Baltimore bridge collapse: engineers explain how failures can be avoided

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Hello and welcome to the physics world weekly

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podcast. I'm Hamish Johnston.

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Earlier this year, the world watched in horror.

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As the Francis

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Scott key bridge

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collapsed after being struck by a large container

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ship.

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6 people were killed in the disaster, which

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occurred near Baltimore Maryland

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in the Us.

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In this episode, Physics World's Margaret Harris is

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in conversation with Aaron Bell. A university of

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New Hampshire engineer who specializes

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in the structural design and dynamics

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of bridges.

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She explains why the Bridge C apps and

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talks about what can be done to avoid

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future catastrophes.

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Joining the conversation later on apps is Bell

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new Hampshire engineering colleague,

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Martin W,

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who specializes in fluid flow.

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Together, they talk about the living bridge project,

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which looks at how bridges can become more

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integrated

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international

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infrastructure.

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By doing things like generating

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renewable

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energy using water turbines.

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Here's that

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conversation.

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1 of the first things we learn about

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is physics students is static forces,

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so forces that act an objects at rest.

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These forces are straightforward compared to the ones

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we meet in general longevity and quantum mechanics,

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which is why we learn about them first,

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but this apparently is simple behavior, can give

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rise some surprisingly complex and even terrifying events,

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especially when those forces suddenly cease to be

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static.

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As tragically happened in March when a container

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ship struck a bridge near Baltimore in the

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Us. Here's tell us more about bridges in

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the science of how they stay up or

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ball down is Aaron Bell, a professor of

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Civil and an environmental engineering at the university

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of New Hampshire and an expert in bridge

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health.

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Hello, Aaron. Welcome to the podcast.

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Hi. Good morning. Thanks for having me. What

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actually happened on that night of March 26.

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On March 20 sixth, the around

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12:45 or just past midnight,

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the dolly, which is the, vessel

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left its port. It was

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led by tug out of its birth and

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then released and about 01:20

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in the morning,

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it lost power,

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and luckily, the captain about 01:27

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put out a may day call that he

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had lost power and notifying that the a

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collision was well that allowed the Maryland state

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police to actually shut the bridge to traffic.

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It was, you know, obviously very early in

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the warnings.

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The lost power power was able to come

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back on, and then they lost power again,

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and then just about 90 sec seconds after

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the May day call, it was the impact

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to the bridge, and it's actually struck the

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southwest

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pure of the central large trust span.

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And it was traveling at relatively high speed.

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It was at 8 knots

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which,

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9.2 miles per hour may not seem like

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a lot but 8 knots is if any

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listeners are nautical a. It's pretty fast, the

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data, it was troubling about 8 knots or

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a little bit above 8 knots when it

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impacted the collision, and it broke the bridge

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itself. Into several parts

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because of the energy impact into the pier,

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which if energy comes into it a object

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there's really 3 things that can happen, either

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the object can absorb the energy, the object

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has damage due to the energy or the

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object has movement.

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And I think what we saw was movement,

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which then caused damage, which had led to

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our cascading gaining failure.

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Now, what did this bridge look like before

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it collapsed? How is it designed? Tell us

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a little bit about the bridge itself? So

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this was a through truss bridge?

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Which

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meant that the trust structure itself spanned over

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multiple peers or supports,

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and then those spans

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weren't

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independent, they were interdependent. And I think that

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now when you watch the video of that

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cascading failure, that inter dependency

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makes a little bit more sense.

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So if you look at the bridge, it

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may look very... It looks like a trust...

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It's a trust bridge, and it can also

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look like a can bridge, which is maybe

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if you think of the fear the fourth.

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Or some of the other bridges here in

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the United States where the spans itself almost

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satellite out from the pier.

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But then when they meet in the middle

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that meeting in the middle is almost like

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a fuse, so you wouldn't have a cascading

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failure across where this through trust sits on

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the piers, and then they rely on their

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adjacent spans for distributed load. So a through

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trust can be smaller members,

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so it can use less material,

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but then we have a little bit less

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redundancy in the system.

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And 1 of the things as bridged designers

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when you're looking at,

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protecting your bridge. It's not always making the

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members bigger. It's adding redundancy,

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to anything that could happen to them. So

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a bridge, like, the Francis Scott Key, which

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is in a very busy,

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water way was designed in 19 77,

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and it had... It did have pure protection,

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but it was obviously woe fully under size.

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So if you look at some of the

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videos, you see very, they look they look

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very small next to the container shipped

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protection tool called the dolphin, which is a

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sac official concrete

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pure basically pure that supports nothing, but is

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structurally independent, and meant to be sac

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so that a container ship would hit it,

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absorb some of the energy or potentially actually

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change of course.

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If you see the modern

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dolphins since then they are much, much larger.

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And part of the reason for that is

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in the United States in 19 80,

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the Sun sunshine Sky bridge in Florida

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had a vessel collision, and there was a

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loss of, I think, 35

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lives,

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and post post that collision, the, federal highway

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administration which manages all of our bridges,

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funded study to look in the design codes

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for a specifically vessel collision. And in 19

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91

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Asha, which is the American Society of State

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and Highway transportation officials publishes, the first guide

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specification for vessel collision,

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That's a collision design for highway bridges.

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And that code obviously comes out 14 years

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after this bridge has been constructed.

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I think that over the year over the

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coming months and years we'll really look at

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what was the decision making in Maryland?

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That led

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no retrofit to this protection,

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especially as if you think about the the

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container ship that was used in 19 77,

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versus the container ship that's used in 2024,

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it's about 10 times larger and weighs about

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10 times more

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So whatever was,

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a, a adequate peer protection system or vessel

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collision protection system in 19.

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77

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clearly is not now. So 1 of the

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things that I think will be evaluated. And

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I think this is this will be beyond

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bridge design, but it really will be systems

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design. So there's only so much we can

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do with physics.

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Because we just can't build something

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big enough in a real way to absorb

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the energy. This is that kind of first

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locks thermodynamics, energy can neither be created or

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to destroyed I think that's thermo. So if

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you think of all of the energy coming

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into that coming with that ship, thermo that

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energy just caused that huge deflect deflation of

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the trust structure

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off of the peer cap, and then that

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that large deflect deflation or large defamation was

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just too much for the system to absorb

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and and led to a cascading failure.

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So I think that in the Us, we

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will see changes not only to evaluating

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if a vessel,

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collision protection system is adequate,

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but related to the bridge. So if it's

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a redundant peer

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appear that has enough inertial force to absorb,

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the energy impact, it will also be the

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sac superficial elements, whether it's a fend system

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or the islands around that have those separate

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structurally independent kind of tips that then can

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be damaged that meant to be damaged

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or the dolphins, but also how we support

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navigation in the waterways.

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When do we use tug boats

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I think 1 of the big questions being

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asked is that that vessel being so large,

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and it did have Tug assist. And getting

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out of dock? Why didn't have tug assistance

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all the way through the port. And I

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I think they'll be... It won't just be

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1 solution. It will really be multiple

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checks

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and the end, you know, checks throughout the

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whole process of of, these ships have to

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move through these ports,

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that's how the economy functions, and then how

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can we support them because as structural engineers,

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you know, it's not meant to be gl,

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but it's true that if you build it,

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they will hit it, and that's everything,

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whether it

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and, unfortunately, after 09:11 in 2001, it became

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plain impact. But if you looked at any

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type of bridge structure,

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you really thought about it, and we still

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do. You think about... If you if you

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think of a cable state bridge, we really

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think about what if you lost 3 cables

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due to a...

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Tractor trailer collision with them, can the bridge

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stay standing. We think about those things of

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having redundancy in the system being able to

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have

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redistribution of forces

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and also, how how we use the... How

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we use these systems. And so I think

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this will be an additional, very large, very

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impact full data point of how we look

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at the overall design of not just the

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bridge itself, the surrounding areas and then how

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we support the use of it that it

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it has redundancy,

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and I think, 1 of the things going

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back to the tug vote is, you know,

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a ship of that size would have multiple

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tug,

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but guiding it through the water way, and

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so you wouldn't have a loss of engine

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power that would be a single point of

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failure. You actually have multiple

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tug that would be available. So I know

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here in new England, our our ports are

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much... Smaller, and our waterways are much narrower.

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So all ships that come in. It's not

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a Us coast guard

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requirement, but all ships that come into any

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ports in New Hampshire or Maine or even

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Massachusetts. They come under not their own power,

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but by Tug boats to guide them, and

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those tug bolt pilots are very familiar with

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the currents,

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with the the symmetry of the, water way

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with the peers with the obstruction

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because I think we have to remember. A

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bridge is an obstruction

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00:11:03,519 --> 00:11:05,993
to a nav water way. We have to

275
00:11:05,993 --> 00:11:07,430
get a permit to be there at least

276
00:11:07,430 --> 00:11:09,345
in the Us, you have to get a

277
00:11:09,345 --> 00:11:11,340
permit because you are in obstruction as a

278
00:11:11,340 --> 00:11:14,961
bridge the sea faring traffic really takes precedence.

