1085: Mailbag - Rome Odunze's Ceiling, Wide Receiver 40 Times, and More

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Speaker 1: This is the Labor Podcast with your host JJ Zacheratha j J zacherrefon. What's up everyone. It's JJ Zacharyesen in this episode ten eighty five of the Late Round Fantasy Football Podcast. Thanks for tuning in. Before I get to the mailbag questions today, I just want to send to the reminder that the Late Round Prospect Guide is currently available for pre order and it's better than ever. This year's guide includes an outline of what goes into the models, prospect profiles for every running back, wide receiver, and tight end who went to the combine over thirty year two profile write ups. There's rankings and more. It'll launch in mid March, so pre order it now at fourteen ninety nine that's going to rise to nineteen ninety nine in less than two weeks when it launches. You can find out more over on Lateround dot com. The first mailbag question this week says, Hey, JJ, thanks for all the great work you do. Thanks this draft cycle, I've heard several fantasy analysts say something to the effect of Malachi Fields is my wide receiver X, but he'll probably get moved up after the draft. Basically, no one likes him. Analytically as a prospect, but everyone agrees that the NFL will probably draft him highly, so we'll have to get moved up prospect boards. What I'm wondering is, at what point do we just ignore outlier draft capital? Is there a point when a player is so overdrafted compared to their analytical profile that it's just more misleading to consider that draft capital. Anecdotally, it feels there are some types of players we always get burned by, especially at wide receiver. Michel Hardman, Jalen Rager, et cetera. Wondering if you've looked into this before or have any data that would be interesting to share. Thanks Eric, Well, first off, clearly we're going to be burned by bad profiles more than good profiles, because bad profiles they're bad for a reason. When a player doesn't have good age justin production, he's less likely to succeed in the NFL. But I think what's difficult with a question like this is that not every player has the same expectation right Like you're talking about Malachi Fields and fading him. I have no problem with that general idea. I think Fields has a lot of glaring red flags to his profile, but we're not drafting fields and the same spot as Jordan Tyson. We're drafting fields amongst other players with red flags to their profiles. Like right now, over on keep Trade Cut, you have Zach Branch going ahead of fields. At wide receiver, you have Chris Brazzle and Chris Bell going right after him, which all three of those guys have something that you can point out as being negative to their profile. Like a lot of things, it's a second round rookie pick. Now to your question of is there a point when a player is so overdrafted compared to their analytical profile that it's just more misleading to consider that draft capital, I don't know if there's a point which that's the case. But this is exactly why having a model can be so helpful. It allows you to know how to balance all this. Now, I'm not trying to say that you have to go buy the guide or you have to build a model on your own. I'm just being truthful. It weighs draft capital, but then also weighs in the crappy production profile, and if it's crappy enough, it'll say, hey, don't draft this guy. This guy's probably overvalued. But you also have to remember that there's still subjectivity involved in what you consider to be a bad production profile and what someone else might consider to be a bad one, even if you're both looking at things analytically, I measure things differently than someone else does. There's not just one way to do this, So my overall stance here is the following, Just to be super straightforward. Number One, if people are saying that, if they're saying they're going to rank him high post draft, I get it to a degree because you have to keep an open mind. But if you're anchoring a projected draft capital, things shouldn't change that much, especially because the difference between certain spots on day two isn't as significant as people think. Number Two, you can't ignore costs in these situations. I'll draft bad players in rookie drafts if the cost is right, or players where I question how good they are, although admittedly I do that a lot more at running back than I do wide receiver. Number Three, and probably the most important one. If you feel off about a player, don't draft that player. Seriously. Rookie drafts are not some exact science. Get your guys. You don't need to play the ADP game like you do in best Ball or even a regular redraft league. If there's something that really concerns you about a player, don't draft that player. You have my permission. I play enough dynasty leagues where I can keep an open mind. But when you hear me say I'm going to be lower than the market on this player, it generally means that if you're in one league, chances are you shouldn't be targeting that player in most leagues unless the cost is undeniable. So don't overthink this. Yes, but if you need me to say this, I will because I firmly believe it. Don't let draft capital dictate everything. This as question from Patreon is from Dino miz. It says, hey, JJ, love your work. Thanks. With the departure of Aaron Jones, do you think Jordan Mason can run away with the job. He has shown in the past he can be great, and the Vikings have limited cap space and limited talent options for running back in free agency and in the upcoming draft. I think the thought behind this it's right Situationally, the Vikings currently have by far the worst cap situation in football, so them landing a huge free agent it's not likely. But I don't think the free agent poll is that bad. There could be a player out there for added competition. That player is likely going to be a pass catcher too. That's the biggest issue with Jordan Mason. I talked about it all last summer. He ended up with a three and a half percent target share last year. His yards per route run was point three to two. I mean, he's just proven now over multiple seasons, over