards fielding of this

956
00:49:28,840 --> 00:49:34,030
capability for the Army in FY23
and for the Navy in the mid to

957
00:49:34,030 --> 00:49:37,360
late 2020s. So, you know, the
guiding light for us is getting

958
00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:39,940
this capability into the hands
of our customers as fast as

959
00:49:39,940 --> 00:49:42,640
possible so that they can deploy
these tools and defend our

960
00:49:42,640 --> 00:49:43,090
nation.

961
00:49:44,410 --> 00:49:46,150
Brian Schappacher: And I think
looking at hypersonics, you

962
00:49:46,150 --> 00:49:49,510
know, from a little more macro
level, I think for every every

963
00:49:49,510 --> 00:49:53,500
hypersonic product, the goal is
to go faster and be more capable

964
00:49:53,500 --> 00:49:58,420
and even more affordable. So I
think you know, as you look one

965
00:49:58,420 --> 00:50:01,930
year, two years, five years down
the road. You know, I mentioned

966
00:50:01,930 --> 00:50:05,200
before that it's not it's not
just the specific weapons

967
00:50:05,200 --> 00:50:09,430
systems that we're working on.
There are other hypersonic, you

968
00:50:09,430 --> 00:50:12,460
know, technologies that enable
these current systems to go

969
00:50:12,460 --> 00:50:15,520
faster or be more capable or be
more affordable, that are also

970
00:50:15,520 --> 00:50:18,910
being worked. And I can see, you
know, in the one to two to five

971
00:50:18,910 --> 00:50:21,520
years, we're going to start
rolling those in and have you

972
00:50:21,520 --> 00:50:23,710
know, even better hypersonics
than we have today.

973
00:50:24,460 --> 00:50:26,380
John "Slick" Baum: Okay, well,
gentlemen, I can't thank you

974
00:50:26,380 --> 00:50:29,530
enough for being here. There are
those that talk about history.

975
00:50:29,530 --> 00:50:32,050
And then there are those that
make history, and you and your

976
00:50:32,050 --> 00:50:34,660
team are definitely in that
latter camp. And, you know, as

977
00:50:34,660 --> 00:50:37,120
we've talked about today,
hypersonics is such a tough

978
00:50:37,120 --> 00:50:40,990
challenge. And it's so important
and this is a race we must win

979
00:50:40,990 --> 00:50:43,960
compared to our adversaries and
those that are out there seeking

980
00:50:43,960 --> 00:50:46,900
this technology as well. And one
last thing I want to say is I

981
00:50:46,900 --> 00:50:49,660
can't thank you enough, just as
an American, for your personal

982
00:50:49,690 --> 00:50:52,510
efforts as Arlen you know,
clearly shared with us as well,

983
00:50:52,540 --> 00:50:55,060
and all the hard work and late
nights you guys put into this.

984
00:50:55,060 --> 00:50:56,860
So all thank you so much for
being here.

985
00:50:57,160 --> 00:50:57,730
Eric Knutson: Thanks Slick.

986
00:50:57,730 --> 00:50:58,660
Arlen Kostival: Thank you for
having us.

987
00:50:58,720 --> 00:51:00,490
Brian Schappacher: This was a
great time, it really was.

988
00:51:00,000 --> 00:51:04,830
John "Slick" Baum: With that,
I'd like to extend a big thank

989
00:51:04,830 --> 00:51:07,920
you to our guests for joining in
today's discussion. I'd also

990
00:51:07,920 --> 00:51:10,140
like to extend a big thank you
to our listeners for your

991
00:51:10,140 --> 00:51:13,680
continued support, and for
tuning into today's show. If you

992
00:51:13,680 --> 00:51:16,140
like what you've heard today,
don't forget to hit that like

993
00:51:16,140 --> 00:51:19,560
button and follow or subscribe
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994
00:51:19,560 --> 00:51:22,140
can also leave a comment to let
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995
00:51:22,140 --> 00:51:25,440
show or areas you think we
should explore further. As

996
00:51:25,440 --> 00:51:28,500
always, you can join in on the
conversation by following the

997
00:51:28,500 --> 00:51:32,070
Mitchell Institute on Twitter,
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998
00:51:32,190 --> 00:51:35,460
And you can always find us at
mitchellaerospacepower.org.

999
00:51:35,730 --> 00:51:37,950
Thanks again for joining us and
we'll see you next time. Stay

1000
00:51:37,950 --> 00:51:39,120
safe and check six.