279
00:11:15,496 --> 00:11:17,884
And so working with that as a system,

280
00:11:18,361 --> 00:11:21,721
not necessarily just the stand building a behemoth

281
00:11:21,721 --> 00:11:23,952
of a bridge that that could take anything,

282
00:11:24,111 --> 00:11:25,886
but really looking at the system and that

283
00:11:26,103 --> 00:11:29,293
distribution of risk. It's across multiple multiple parts

284
00:11:29,293 --> 00:11:31,988
that play a role in, the safety of

285
00:11:31,988 --> 00:11:34,390
the traveling public both from a naval

286
00:11:34,699 --> 00:11:37,885
standpoint and also the he standpoint. It's interesting

287
00:11:37,885 --> 00:11:39,558
that you focus on the fact that the

288
00:11:39,558 --> 00:11:41,549
bridge is the obstruction here because I think

289
00:11:41,549 --> 00:11:43,143
in the immediate aftermath, we saw a lot

290
00:11:43,143 --> 00:11:45,545
of analyses about, oh, what's this gonna mean

291
00:11:45,545 --> 00:11:47,374
for highway traffic, You know, people are using

292
00:11:47,374 --> 00:11:49,123
this bridge to commute between different parts of

293
00:11:49,282 --> 00:11:50,952
Baltimore around that's... It's part of the the

294
00:11:50,952 --> 00:11:52,860
city's belt way, I think. But actually the

295
00:11:52,860 --> 00:11:53,758
more importance

296
00:11:54,069 --> 00:11:56,941
obstacle caused by the bridge disappearing is actually

297
00:11:56,941 --> 00:11:58,537
the fact the bridge is in the water

298
00:11:58,537 --> 00:12:00,292
or was in the water and it's blocking

299
00:12:00,292 --> 00:12:02,538
the channel. There's this this navigation channel.

300
00:12:03,095 --> 00:12:05,585
Yeah. The the bridge itself has a very

301
00:12:05,642 --> 00:12:08,984
local impact in terms of its inability to

302
00:12:08,984 --> 00:12:11,229
be used for a passage for vic... Killer

303
00:12:11,229 --> 00:12:13,464
traffic. So you see a very local impact

304
00:12:13,464 --> 00:12:15,859
from that, but the fact that it's blocking

305
00:12:15,859 --> 00:12:17,375
a water away of 1 of the big

306
00:12:17,375 --> 00:12:19,530
busiest ports in the Us has a global

307
00:12:19,530 --> 00:12:19,690
impact.

308
00:12:20,342 --> 00:12:23,205
So there's a broader view from this that

309
00:12:23,205 --> 00:12:24,557
has to be looked at, and I think

310
00:12:24,557 --> 00:12:27,102
that's, you know, when, people ask me how

311
00:12:27,102 --> 00:12:28,317
long it will take to

312
00:12:28,772 --> 00:12:31,016
rebuild this bridge. And there really is going

313
00:12:31,016 --> 00:12:32,712
to be a almost like a gated

314
00:12:33,089 --> 00:12:34,865
review of how this is going to go

315
00:12:35,163 --> 00:12:37,316
because the first the first top priority is

316
00:12:37,316 --> 00:12:38,751
getting the port open.

317
00:12:39,324 --> 00:12:42,108
So getting the the debris out of the

318
00:12:42,108 --> 00:12:43,937
water. And then the next thing I think

319
00:12:43,937 --> 00:12:45,528
will be evaluating the peers.

320
00:12:46,656 --> 00:12:48,325
1 of the things that that I think

321
00:12:48,325 --> 00:12:50,811
will be evaluated is can those peers now

322
00:12:51,502 --> 00:12:52,479
with new technology

323
00:12:52,932 --> 00:12:55,651
to have longer spans be moved further outside

324
00:12:55,651 --> 00:12:58,203
of the shipping lane. So I... It's it's

325
00:12:58,203 --> 00:13:00,515
all of those pieces that reduce the risk

326
00:13:00,515 --> 00:13:02,349
of impact. Do we move it, you know,

327
00:13:02,748 --> 00:13:05,151
outside of the shipping lane coming being again

328
00:13:05,151 --> 00:13:06,503
here from New England. We have a bridge,

329
00:13:06,662 --> 00:13:08,967
the Maurice j To bridge, which is Big

330
00:13:08,967 --> 00:13:11,035
bridge in downtown Us and people were very

331
00:13:11,035 --> 00:13:13,677
concerned about that. But those peers are so

332
00:13:13,677 --> 00:13:16,067
outside the shipping lane that I'm pretty sure

333
00:13:16,067 --> 00:13:18,218
a vessel would go ground before it would

334
00:13:18,218 --> 00:13:18,855
hit peer.

335
00:13:19,904 --> 00:13:22,051
And that's, I think what you also wanna

336
00:13:22,051 --> 00:13:23,425
look at is do you have

337
00:13:24,436 --> 00:13:26,821
protection just from the of your port?

338
00:13:27,314 --> 00:13:29,150
That will help you on your... So using

339
00:13:29,150 --> 00:13:31,544
everything that's available to you. But if you

340
00:13:31,544 --> 00:13:33,002
are a resident of Baltimore,

341
00:13:33,460 --> 00:13:35,375
that traffic is the first thing you think

342
00:13:35,375 --> 00:13:37,960
about And there's also a confidence

343
00:13:38,336 --> 00:13:40,564
that happens or a lack of confidence of

344
00:13:40,564 --> 00:13:43,906
traveling these roadway or these bridges that are

345
00:13:43,906 --> 00:13:44,781
a necessity,

346
00:13:45,195 --> 00:13:46,575
Our bridges are our links

347
00:13:47,035 --> 00:13:50,235
across either waterways or other highways that link

348
00:13:50,235 --> 00:13:53,115
communities together. So just like after the Sunshine

349
00:13:53,115 --> 00:13:54,240
high way There was a lot that the

350
00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:55,826
bridge community had to do to build confidence.

351
00:13:55,985 --> 00:13:57,436
I think that will happen here

352
00:13:58,602 --> 00:13:59,870
as well. I mean I think we know

353
00:13:59,870 --> 00:14:01,714
more about bridge behavior way but I think

354
00:14:01,714 --> 00:14:02,992
this is 1 of those things there's still

355
00:14:02,992 --> 00:14:04,351
a lot for us to learn,

356
00:14:04,910 --> 00:14:06,108
and we will learn about,

357
00:14:06,828 --> 00:14:10,751
the redundancy and robustness of... For, this specific

358
00:14:10,751 --> 00:14:13,215
type of bridge design kind of moving forward,

359
00:14:13,613 --> 00:14:15,441
and it still is a valid bridge design,

360
00:14:15,600 --> 00:14:17,110
but maybe we look at anchorage in a

361
00:14:17,110 --> 00:14:19,303
different way or maybe we look at protection

362
00:14:19,522 --> 00:14:22,239
of, that energy impact as a different way.

363
00:14:22,479 --> 00:14:23,678
Maybe there's some absorption,

364
00:14:24,157 --> 00:14:26,395
energy... You know, some absorption tools that we

365
00:14:26,395 --> 00:14:29,047
use or along there, but I do think

366
00:14:29,047 --> 00:14:31,124
that the the traffic is an impact.

367
00:14:31,923 --> 00:14:34,811
The vessel traffic is the bigger impact. So

368
00:14:34,811 --> 00:14:36,873
you... Obviously, you want to rebuild the bridge

369
00:14:36,873 --> 00:14:38,697
as quickly as possible, but as quickly as

370
00:14:38,697 --> 00:14:40,521
possible has to take into the fact that,

371
00:14:40,600 --> 00:14:42,107
you know, maybe you don't wanna build as

372
00:14:42,107 --> 00:14:44,192
well... Actually, you will certainly don't wanna build

373
00:14:44,192 --> 00:14:45,866
a bridge that's exactly the same as what

374
00:14:45,866 --> 00:14:47,800
came before because that bridge had

375
00:14:48,177 --> 00:14:49,985
as we've now seen tragically with the loss

376
00:14:50,104 --> 00:14:51,774
life and the the damage to the bridge.

377
00:14:52,013 --> 00:14:54,638
It had 2 little redundancy and structure. Its

378
00:14:54,638 --> 00:14:56,945
peers were not not necessarily as well protected

379
00:14:56,945 --> 00:14:59,028
by these these dolphins you talk about and

380
00:14:59,028 --> 00:15:00,938
it was maybe not as well coordinated with

381
00:15:00,938 --> 00:15:01,438
the

382
00:15:01,972 --> 00:15:04,200
so the the the water shape of as

383
00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:05,871
as it could have been. I think a

384
00:15:05,871 --> 00:15:08,194
big decision will be... And I think... Will

385
00:15:08,194 --> 00:15:10,828
really impact the cost is if they reuse

386
00:15:10,828 --> 00:15:11,727
those peers

387
00:15:12,185 --> 00:15:14,739
with additional protection because the biggest cost to

388
00:15:14,739 --> 00:15:16,335
building a bridge getting out of the water.