multiple offenses. He's not a pass catcher. And we have a sample of Mason without Aaron Jones. Jones miss weeks three through seven last year. Mason snapshare was sixty seven percent during that timeframe, his route share fifty percent. Those numbers are fine. They're not elite, but they're fine. They weren't better, though, because he was losing some work to Xavier Scott and Mason was still only seeing a five percent target share without Aaron Jones. My stance on Mason is that he's one of those players who can beat ADP. He can beat his current market value pretty easily, but I don't think he's someone that's going to far exceeded. Those types of players are usually ones in a more interested in deep formats than shallower ones. Like he's fine in best ball, he's fine in deep dynasty formats. But if you're only starting seven or eight players in your starting lineup, Mason's a way tougher bet. To make this last question from Kobe, it says, hey, JJ, why does it feel the sentiment is cooled? On Roma doonsday heading into year three. He entered the league as a highly touted prospect with elite draft capital and flashed clear wide receiver one upside in the first four weeks before injuries slowed his momentum. He rarely leaves the field because of his blocking. He has shown he can beat man in press coverage and drops her not typically a persistent issue even if he settles in as a true X receiver in Ben Johnson's offense. What is realistically preventing him from developing along a trajectory similar to DeVante Adams. I mean, look, I was with you until you said developing along a trajectory similar to DeVante Adams. Adams went down a very rare path. At one point people were totally over him early on in his career. They were done. I don't think we should compare anyone to DeVante Adams, even if that is in his range of outcomes. Now, before I get into this analysis, I know that the Bears just traded DJ Moore, but that trade really doesn't have that much to do with the Dunzay's long term outlook as a player. His market value might change. We're going to see where all that settles. But I really approach this answer, which I did put together before that trade went down. I answered it with a Dunzay's individual outlook in mind, without DJ more involved. So I just want to throw that out there before I really dig in. I think there's a very easy narrative to tell yourself about Roman Dunsay that could get you excited, that injury being a key thing. Even with that nagging injury, he finished last year with a solid enough one point sixty one yards perut run rate. He saw a target on twenty two percent of his routes run all while playing inside out. You know, forty and a half percent of his routes came from the slot last year. According to PFF. That was more than what I remembered. He was pretty ineffective from that area of the field, though he had a yards per run rate out of the slot of just one point zero one. He's definitely an outside receiver. No shock there. My pushback on the overall question here, though, is has the sentiment actually cooled. He's had a very similar startup ADP since early December, and he's playing on a team that has two up and coming studs or potential studs in Colston Lovelin and Luther Burden, all while not showing yet through two seasons that he's a stud himself. Let's look at this from a ceiling perspective, because that's really what we should care about with the Dounza. Is he capable of being more than a wide receiver? Two? Well, since twenty thirteen, there have been fifty different wide receivers to scored sixteen or more PPR points per game in a season, with a caveat that they started their NFL career in twenty eleven or later. That way, I have all of their data, so these are the wide receivers that have scored sixteen or more PPR points per game. Of those fifty wide receivers, only two of them had a first season yards per out run rate as low as a Doonza's. One of them was Mike Williams, who barely played and he's arguably the weakest player in this sample objectively, and that's largely because I forgot to change the minimum games threshold. Mike Williams shouldn't even be in the sample. And then the other one is hilariously Davonte Adams, which again that's why we shouldn't compare anyone to Devonte Adams. When looking at their year two yards per out run rates, Adams was still below. He was below Romadunzes, as were six other wide receivers, but each of them had way higher yards per OUH run rates as rookies, aside from Will Fuller. What I'm getting at is that analytically, and yes, this is only one metric, albeit it is a pretty predicted metric, but it's only one metric. But analytically, a DUNDE doesn't necessarily profile at this point as someone with a crazy, crazy ceiling. I think he's good. I think he's priced correctly. I just think we're getting a little carried away if we're buying into him for that outcome, for that high end outcome. To me, we're more than likely looking at a wide receiver two in fantasy football, not a wide receiver one. This next question is another one about the bear, and it's an email from Tony. It says, hi, JJ love the show. Going over the late round prospect guide from last year. How did the ZAP model miss so badly on Kyle Manungu. We knew he had a relatively slow forty, but had good size and landed in Chicago. Was it his lack of receiving production? What lessons were learned from this profile? If any? Okay? So, First off, I think the top thing to remember with the ZAP model is that it has nothing to do with landing spot him landing in Chicago doesn't impact the ZAP score whatsoever. We can more subjectively add to that. Second, depending on your source, my rankings were actually higher on Kyle Manungui than ADP. Now, some ADP sources might disagree, others won't. That's just the way that ADP works. But considering I acquired Benungai in a lot of dynasty leagues, my guess is that others were able to do the same if they followed the rankings. The way this question is framed makes it seem like there was no cost benefit involved with Kyle Manungui last summer. There was. He was even one of my highest rostered best ball players. But let's dig in a little bit. Yes, his