389
00:15:16,735 --> 00:15:18,897
Will that's the number. I mean, it's really

390
00:15:18,897 --> 00:15:20,805
hard to build in the water. So if

391
00:15:20,805 --> 00:15:23,769
you can reuse peers or you can limit

392
00:15:23,826 --> 00:15:24,621
the construction,

393
00:15:25,114 --> 00:15:27,984
1, that you limit the environmental impact, the

394
00:15:27,984 --> 00:15:30,716
less you disturb the water, especially the bottom

395
00:15:31,013 --> 00:15:33,245
that really limits your cost.

396
00:15:33,740 --> 00:15:35,840
And a a great example is we have

397
00:15:35,899 --> 00:15:38,860
2 vertical lift bridges here in the port

398
00:15:38,860 --> 00:15:41,519
of Ports smith in the Pis River way

399
00:15:41,754 --> 00:15:44,471
and 1 bridge was replaced in 2013,

400
00:15:44,710 --> 00:15:46,228
and the cost was about 80000000,

401
00:15:46,708 --> 00:15:49,185
but they rehab and reused the peers.

402
00:15:49,758 --> 00:15:52,806
So the construction underwater was really minimal

403
00:15:53,422 --> 00:15:55,493
because that the peers were reinforced and then

404
00:15:55,493 --> 00:15:58,041
the second 1, the opening was so small.

405
00:15:58,934 --> 00:16:01,254
That a Panama max ship couldn't go through

406
00:16:01,254 --> 00:16:03,575
it. So they changed the opening and that

407
00:16:03,575 --> 00:16:05,654
bridge cost about a 660000000.

408
00:16:05,989 --> 00:16:08,637
So your cost and your timeline really changes

409
00:16:09,330 --> 00:16:11,399
depending on your usage, but as you kind

410
00:16:11,399 --> 00:16:12,115
of pointed out,

411
00:16:13,404 --> 00:16:15,318
there will be a lot of I eyes

412
00:16:15,318 --> 00:16:18,189
and a lot of thought into is reusing

413
00:16:18,189 --> 00:16:19,625
these peers the right thing or is there

414
00:16:19,625 --> 00:16:22,895
a totally different form of bridge that that

415
00:16:22,895 --> 00:16:25,214
we could produce. And I think, again, if

416
00:16:25,214 --> 00:16:27,200
you look at Florida, they totally went from

417
00:16:27,200 --> 00:16:29,368
a trust bridge to a cable state bridge

418
00:16:29,503 --> 00:16:30,853
when when it was finally,

419
00:16:31,568 --> 00:16:33,806
rebuilt and and could that really kind of

420
00:16:33,806 --> 00:16:36,768
changed our look. This the state of Delaware

421
00:16:36,824 --> 00:16:39,762
is in the middle of a vessel collision

422
00:16:39,762 --> 00:16:40,500
protection project

423
00:16:40,889 --> 00:16:42,560
for the Delaware Memorial bridge. So there'll be

424
00:16:42,560 --> 00:16:43,378
a lot of

425
00:16:44,072 --> 00:16:46,698
consideration about how did Delaware make the decision

426
00:16:46,698 --> 00:16:48,768
that it needed to up its game in

427
00:16:48,768 --> 00:16:51,252
terms of vessel collision for a November... I

428
00:16:51,252 --> 00:16:53,088
think the project started in October or November,

429
00:16:53,407 --> 00:16:55,562
but Maryland did not. And I think,

430
00:16:56,440 --> 00:16:58,616
you know, Sunday, Monday morning quarterback,

431
00:16:59,169 --> 00:17:01,166
is something we do a lot because there's

432
00:17:01,166 --> 00:17:03,643
so there's only so many resources, and there's

433
00:17:03,643 --> 00:17:05,800
so many assets that need to be managed.

434
00:17:06,134 --> 00:17:08,684
And we saw this after hurricane Katrina when

435
00:17:08,684 --> 00:17:11,313
it was well why weren't those levi, the

436
00:17:11,313 --> 00:17:13,720
ones that was fixed. Why wasn't... You know,

437
00:17:13,960 --> 00:17:16,119
so we really do our best to predict

438
00:17:16,119 --> 00:17:17,720
where we're going to need the at... Where

439
00:17:17,720 --> 00:17:18,599
with the resources,

440
00:17:19,559 --> 00:17:21,400
and and then, unfortunately, sometimes,

441
00:17:21,894 --> 00:17:24,131
those predictions just are not as accurate as

442
00:17:24,131 --> 00:17:25,090
we would like them to be.

443
00:17:25,969 --> 00:17:28,446
Yeah. Yeah. We're talking about the collapse of

444
00:17:28,446 --> 00:17:29,485
this bridging in Baltimore,

445
00:17:29,899 --> 00:17:32,136
in part because it's unusual It's unusual that

446
00:17:32,136 --> 00:17:34,074
a brings collapse at all. Yeah. And it's

447
00:17:34,133 --> 00:17:36,370
unusual that it clasp because a a great

448
00:17:36,370 --> 00:17:38,776
huge ship ran into it rather than some

449
00:17:38,776 --> 00:17:39,754
more mundane,

450
00:17:40,210 --> 00:17:40,449
cause?

451
00:17:41,086 --> 00:17:43,100
What are some of the more common causes

452
00:17:43,157 --> 00:17:43,849
of bridges

453
00:17:44,208 --> 00:17:44,526
failing.

454
00:17:45,243 --> 00:17:46,676
So a lot of people ask about that...

455
00:17:46,835 --> 00:17:48,666
Says this bridge was actually inspected,

456
00:17:49,382 --> 00:17:51,771
the last inspection had it as a fair.

457
00:17:52,423 --> 00:17:55,132
So we don't know. Fair sounds okay. It's

458
00:17:55,132 --> 00:17:57,306
not great, but I don't think the structural

459
00:17:57,363 --> 00:17:59,037
condition of this bridge had anything to do

460
00:17:59,037 --> 00:18:01,917
with its. Collapse. I mean, I think any

461
00:18:01,917 --> 00:18:04,941
any bridge with that much energy coming into

462
00:18:04,941 --> 00:18:05,100
it,

463
00:18:06,135 --> 00:18:08,942
where there was really no dis disposition

464
00:18:09,575 --> 00:18:10,075
mechanism

465
00:18:10,535 --> 00:18:11,974
besides the damage.

466
00:18:12,855 --> 00:18:15,194
If you think back to the 2007

467
00:18:15,255 --> 00:18:16,554
collapse in Minneapolis

468
00:18:17,269 --> 00:18:19,905
Minnesota, the I 35 bridge collapse, it was

469
00:18:19,905 --> 00:18:21,983
a buckled gus plate that then had a

470
00:18:21,983 --> 00:18:24,460
cascading failure. And since then, we've really looked

471
00:18:24,460 --> 00:18:27,098
at, this idea of the fracture critical bridge

472
00:18:27,098 --> 00:18:29,323
or the... The... Those bridges that have the

473
00:18:29,323 --> 00:18:32,579
element that if that element fails, there's no

474
00:18:32,579 --> 00:18:34,700
redundancy in the system and you'll have progressed

475
00:18:34,819 --> 00:18:37,126
of collapse. Single point of failure sort of

476
00:18:37,126 --> 00:18:38,478
things. Yeah. Yeah. You have a point of

477
00:18:38,478 --> 00:18:41,103
failure where there's just no catch. There's nothing

478
00:18:41,103 --> 00:18:41,714
that catches have

479
00:18:43,187 --> 00:18:45,336
the the load that red distributes the load.

480
00:18:45,495 --> 00:18:47,643
So we really do look at more robust

481
00:18:47,643 --> 00:18:50,031
systems, but the I 35 bridge collapse in

482
00:18:50,031 --> 00:18:51,066
2007,

483
00:18:51,479 --> 00:18:54,908
and and that really was a failed gus

484
00:18:54,908 --> 00:18:57,779
plate and gus plates are the connectors.

485
00:18:58,737 --> 00:19:01,542
Again, for the physicists, not the engineers, gus

486
00:19:01,542 --> 00:19:04,012
plates are what allows steel members to change

487
00:19:04,012 --> 00:19:05,924
direction because we have straight members are coming

488
00:19:05,924 --> 00:19:07,438
in. If we want them to take a

489
00:19:07,438 --> 00:19:10,084
right hand turn. You you sandwich them in

490
00:19:10,084 --> 00:19:11,940
between a gus plate and then bolt everything

491
00:19:11,998 --> 00:19:13,991
together. So that allows our straight members to

492
00:19:13,991 --> 00:19:15,905
change direction, whether it's a right hand turn

493
00:19:15,905 --> 00:19:18,889
or diagonal for a truss. So those elements

494
00:19:18,944 --> 00:19:20,215
prior to 2007,

495
00:19:21,167 --> 00:19:23,970
in our bridge inspection protocols, those were considered

496
00:19:24,263 --> 00:19:25,137
unexpected quantities.

497
00:19:25,629 --> 00:19:27,941
They weren't considered in our bridge inspection protocols.

498
00:19:28,340 --> 00:19:30,014
And obviously, since 2007,

499
00:19:30,253 --> 00:19:32,566
we've had a lot of publications about how

500
00:19:32,566 --> 00:19:34,161
do you evaluate gus plates.

501
00:19:34,813 --> 00:19:37,863
And even looking at bridges and can we

502
00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:38,979
with new technology,

503
00:19:39,514 --> 00:19:40,072
can we,

504
00:19:40,949 --> 00:19:41,825
remove gus plates?

505
00:19:42,636 --> 00:19:45,182
And actually, the the Memorial bridge that I

506
00:19:45,182 --> 00:19:47,250
mentioned that we reuse the peers in Ports

507
00:19:47,250 --> 00:19:50,841
smith has a gus list trust connection, which

508
00:19:50,841 --> 00:19:53,144
is part of that bridge was actually designed

509
00:19:53,144 --> 00:19:54,573
in 2012,

510
00:19:55,050 --> 00:19:56,717
just 5 years after that collapse.

511
00:19:57,289 --> 00:19:59,442
So I think we, you know, if we

512
00:19:59,442 --> 00:20:00,878
go back to the 19 forties with the

513
00:20:01,117 --> 00:20:03,351
Tacoma narrow bridge collapse, there was just a

514
00:20:03,351 --> 00:20:06,243
lack of understanding of bridge air aerodynamics because

515
00:20:06,461 --> 00:20:09,733
we were just pushing the limits of long

516
00:20:09,733 --> 00:20:10,551
span bridges

517
00:20:10,924 --> 00:20:12,773
that are lighter and narrower.

518
00:20:13,226 --> 00:20:14,496
And, really, you know, if you think about

519
00:20:14,496 --> 00:20:15,449
it more elegant,

520
00:20:16,417 --> 00:20:18,190
and when you translate that

521
00:20:18,962 --> 00:20:20,792
methodology that was being used in New York,

522
00:20:21,428 --> 00:20:22,994
where had big traffic

523
00:20:23,510 --> 00:20:26,129
huge lanes, heavy bridges and you move it

524
00:20:26,129 --> 00:20:28,034
to Washington State that only needs 2 lanes,

525
00:20:28,192 --> 00:20:30,176
so it's much much lighter. There was just

526
00:20:30,176 --> 00:20:32,976
a lack of understanding, that that change was

527
00:20:32,976 --> 00:20:34,193
going to change the dynamic

528
00:20:34,650 --> 00:20:36,724
signature because as you kind of started out

529
00:20:36,724 --> 00:20:38,957
talking about everything equals 0 in the structural

530
00:20:38,957 --> 00:20:41,404
engineering world, everything supposed to equal 0,

531
00:20:42,001 --> 00:20:43,991
you know, some of the forces should equal

532
00:20:43,991 --> 00:20:45,742
0. And when the some of the forces

533
00:20:45,742 --> 00:20:46,856
don't equal 0,

534
00:20:47,573 --> 00:20:50,293
or we have dynamic effects, that's something that's

535
00:20:50,293 --> 00:20:53,236
out of the ordinary for us as

536
00:20:53,793 --> 00:20:55,861
as structural engineers, and we have to think

537
00:20:55,861 --> 00:20:58,674
about really specifically, how can we make sure

538
00:20:58,674 --> 00:20:59,494
that that's

539
00:21:00,115 --> 00:21:02,994
something that we account for, and and we

540
00:21:02,994 --> 00:21:05,168
do that much better now, part of it

541
00:21:05,168 --> 00:21:07,003
is because of the collapse at the Tacoma

542
00:21:07,003 --> 00:21:09,475
narrows, or you could look at in 19

543
00:21:09,475 --> 00:21:12,586
67, the silver city bridge collapse in... Oh,

544
00:21:12,745 --> 00:21:13,702
I think it was Ohio.

545
00:21:14,580 --> 00:21:16,978
When we didn't do routine bridge inspection prior

546
00:21:16,978 --> 00:21:19,122
to that. And that bridge collapse and it

547
00:21:19,122 --> 00:21:21,289
was a fracture of a pin and hanger

548
00:21:22,139 --> 00:21:23,886
that the the crack had probably...

549
00:21:24,299 --> 00:21:25,417
Been there for years,

550
00:21:26,135 --> 00:21:27,731
the bridge collapse, there was a loss of

551
00:21:27,731 --> 00:21:30,286
life, and the response then was we we

552
00:21:30,286 --> 00:21:31,563
should be looking at our bridges, and we

553
00:21:31,563 --> 00:21:33,000
should be looking at them frequently.

554
00:21:33,654 --> 00:21:35,115
So it's usually...

555
00:21:35,894 --> 00:21:38,315
It's it's rare that we have a design

556
00:21:38,375 --> 00:21:40,134
that causes a collapse. We saw that in

557
00:21:40,214 --> 00:21:41,575
Florida with the Pedestrian bridge.

558
00:21:42,708 --> 00:21:43,905
At Florida international,

559
00:21:44,702 --> 00:21:47,894
designed by, fig engineers, which are a very

560
00:21:47,894 --> 00:21:49,490
well known bridge engineering firm,

561
00:21:50,301 --> 00:21:51,494
but the the,

562
00:21:52,051 --> 00:21:54,596
Pedestrian bridge over a highway was meant to

563
00:21:54,596 --> 00:21:55,471
be a

564
00:21:56,998 --> 00:21:57,975
cable state bridge

565
00:21:58,509 --> 00:22:00,896
due to a construction sequencing issue, the deck

566
00:22:00,896 --> 00:22:02,646
went in and and collapsed, and and there

567
00:22:02,646 --> 00:22:04,891
was a loss of life, So each 1

568
00:22:04,891 --> 00:22:05,369
of these,

569
00:22:06,485 --> 00:22:08,558
it's rare that it's a design flaw now

570
00:22:08,558 --> 00:22:10,472
that we know things, but it's a it's

571
00:22:10,472 --> 00:22:12,465
not necessarily the design flaw. It's a use.

572
00:22:13,039 --> 00:22:14,634
An understanding of how it was going to

573
00:22:14,634 --> 00:22:16,628
be used or what it was going to

574
00:22:16,628 --> 00:22:19,361
experience, and I usually tell the students that

575
00:22:19,499 --> 00:22:22,291
we... As designers, were always thinking of the

576
00:22:22,291 --> 00:22:23,657
demand what we're asking,

577
00:22:24,213 --> 00:22:27,228
the structure to do and its capacity. The

578
00:22:27,228 --> 00:22:28,498
capacity is pretty easy.

579
00:22:29,371 --> 00:22:31,037
The demand is what's really hard.

580
00:22:31,529 --> 00:22:33,282
Because you think about... I may design it

581
00:22:33,282 --> 00:22:36,150
for XYZ, well, what happens when Abc happens?

582
00:22:36,787 --> 00:22:39,496
What happens when an extreme event happens? And

583
00:22:39,496 --> 00:22:41,982
how does it behave because... We may design

584
00:22:41,982 --> 00:22:43,658
for when to come from the north, but

585
00:22:43,658 --> 00:22:45,175
what if it comes from the northeast.

586
00:22:45,653 --> 00:22:47,649
And when doesn't do what we would like

587
00:22:47,649 --> 00:22:48,926
it to do? When does what it wants

588
00:22:48,926 --> 00:22:51,095
to do? Just like an earthquake or just

589
00:22:51,095 --> 00:22:53,808
like AAA

590
00:22:53,808 --> 00:22:56,441
hurricane or a a heavy rain or a

591
00:22:56,441 --> 00:22:56,920
snowfall,

592
00:22:57,412 --> 00:23:00,587
So we do our best with historic information

593
00:23:00,587 --> 00:23:03,389
about the risk and the, the

594
00:23:04,239 --> 00:23:04,739
category

595
00:23:05,112 --> 00:23:05,747
or the...

596
00:23:06,476 --> 00:23:08,459
Magnitude of the event that we think is

597
00:23:08,459 --> 00:23:10,918
going to happen in that geographic region where

598
00:23:10,918 --> 00:23:13,615
we're putting this... Whether it's the structure or

599
00:23:13,615 --> 00:23:14,224
the bridge

600
00:23:14,662 --> 00:23:17,448
or or whatever system is there. And,

601
00:23:19,040 --> 00:23:21,030
usually, we do a pretty good job. And

602
00:23:21,030 --> 00:23:22,622
then when we don't, that's when we learn,

603
00:23:22,860 --> 00:23:24,625
and we realize okay, What can we do

604
00:23:24,625 --> 00:23:26,054
about that? And I think we saw that

605
00:23:26,054 --> 00:23:28,277
even with the earthquake in Taiwan with Taipei

606
00:23:28,277 --> 00:23:30,897
01:01 and and the ball doing exactly what

607
00:23:30,897 --> 00:23:31,611
it was supposed to do.

608
00:23:32,344 --> 00:23:33,622
And those... So really,

609
00:23:34,741 --> 00:23:36,578
1 of the things I think that's exciting

610
00:23:36,578 --> 00:23:40,183
about engineering is that we use... The principles

611
00:23:40,183 --> 00:23:42,724
of the natural world, the physics principles, the

612
00:23:42,724 --> 00:23:45,345
mathematical equations that describe those principles to do

613
00:23:45,345 --> 00:23:47,012
our best to predict the future.

614
00:23:47,744 --> 00:23:50,616
And the predict future part that's the hardest

615
00:23:50,616 --> 00:23:52,771
part is what kind of demand are are

616
00:23:52,771 --> 00:23:54,925
they gonna experience over their life?