receiving profile was not very good. His numbers across the board, even with the new ZAP model iterations, they don't look great now regarding landing spot, and this is something I'll be putting more emphasis on this year. I've discovered with Day three running back picks, and it shouldn't be that surprising when they land in an ambiguous backfield, they have a much higher likelihood of giving us a year one production. So you can look at a teammates redraft adp to see how ambiguous that backfield really is. I'm going to try to lean in on that as I do post draft writeups, and that year one production, if it's there, it can allow us to gain year over year value like we're seeing with Kyle Mnunguy. But saying the ZAP model missed so badly on manung Guy makes it sound like he had this incredible rookie season. He had a five point seven percent target share and point seventy five yards per route run. I think the analysis of him not being that great of a pass catcher it translated to the NFL, and look, he was definitely fun to watch as a rusher, but his efficiency wasn't as good as you probably think. I'm gonna read something straight from his year two profile that's in the Prospect Guide. It says PFF graded him below average and mistackles force per attempt, and next Gen stats had his rushing yards over expected per attempt hovering around the league average. Where he did stand out is inconsistency. Among forty eight qualified backs, Manunguy ranked fifth in success rate, but even that deserves context. Teammate DeAndre Swift ranked just below him, and Chicago's offensive line finished fifth, and run blocking grade per PFF, the environment was doing some of the lifting. Manungai was just a fourth player in the zapmodel database to hit one hundred and sixty rush attempts after being picked outside the top two hundred as a rookie. That kind of outcome is not something that you really change a model over or severely change your process over. To me, Manunga was better than I expected. Sure, I didn't think he'd be one of those four running backs. But I also don't think that we're looking at some undeniably really great running back from a talent perspective. I think he's in a great environment. He works in that environment, and he can give us spiked weeks, especially when injuries occur around him. But it's really not uncommon for there to be crazy variants with Day three running backs as a beginning of the year two, year three, and year four. As I've said a lot this offseason ZAP model scores, they correlate to that year two to year four production better than year one PPR points per game. We're already seeing that in action with Woody Marks. They added David Montgomery to that backfield, he already has more competition. I'm not saying that's gonna happen with Kyle Mnungai. Don't get me wrong when I am saying I don't think Manunguy has a crazy, insane sea. Will we see this a lot with Day three running backs and nless they're undeniably good, And in my opinion, I don't think Kyle Manungai was undeniably good in twenty twenty five. He was a solid player. I wish I had more of him. I wish I leaned into that landing spot analysis harder. But this isn't a Bucky Irving situation where I just missed on him completely when he came out, because to me, that's more of a talent thing. This, to me, is a pretty standard case of landing spot being really good for a particular running back, and that's not what the ZAP model analyzes. This test questions from Twitter is from at ff Hound seven. It says, for z scores, I believe you removed forty yard dash times since it was largely captured in draft capital. Wouldn't that same logic apply to competition. Sure, players at lesser schools play against less talent, but they also have less talent on their side of the ball, So I still have speed score in the running back model just for the record. But let's focus more on wide receivers here, because I think that's what this question is. Kind of focused on players who play at smaller schools. They're often drafted later. Yes, so draft capital captures that to some degree, but strength of schedule adjustments objectively help the ZAP model become more helpful. I know that because I've tested it. I actually got this question a couple of times this week after making a thread on Twitter about things to note when prospecting via data. But it's this idea that players are playing with worst talent as well, not just against inferior talent, and therefore it's tough for them to put up numbers because it's not just the defense that they're facing that's bad. It's also the quarterback that's throwing them the ball, the offensive line that's blocking for them. Unfortunately, none of that shows up in the data at all. You can look at a ton of combine invited running backs who went to a smaller school right out of high school, and you can see crazy numbers for them immediately as a freshman. They're not going to do that at Ohio State, not just because the competition they're facing is going to be more difficult where they can't break as many tackles, they can't do as much on their own, but the competition on their team is more intense. They share a backfield with other high star recruits. If a dude's going to play at Ohio University out of high school instead of Ohio State, he should give us better production because we're looking at that production within the context of his own team. That's what market share statistics are all about. Like, imagine Carnell Tate not going to Ohio State. Imagine he went to OHIOU and shout out to all the Bobcats out there. I have a lot of friends who went to OU. Two. You don't think that Tate would see infinitely better receiving share numbers at Ohio versus Ohio State as a freshman. He would dominate at OU. He's not competing with a Mecca Buca and Marvin Harrison junior at Ohio University. The volume would be crazy. You still have to be careful about how you're adjusting those numbers. Yes, oftentimes draft capital is gonna capture this. Small school players, like I said, generally get drafted later. But guys, there really aren't a ton of small school players who make it big in the NFL. Like, I'm not gonna waste people's times and name all