617
00:23:55,499 --> 00:23:58,067
And that's a vessel collision of this size

618
00:23:58,681 --> 00:23:58,920
or,

619
00:24:00,114 --> 00:24:02,421
natural disaster is really thinking about what's the

620
00:24:02,421 --> 00:24:04,172
worst thing that could happen to this structure.

621
00:24:04,744 --> 00:24:06,652
And can it withstand it. And we almost

622
00:24:06,652 --> 00:24:07,845
look at it in tears.

623
00:24:08,322 --> 00:24:09,935
And really that first tier

624
00:24:10,627 --> 00:24:13,107
is that you wanted to stay open that

625
00:24:13,107 --> 00:24:15,017
people can get you know, people can get

626
00:24:15,017 --> 00:24:17,244
off it safely, that you have enough warning,

627
00:24:18,676 --> 00:24:21,158
the... Or that you know, hopefully, that it

628
00:24:21,158 --> 00:24:23,069
stays open and minimal damage. If you have

629
00:24:23,069 --> 00:24:23,626
a critical...

630
00:24:24,343 --> 00:24:26,254
If the... If your critical is very high.

631
00:24:26,572 --> 00:24:28,577
For example, if it's a 1 path, out

632
00:24:28,577 --> 00:24:30,350
of an area. If your 1

633
00:24:30,884 --> 00:24:33,509
path for first responders, you know, you're really

634
00:24:33,509 --> 00:24:35,100
going to put a lot of effort to

635
00:24:35,100 --> 00:24:36,888
make sure not only can that bridge

636
00:24:37,820 --> 00:24:39,649
survive a storm, but stay open during a

637
00:24:39,649 --> 00:24:39,967
storm.

638
00:24:40,524 --> 00:24:42,528
And then, you know, can it survive the

639
00:24:42,528 --> 00:24:44,118
store, maybe it can't be open during it,

640
00:24:44,277 --> 00:24:46,424
but it can survive it or survive with

641
00:24:46,424 --> 00:24:48,809
minor repairs, and then the worst case scenario

642
00:24:48,809 --> 00:24:50,956
there the can't that you have either collapse

643
00:24:50,956 --> 00:24:52,481
or a replacement. At But,

644
00:24:53,197 --> 00:24:56,856
given resources available, it's usually that tiered of

645
00:24:56,856 --> 00:24:58,766
what what kind of risk can we accept.

646
00:24:59,496 --> 00:25:01,722
And you know, obviously, we do our best

647
00:25:01,722 --> 00:25:04,583
to make sure that the loss of of

648
00:25:04,583 --> 00:25:07,285
life is that is protected as best as

649
00:25:07,285 --> 00:25:09,769
as we can. With with are the knowledge

650
00:25:09,769 --> 00:25:10,328
that we have.

651
00:25:11,285 --> 00:25:13,757
So you talked about various different, sort of

652
00:25:13,757 --> 00:25:16,548
bridge collapse mechanisms you like that have happened

653
00:25:16,548 --> 00:25:18,078
historically in the lessons we've learned from there.

654
00:25:18,317 --> 00:25:20,548
Whether... Whether it's the the fire, the Gus

655
00:25:20,548 --> 00:25:22,699
plate in Minneapolis or in this case, with

656
00:25:22,699 --> 00:25:24,213
the Baltimore bridge, the key bridge,

657
00:25:24,930 --> 00:25:27,569
and you know, a poor inadequate defense and

658
00:25:27,569 --> 00:25:28,683
possibly design contributions.

659
00:25:29,398 --> 00:25:31,489
What do you think is the

660
00:25:31,943 --> 00:25:34,647
next lesson we will hopefully learn without having

661
00:25:34,647 --> 00:25:36,808
a tech catastrophe. What's the thing with is

662
00:25:36,808 --> 00:25:39,035
sort of missing that you haven't patched up

663
00:25:39,035 --> 00:25:39,273
yet?

664
00:25:40,386 --> 00:25:42,397
I think a lot of what we're learning

665
00:25:42,453 --> 00:25:43,987
it about is the

666
00:25:44,362 --> 00:25:45,992
impact of repeated

667
00:25:46,689 --> 00:25:49,161
fatigue use, and we're we're learning more about

668
00:25:49,161 --> 00:25:52,112
that, taking better care of the bridges, realizing

669
00:25:52,112 --> 00:25:54,346
that, not only if we take better care

670
00:25:54,346 --> 00:25:56,107
of the structural actual side. But if we

671
00:25:56,107 --> 00:25:57,693
take better care of how they're used.

672
00:25:58,328 --> 00:25:59,462
So really monitoring

673
00:25:59,834 --> 00:26:01,658
not... And I know people get a little

674
00:26:01,658 --> 00:26:04,540
squirrel about structural if we're monitoring kind of

675
00:26:04,540 --> 00:26:07,733
your your vehicle weight, they're in, you know,

676
00:26:07,813 --> 00:26:09,330
in the United States, especially in New Hampshire,

677
00:26:09,490 --> 00:26:11,246
our armada is live free or die. So

678
00:26:11,246 --> 00:26:12,535
nobody likes, to be monitored,

679
00:26:13,012 --> 00:26:15,422
but from a bridges use standpoint,

680
00:26:15,797 --> 00:26:18,262
most of our vehicles are communicating all the

681
00:26:18,262 --> 00:26:20,912
time to communicating how much they weigh they're

682
00:26:20,912 --> 00:26:22,589
communicating if they're anti like breaks are in.

683
00:26:22,909 --> 00:26:24,826
So I think with that data, we use

684
00:26:24,826 --> 00:26:26,025
it for traffic management.

685
00:26:26,440 --> 00:26:28,039
To be able to bring that into asset

686
00:26:28,039 --> 00:26:30,279
management, so we have a better sense of

687
00:26:30,279 --> 00:26:31,399
the history of use.

688
00:26:32,039 --> 00:26:33,480
So we can get in front of some

689
00:26:33,480 --> 00:26:36,050
of these fracture failures. I think we're already

690
00:26:36,050 --> 00:26:36,949
seeing that

691
00:26:37,325 --> 00:26:39,796
because people are very lea if we were

692
00:26:39,796 --> 00:26:42,585
using that to give citations for overloaded vehicles.

693
00:26:42,918 --> 00:26:44,348
But if we're using it just for the

694
00:26:44,348 --> 00:26:47,288
public safety of, this bridge is actually getting

695
00:26:47,288 --> 00:26:48,639
overloaded multiple times.

696
00:26:49,195 --> 00:26:51,261
I think that's almost like a better use.

697
00:26:51,595 --> 00:26:52,474
Of the data,

698
00:26:53,035 --> 00:26:54,794
I think and and I think that we...

699
00:26:55,035 --> 00:26:56,794
You know, when you see that the the

700
00:26:56,794 --> 00:26:58,849
bridge collapse, I think it was in Indonesia

701
00:26:59,049 --> 00:27:01,123
and it was a 10 year old suspension

702
00:27:01,123 --> 00:27:02,798
bridge. Am Might be having the wrong country.

703
00:27:02,957 --> 00:27:04,792
But it was because it was constantly being

704
00:27:04,792 --> 00:27:05,292
overloaded

705
00:27:05,749 --> 00:27:07,126
because their their major

706
00:27:07,743 --> 00:27:08,540
export was timber.

707
00:27:09,114 --> 00:27:12,390
So lack of management of the the use.

708
00:27:12,710 --> 00:27:14,808
So I think that because

709
00:27:15,347 --> 00:27:17,559
we have cars that are communicating everything else

710
00:27:17,680 --> 00:27:20,080
everything out about them at all times.

711
00:27:20,559 --> 00:27:22,480
And we're using that data in a lot

712
00:27:22,480 --> 00:27:24,240
of different ways, and we like that data

713
00:27:24,240 --> 00:27:25,840
because that tells us it's 6 minutes to

714
00:27:25,840 --> 00:27:28,250
the airport. Or 12 minutes and we're using

715
00:27:28,250 --> 00:27:30,723
that mostly by communication either from the car

716
00:27:30,723 --> 00:27:32,638
or cell phones in the car, but you

717
00:27:32,638 --> 00:27:34,405
have a sense of the use So I

718
00:27:34,405 --> 00:27:36,651
think we're going to... And I'm hoping

719
00:27:37,659 --> 00:27:39,191
that using that data

720
00:27:39,723 --> 00:27:41,628
will help us with actually how the bridges

721
00:27:41,628 --> 00:27:42,422
are being used.

722
00:27:42,833 --> 00:27:44,656
And we can use that as better input

723
00:27:44,656 --> 00:27:45,607
for that demand.

724
00:27:46,320 --> 00:27:48,302
Sorry, and and again, I'm not an Ai

725
00:27:48,302 --> 00:27:49,570
person. I know it exists I don't know

726
00:27:49,570 --> 00:27:51,013
how to use it. But I feel like

727
00:27:51,013 --> 00:27:53,870
there's a lot of that's using machine learning

728
00:27:53,870 --> 00:27:56,250
and machine vision as we're bringing in that

729
00:27:56,250 --> 00:27:58,234
demand data that is just coming in in

730
00:27:58,234 --> 00:27:58,472
drove.

731
00:27:59,043 --> 00:28:01,578
I... When I talk with, my colleagues in

732
00:28:01,578 --> 00:28:03,163
computer science, I think I have big data

733
00:28:03,163 --> 00:28:04,509
and they're like, you you do not have

734
00:28:04,509 --> 00:28:04,906
big data.

735
00:28:05,856 --> 00:28:08,739
Like, Google's buying data is big data. Your

736
00:28:08,739 --> 00:28:11,687
data about the the temperature and the stream

737
00:28:11,687 --> 00:28:13,360
effects on a bridge is is not big

738
00:28:13,360 --> 00:28:15,591
data, but I can still use those tools.

739
00:28:16,084 --> 00:28:17,763
So I can predict the effect of the

740
00:28:17,763 --> 00:28:18,562
bridge during,

741
00:28:19,361 --> 00:28:21,998
different weather weather conditions. I think that's where

742
00:28:21,998 --> 00:28:23,916
we'll have a lot of learning because we'll

743
00:28:23,916 --> 00:28:24,955
have such a better...

744
00:28:25,688 --> 00:28:27,762
Handle on the demand that the bridge is

745
00:28:27,762 --> 00:28:28,262
experiencing.

746
00:28:35,835 --> 00:28:38,154
I'm gonna bring your mechanical engineering colleague Martin

747
00:28:38,234 --> 00:28:40,555
Was now because the 2 of you C

748
00:28:40,555 --> 00:28:42,394
lead a project called the living bridge that

749
00:28:42,394 --> 00:28:45,208
focuses on understanding the stresses and strains. Bridges

750
00:28:45,208 --> 00:28:48,560
face under everyday conditions, and therefore, hopefully, once

751
00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:50,715
you understand those conditions you can prevent those

752
00:28:50,715 --> 00:28:53,110
bridges from failing. Martin, what's that project involve?

753
00:28:53,269 --> 00:28:55,778
But So the living bridge project

754
00:28:56,554 --> 00:29:00,083
is is called that because we instrument

755
00:29:00,699 --> 00:29:02,076
a bridge to

756
00:29:02,468 --> 00:29:04,941
have it talk to us on on how

757
00:29:04,941 --> 00:29:06,377
it senses loads,

758
00:29:07,892 --> 00:29:11,162
also feed its feeds itself was locally available

759
00:29:11,162 --> 00:29:13,565
renewable energy, which case in this case is

760
00:29:13,565 --> 00:29:16,109
title energy, and hence the living rich product.

761
00:29:16,745 --> 00:29:18,653
So it is sensing how it is doing.

762
00:29:18,891 --> 00:29:20,738
It is talking to us, and that it

763
00:29:20,738 --> 00:29:23,133
feeds itself with with renewable in energy. What

764
00:29:23,133 --> 00:29:24,969
do you mean feeds itself? I mean, how

765
00:29:24,969 --> 00:29:25,527
how does that work?

766
00:29:26,485 --> 00:29:29,095
This is some... The bread we chose is

767
00:29:29,690 --> 00:29:30,190
the

768
00:29:30,643 --> 00:29:32,232
memorial bridge in downtown ports,

769
00:29:32,947 --> 00:29:35,648
which is the bridge over title est. Bridges

770
00:29:35,648 --> 00:29:38,451
over title est are typically built at narrow

771
00:29:38,508 --> 00:29:38,960
locations

772
00:29:39,319 --> 00:29:40,679
with the currents are very fast.

773
00:29:41,319 --> 00:29:43,659
And hence, these are good locations to actually

774
00:29:43,720 --> 00:29:45,720
convert some of the available kinetic energy in

775
00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:47,159
the tides as they move in and out,

776
00:29:47,319 --> 00:29:48,440
they flown in both directions.

777
00:29:49,571 --> 00:29:53,556
With tidal turbines to, provide electric energy for

778
00:29:53,556 --> 00:29:56,999
bridge operation and sense sensors bridge operation and

779
00:29:56,999 --> 00:30:00,595
actually turn bridges into internet power producers, net

780
00:30:00,595 --> 00:30:02,673
power plants in general. What the bridge does

781
00:30:02,673 --> 00:30:04,750
with the energy is to basically power its

782
00:30:04,750 --> 00:30:07,234
sensors. And and make sure that that... That's

783
00:30:07,234 --> 00:30:09,462
going on rather than using solar electricity or

784
00:30:09,462 --> 00:30:11,611
or wiring it up? Yes. It that it's

785
00:30:11,611 --> 00:30:12,963
used for sensors and more,

786
00:30:14,077 --> 00:30:16,395
many cases. Solar panels might be an easier.

787
00:30:16,713 --> 00:30:19,015
Choice just to power sensors, of course, but

788
00:30:19,253 --> 00:30:21,317
there's quite a bit of title energy available

789
00:30:21,317 --> 00:30:23,381
in in fast moving est, so this might

790
00:30:23,381 --> 00:30:25,387
like be an opportunity need to combine

791
00:30:26,024 --> 00:30:28,516
transportation infrastructure with title energy

792
00:30:28,971 --> 00:30:30,507
installations to actually have

793
00:30:30,818 --> 00:30:33,518
small title power plants under a bridge. So

794
00:30:33,518 --> 00:30:35,186
what have you learned from the project so

795
00:30:35,186 --> 00:30:36,775
so far? What has the bridge told you?

796
00:30:37,490 --> 00:30:39,793
My part of this project is underneath everything.

797
00:30:40,604 --> 00:30:43,721
Above the water. Martin's part is everything below

798
00:30:43,721 --> 00:30:45,319
the water or below the bridge I should

799
00:30:45,319 --> 00:30:48,196
say. So from our side, this bridge is

800
00:30:48,196 --> 00:30:50,528
a gus list steel trust bridge and it's

801
00:30:50,528 --> 00:30:53,006
a movable bridge. So that means that the

802
00:30:53,006 --> 00:30:55,963
vertical lift span, which weighs about a million

803
00:30:55,963 --> 00:30:56,463
pounds

804
00:30:56,842 --> 00:30:58,061
gives me a really

805
00:30:58,760 --> 00:30:59,580
impact load

806
00:30:59,894 --> 00:31:02,684
every half an hour from our Memorial Day,

807
00:31:02,844 --> 00:31:04,758
which is in May till labor day in

808
00:31:04,917 --> 00:31:06,751
August so all summer long. So I have

809
00:31:06,751 --> 00:31:09,634
these really nice high impact loads. That give

810
00:31:09,634 --> 00:31:09,873
me,

811
00:31:10,826 --> 00:31:13,790
response data on how these gus list trust

812
00:31:13,846 --> 00:31:16,628
connections are behaving. Also, the bridges is very,

813
00:31:17,184 --> 00:31:17,684
s

814
00:31:18,074 --> 00:31:19,690
So it's again a very elegant

815
00:31:20,306 --> 00:31:21,980
profile, and 1 of the things we're looking

816
00:31:21,980 --> 00:31:24,233
at is how is that vibration affected

817
00:31:24,849 --> 00:31:26,125
by the fact that it was a much...

818
00:31:26,379 --> 00:31:29,171
Broader, and much wider bridge, tower and now

819
00:31:29,171 --> 00:31:31,643
it's much narrower tower. So we're... We collect

820
00:31:31,643 --> 00:31:32,122
that data,

821
00:31:32,839 --> 00:31:35,653
we're actually learned about this gus list trust

822
00:31:35,711 --> 00:31:36,164
connection

823
00:31:36,522 --> 00:31:39,646
its behavior in the field is really surpassing

824
00:31:39,702 --> 00:31:40,202
all

825
00:31:40,815 --> 00:31:41,133
expectations.

826
00:31:41,690 --> 00:31:45,464
It's, a very robust connection. It allows for

827
00:31:45,521 --> 00:31:46,021
load

828
00:31:46,396 --> 00:31:48,782
distribution. We have matched that with data in

829
00:31:48,782 --> 00:31:51,502
our lab where we have a, half... Scale

830
00:31:51,502 --> 00:31:53,250
or a 1 to 2 scale model of

831
00:31:53,250 --> 00:31:56,588
this gus list connection, which uses bent steel

832
00:31:56,588 --> 00:31:57,088
fl

833
00:31:57,622 --> 00:32:00,006
welded to a a web, a steel web,

834
00:32:01,138 --> 00:32:04,012
and we put about 2000000 cycles at about

835
00:32:04,012 --> 00:32:07,444
a hundred thousand pounds of tension, and nothing.

836
00:32:07,684 --> 00:32:09,440
We saw no change in behavior.

837
00:32:10,570 --> 00:32:13,514
We did very mean things to this connection.

838
00:32:13,673 --> 00:32:16,935
We go out the wells on, 6 inches

839
00:32:16,935 --> 00:32:19,898
on either side of the web We drilled

840
00:32:19,898 --> 00:32:22,534
holes in areas that you don't want holes

841
00:32:22,534 --> 00:32:24,472
in, and we're still seeing force

842
00:32:25,011 --> 00:32:25,650
redistribution across.

843
00:32:26,303 --> 00:32:28,923
That which gives the redundancy and me... Means

844
00:32:28,923 --> 00:32:31,226
that that connection is a very robust connection.