of the small school wide receivers who've been drafted on Day one and two over the last ten years. But do yourself a favor. Go to Wikipedia. Just look at previous drafts. Some of the biggest Day two draft busts in particular have come from players who are from smaller programs, which means if you don't adjust their production, you're gonna think they're really, really good and really really underrated, and I didn't do that nearly enough early on with my prospecting work. That led me to liking players like Andy Isabella more than I should have, or even Sky Moore, though he got steamed up draft boards because of his landing spot. That's why those numbers are adjusted. Though. This last one also references forty times, but it's completely specific to those forty times. It's from Kirk Havia on Bluesky, and it says the NFL seems to love speedy wide receivers. Does the fastest guy at the combine have more or less NFL success than the wide receiver drafted after them? I e would teams be better served avoiding the speedster and instead draft the next best available wide receiver. So I think going with that approach doesn't make that much sense because you're just going off of what one specific team did. Instead, I have another approach that's gonna really capture what you're asking. I've talked about this on the show plenty and we had a great newsletter from Brandon Godoulah last week about what matters and what doesn't matter at the NFL combine for each position. But let me just give you some hard data on this topic because I do think it's really interesting and it's really important. Does that models analyze what I call B two s. It's the best two seasons average in PPR points per game across their first three years in the league. Minimum seven games played, only relevant week, so I removed the final week of the regular season when teams rest players and such essentially imaginal player played each game. Over his first three years in the NFL, he scored ten, eleven and thirteen p puero points per game in those three seasons. B two S would throw out that ten number and simply keep that eleven and thirteen, so we had a B two S of twelve his best two seasons average. That's what the ZAP model is trying to solve. It's trying to forecast which prospects will perform best in B two s. If we look at top one hundred wide receiver since twenty eleven, so wide receivers drafted in the top one hundred, the correlation between forty time and B two s is almost nonexistent. It actually leans more in the direction that you wouldn't expect that actually faster forty times lead the worst outcomes. But the R square. It is literally zero point zero, meaning forty time isn't explaining any of the B two S variants of top one hundred wide receiver prospects. You can look at this through the lens of expected B two S two expected B two S factors in draft capital. It says, hey, based on history, here's how wide receivers have performed in B two S at this particular draft slot. If you're fifty six though, overall, here's what you're expected B two S is. And from there we can see if a player over or underperformed versus that expectation. When you look at the correlation between outperforming B two S expectation and forty times, you get the exact same result, absolutely no correlation at all. And here's what's really interesting with expected B two s. If you start to segment players and look at the really fast guys, the players who ran sub four four forties as an example, if you group those players up, they on average have underperformed versus expectation by point six PPR points per game in B two S. So if they're expected B two S said that they would score twelve PPR points per game, the fast players typically have scored eleven point four PPR points per game. When looking at all other wide receivers, the ones who ran slower than four to four, that number is plus point six. To put that another way, when we're controlling for draft capital, the super fast players, the super fast wide receivers have actually done worse versus expectation than the not super fast wide receivers. What this tells us is that teams are almost definitely inflating these numbers when they're really really high, when they run really really fast forties at least among day one and day two picks. I didn't go into day three because we rarely get hits at wide receiver on day three, so the sample itself is just kind of uninteresting. Now, this doesn't mean that you should just fade wide receivers with sub four four forties. I think dumbing all this down to a forty time is really harmful with this kind of analysis. Like, we have some size speed freaks who ended up giving us a surplus and value post draft, DK Metcalf, Brian Thomas, Julio Jones, Garrett Wilson, Chris Alave. They were all sub four to four players. The list goes on and on. What I do think you should be careful of, though, is super fast players who don't necessarily have the best production profiles, because that age adjustin production is so much more important. And if we know a team might inflate a player's draft capital because of his forty time, you're then inflating a bad profile in doing that, like Matthew Golden last year, or Taekwan Thornton, or Henry Ruggs or Paris Campbell. The list goes on and on. A fast forty yard dashtime does not mean a player is doomed. That's not what this data says. It just so happens that a lot of the guys who run super fast forties they have really bad age adjustin production profiles. So a fast forty yard dashtime means that we should be aware that he might be overdrafted in the actual NFL draft, and if that draft capital follows that player into the dynasty market his rookie draft ADP, then we should be making sure that there's substance to his profile because if there isn't, chances are he's overrated. That's it for today's show, though, thanks to all of you for listening. If you had subscribe to the Late Round Fantasy Football podcast. Make sure you are bus rooting for it pretty much anywhere podcasts can be found, and don't follow me on Twitter and on Blue Sky at Late Round QB. Thanks for listening everyone. Greatly appreciate all of you. Enjoy your weekend. I'll talk to you next week