845
00:32:31,623 --> 00:32:33,687
That's probably from our side, the biggest,

846
00:32:34,580 --> 00:32:36,420
takeaway has been, but, 1 of the other

847
00:32:36,420 --> 00:32:38,580
things we've seen is we've seen no change

848
00:32:38,580 --> 00:32:39,480
in behavior

849
00:32:39,860 --> 00:32:42,180
when we added the title turbine and 1

850
00:32:42,180 --> 00:32:45,072
of the big concerns that bridge owners had

851
00:32:45,072 --> 00:32:47,567
when we started this project 10 years ago

852
00:32:47,626 --> 00:32:50,020
is the bridge has so many demands on

853
00:32:50,020 --> 00:32:53,467
it. What additional demand is this turbine going

854
00:32:53,467 --> 00:32:55,302
to create. Am I going to have another

855
00:32:55,302 --> 00:32:55,802
maintenance

856
00:32:56,737 --> 00:32:58,572
issue is this going to put more demand

857
00:32:58,572 --> 00:33:01,204
on my peers and what we've really seen

858
00:33:01,204 --> 00:33:03,774
is that the force impact of having even

859
00:33:03,774 --> 00:33:05,315
an operational termite

860
00:33:05,855 --> 00:33:08,575
attached to this bridge pier is really in

861
00:33:08,575 --> 00:33:09,315
the noise

862
00:33:09,615 --> 00:33:11,889
of design elements in the... Other

863
00:33:12,904 --> 00:33:15,058
demands that the bridge experiences. So that kind

864
00:33:15,058 --> 00:33:17,769
of opens the door for as Martin had

865
00:33:17,769 --> 00:33:20,880
mentioned, looking at these bridges as being opportunities,

866
00:33:21,134 --> 00:33:22,515
for renewable energy

867
00:33:22,815 --> 00:33:23,315
installations

868
00:33:23,855 --> 00:33:25,695
because especially if you think of either a

869
00:33:25,695 --> 00:33:29,055
wind turbine or a tidal turbine, the the

870
00:33:29,055 --> 00:33:30,515
structure of that turbine

871
00:33:30,828 --> 00:33:32,895
is meant that it shouldn't move. And the

872
00:33:32,895 --> 00:33:35,599
bridge really has 1 really big job don't

873
00:33:35,599 --> 00:33:37,985
move. So if you attach a turbine to

874
00:33:37,985 --> 00:33:39,996
a bridge pair that's not supposed to move

875
00:33:40,052 --> 00:33:40,291
anyways,

876
00:33:40,864 --> 00:33:42,622
and we can put it in a location

877
00:33:42,622 --> 00:33:45,579
where maybe it's not grid level energy, but

878
00:33:45,579 --> 00:33:46,558
this distributed

879
00:33:47,177 --> 00:33:47,576
energy

880
00:33:48,375 --> 00:33:49,015
conversion system,

881
00:33:49,508 --> 00:33:51,654
where instead of the bridge as Martin said

882
00:33:51,654 --> 00:33:54,040
being something that's pulling power off the grid

883
00:33:54,040 --> 00:33:56,186
something that's either putting power back in the

884
00:33:56,186 --> 00:33:58,333
grid just depending on the array of turbines

885
00:33:58,333 --> 00:34:00,339
that you have to deployed there, or at

886
00:34:00,339 --> 00:34:03,127
least self sustaining. And I think our,

887
00:34:04,242 --> 00:34:06,154
1 of our goals when we started this

888
00:34:06,154 --> 00:34:08,226
project because we started this project right around

889
00:34:08,226 --> 00:34:10,637
when super storm Sandy had hit New York

890
00:34:10,637 --> 00:34:13,594
and New Jersey was that if we

891
00:34:14,153 --> 00:34:17,190
had this... The title turbine that's installed at

892
00:34:17,190 --> 00:34:17,670
the bridge,

893
00:34:18,241 --> 00:34:20,782
If we had an extreme event where you

894
00:34:20,782 --> 00:34:23,743
lost power that the energy created

895
00:34:24,116 --> 00:34:26,260
by that turbine would be able to power

896
00:34:26,260 --> 00:34:28,263
1 lift and this kind of goes back

897
00:34:28,263 --> 00:34:30,253
to what we were talking about before that

898
00:34:30,253 --> 00:34:33,277
bridges our obstruction to vessel traffic.

899
00:34:33,835 --> 00:34:34,551
So really,

900
00:34:35,282 --> 00:34:36,871
And in an extreme event, you would need

901
00:34:36,871 --> 00:34:38,936
that bridge to be open to allow for

902
00:34:38,936 --> 00:34:40,445
vessel traffic and,

903
00:34:41,240 --> 00:34:43,146
a 1 way to harden our infrastructure,

904
00:34:43,718 --> 00:34:45,865
not from a structural standpoint, but just from

905
00:34:45,865 --> 00:34:47,876
a use a usability standpoint

906
00:34:48,251 --> 00:34:48,648
and

907
00:34:49,443 --> 00:34:51,193
that they have to allow for all different

908
00:34:51,193 --> 00:34:53,278
traffic and That's what we've learned from the

909
00:34:53,278 --> 00:34:55,987
bridge piece. Also, Martin has been able to

910
00:34:55,987 --> 00:34:58,457
collect data about the the tides that are

911
00:34:58,457 --> 00:35:01,109
running in. And some of the characteristics of

912
00:35:01,109 --> 00:35:03,750
the water the water below, which was a

913
00:35:03,750 --> 00:35:05,989
unique aspect of this project as well.

914
00:35:06,884 --> 00:35:08,243
Martin, you wanna tell me a bit more

915
00:35:08,243 --> 00:35:09,042
about, about

916
00:35:09,521 --> 00:35:11,359
what you've learned from this project below below

917
00:35:11,359 --> 00:35:11,839
the surface?

918
00:35:12,718 --> 00:35:15,435
Yeah. Sure. Happy to. Just just to emphasize

919
00:35:15,435 --> 00:35:17,680
the the... Drilling and guarding holes into the

920
00:35:17,680 --> 00:35:19,430
steel that was in a model, not not

921
00:35:19,430 --> 00:35:21,180
on the actual bridge. That wasn't the way

922
00:35:21,180 --> 00:35:22,771
to clarify. Good to clarify.

923
00:35:23,661 --> 00:35:26,685
Lab. So from from a title energy conversion

924
00:35:26,685 --> 00:35:27,083
perspective,

925
00:35:27,799 --> 00:35:28,299
we

926
00:35:28,754 --> 00:35:31,221
have basically created a platform of opportunity where

927
00:35:31,221 --> 00:35:33,860
we can, test turbines and do all sorts

928
00:35:33,860 --> 00:35:36,906
of other important measurements about high

929
00:35:37,281 --> 00:35:41,038
conversion and how it impact the environment. So

930
00:35:41,038 --> 00:35:42,973
we've had a title turbine in there since,

931
00:35:43,191 --> 00:35:44,466
2018.

932
00:35:45,025 --> 00:35:46,083
We've got gathered

933
00:35:46,619 --> 00:35:48,387
a lot of data on this in terms

934
00:35:48,387 --> 00:35:49,580
of power and loads.

935
00:35:50,058 --> 00:35:51,274
We've also done measurements

936
00:35:51,650 --> 00:35:53,980
with acoustic sensors to see how much noise

937
00:35:54,275 --> 00:35:56,265
this turbo adds to the to the aquatic

938
00:35:56,265 --> 00:35:57,795
environment and it's x actually

939
00:35:58,515 --> 00:36:00,994
much quieter than than the noise that's already,

940
00:36:01,315 --> 00:36:04,755
in, this location due to it being, fairly

941
00:36:04,755 --> 00:36:07,873
busy port So that was found to not

942
00:36:07,873 --> 00:36:11,072
be a problem. We've also looked at, possible

943
00:36:11,287 --> 00:36:12,978
interactions with with fish,

944
00:36:13,925 --> 00:36:14,804
we haven't seen any.

945
00:36:15,684 --> 00:36:17,364
That does not mean that they don't

946
00:36:17,764 --> 00:36:19,844
can't occur, but we have not observed any

947
00:36:19,844 --> 00:36:21,204
which is which is which is a good

948
00:36:21,204 --> 00:36:21,684
thing now,

949
00:36:22,259 --> 00:36:24,253
fish generally tend to stay away from,

950
00:36:25,211 --> 00:36:27,626
these kind of structures and high turbulence areas

951
00:36:27,764 --> 00:36:29,360
when when the currents are running fast,

952
00:36:30,253 --> 00:36:32,009
and that's the only time this treble is

953
00:36:32,009 --> 00:36:34,803
actually... It's actually rotating. It's rotating fairly slowly.

954
00:36:35,122 --> 00:36:36,400
So the the... All we have in there

955
00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,555
right now road rotate at about maybe 22.

956
00:36:38,969 --> 00:36:41,283
30 Rpm. So we think it's a fairly

957
00:36:41,283 --> 00:36:43,199
benign way to actually, convert some of the

958
00:36:43,199 --> 00:36:46,253
kinetic energy. We've learned a lot about challenges

959
00:36:47,283 --> 00:36:49,186
the debris and in the water and how

960
00:36:49,186 --> 00:36:51,011
that interacts was true turbines and platforms.

961
00:36:52,042 --> 00:36:53,097
And we've we've,

962
00:36:53,628 --> 00:36:55,239
I guess, demonstrated enough

963
00:36:55,549 --> 00:36:57,867
good things with this installation that it is

964
00:36:57,867 --> 00:37:00,764
now becoming a a scaled title test site

965
00:37:00,823 --> 00:37:02,820
funded by the department of Energy. 1 thing

966
00:37:02,820 --> 00:37:04,432
we're working on currently is like a much

967
00:37:04,432 --> 00:37:06,822
more instrument version of of a term building

968
00:37:06,822 --> 00:37:08,837
a new that will go in

969
00:37:09,213 --> 00:37:11,206
likely later this year or early next year.

970
00:37:11,525 --> 00:37:13,847
Actually And that is in collaboration with several

971
00:37:13,847 --> 00:37:15,995
national labs, Sand National laboratory,

972
00:37:16,473 --> 00:37:19,894
National Noble Laboratory and Pacific Northwest National laboratory.

973
00:37:20,053 --> 00:37:22,857
So this a lot of interest in understanding

974
00:37:22,857 --> 00:37:25,248
how how this... How tight energy works, and

975
00:37:25,567 --> 00:37:27,560
and then looking at in what locations, it

976
00:37:27,560 --> 00:37:28,437
can actually be

977
00:37:29,409 --> 00:37:31,969
could be built out, and and then be

978
00:37:31,969 --> 00:37:32,449
implemented.

979
00:37:32,769 --> 00:37:34,630
Our s is is a

980
00:37:35,489 --> 00:37:38,140
comparatively small, but very energetic as tree, so

981
00:37:38,140 --> 00:37:39,889
it's great for testing these things.

982
00:37:40,524 --> 00:37:42,670
It is not a probably not a good

983
00:37:42,670 --> 00:37:43,862
location to try to build this out to

984
00:37:43,862 --> 00:37:44,949
larger installation

985
00:37:45,710 --> 00:37:47,789
however, as you're put in new bridges,

986
00:37:48,670 --> 00:37:49,170
you

987
00:37:49,469 --> 00:37:51,389
should consider whether that makes sense to actually

988
00:37:51,389 --> 00:37:51,889
cooperating.

989
00:37:52,364 --> 00:37:54,679
You know, arrays of of these turbines under

990
00:37:54,679 --> 00:37:57,393
the bridge in certain locations. And, Aaron and

991
00:37:57,473 --> 00:37:59,070
I actually studied that with a number of

992
00:37:59,070 --> 00:38:00,747
students a few years ago, and it it

993
00:38:00,747 --> 00:38:01,920
turns out that if you

994
00:38:02,356 --> 00:38:03,865
If you do this in a very modular

995
00:38:03,865 --> 00:38:05,294
fashion and then have

996
00:38:06,009 --> 00:38:07,597
once you get up to certain number of

997
00:38:07,597 --> 00:38:09,900
devices install outside of the shipping lanes, it

998
00:38:09,900 --> 00:38:11,035
actually is is

999
00:38:11,661 --> 00:38:13,805
not such a terrible economic proposition anymore more

1000
00:38:13,805 --> 00:38:14,043
either.

1001
00:38:14,837 --> 00:38:15,869
Generally speaking,

1002
00:38:17,139 --> 00:38:19,777
any marine energy will be more expensive than

1003
00:38:19,777 --> 00:38:21,768
land based energy just because you're dealing with

1004
00:38:21,768 --> 00:38:24,157
this, you know, challenging environment that's cor,

1005
00:38:24,795 --> 00:38:26,945
and and you have to debris and other

1006
00:38:26,945 --> 00:38:28,083
another issues, so

1007
00:38:28,713 --> 00:38:31,581
possible flooding of of of electrical components and

1008
00:38:31,581 --> 00:38:33,175
such. So you have to look at the

1009
00:38:33,175 --> 00:38:35,247
value that it actually adds to having that,

1010
00:38:35,406 --> 00:38:37,335
which is in the case of tile energy.

1011
00:38:37,414 --> 00:38:39,885
It's its predictability and and having another energy

1012
00:38:39,885 --> 00:38:41,799
source that is available when, for example,

1013
00:38:42,436 --> 00:38:44,405
solar wind is is not

1014
00:38:45,004 --> 00:38:46,601
So do you think that this sort of,

1015
00:38:47,161 --> 00:38:49,318
living bridge project is is scalable Is it

1016
00:38:49,318 --> 00:38:50,915
something you'd like to see applied to other

1017
00:38:50,915 --> 00:38:53,089
bridges, you know kind of replacing the idea

1018
00:38:53,089 --> 00:38:54,389
that bridge inspection,

1019
00:38:54,690 --> 00:38:54,929
is,

1020
00:38:55,570 --> 00:38:57,329
is just something you do every 6 months

1021
00:38:57,329 --> 00:38:59,269
or every 6 years or whatever the regulatory

1022
00:38:59,329 --> 00:39:01,575
environment says. It's and also replacing the idea

1023
00:39:01,575 --> 00:39:03,243
that ab bridges a static thing that that

1024
00:39:03,243 --> 00:39:05,626
doesn't do anything other than conveyed traffic with

1025
00:39:05,626 --> 00:39:08,167
the idea that a bridge might be part

1026
00:39:08,167 --> 00:39:10,569
of... A solution should generate energy and might

1027
00:39:10,569 --> 00:39:12,798
least be self supporting in that sense. Is

1028
00:39:12,798 --> 00:39:14,549
that really scalable? Can you be... You imagine

1029
00:39:14,549 --> 00:39:17,016
it being implemented in other bridges around the

1030
00:39:17,016 --> 00:39:17,892
world around the country?

1031
00:39:18,545 --> 00:39:20,385
I would say I can. It is just

1032
00:39:20,385 --> 00:39:22,704
a question of how do you set this

1033
00:39:22,704 --> 00:39:25,984
up to to minimize the effort involved and

1034
00:39:25,984 --> 00:39:28,390
looking after. The same goes for for

1035
00:39:28,947 --> 00:39:30,937
ongoing bridge measurements. Right? So you can we

1036
00:39:30,937 --> 00:39:32,289
can put all the senses we want on

1037
00:39:32,289 --> 00:39:34,534
there and they give us great information. How

1038
00:39:34,534 --> 00:39:36,847
do you maintain that infrastructure you know, 10:20,

1039
00:39:37,086 --> 00:39:38,442
30 is down the road when you have

1040
00:39:38,442 --> 00:39:40,196
to upgrade systems? And can you really... Can

1041
00:39:40,196 --> 00:39:41,791
you really provide what a sort of a

1042
00:39:41,791 --> 00:39:43,806
good way to provide long term

1043
00:39:45,237 --> 00:39:47,974
structural health monitoring measurements and and and

1044
00:39:48,433 --> 00:39:49,711
and in the same vein, what is a

1045
00:39:49,711 --> 00:39:50,771
good way to provide

1046
00:39:52,119 --> 00:39:53,177
some long term

1047
00:39:54,271 --> 00:39:54,771
energy

1048
00:39:55,306 --> 00:39:56,820
addition to to title

1049
00:39:57,297 --> 00:39:58,515
to to est bridges

1050
00:39:58,971 --> 00:40:01,079
that does not require a

1051
00:40:01,537 --> 00:40:03,134
an immense amount of maintenance, which was sort

1052
00:40:03,134 --> 00:40:05,130
of, in, you know, kind of make it

1053
00:40:05,130 --> 00:40:07,525
make it not not so feasible way. So

1054
00:40:07,525 --> 00:40:09,041
that's all that's that's... Those are the hard

1055
00:40:09,041 --> 00:40:10,412
questions to to

1056
00:40:11,525 --> 00:40:12,320
to address

1057
00:40:12,876 --> 00:40:14,228
on how to actually make this work.

1058
00:40:15,023 --> 00:40:16,851
Aaron you would add to that? Yeah. I

1059
00:40:16,851 --> 00:40:18,838
think that 1 of the things that I

1060
00:40:18,838 --> 00:40:19,338
hope

1061
00:40:20,128 --> 00:40:21,005
as we see,

1062
00:40:21,723 --> 00:40:23,238
this last administration

1063
00:40:23,796 --> 00:40:26,748
actually created an office of transportation and energy.

1064
00:40:27,226 --> 00:40:28,821
So that was the first time we had

1065
00:40:28,821 --> 00:40:29,061
that,

1066
00:40:29,634 --> 00:40:31,625
where we see, you know, usually the secretary

1067
00:40:31,625 --> 00:40:34,095
of transportation and the secretary of energy is

1068
00:40:34,095 --> 00:40:36,246
actually a combined office. The goal of that

1069
00:40:36,246 --> 00:40:37,636
office was really about

1070
00:40:38,010 --> 00:40:40,975
electrification for electric vehicles, but I do hope

1071
00:40:41,032 --> 00:40:44,371
that that expands so that we, at least

1072
00:40:44,371 --> 00:40:45,961
in the United States and hopefully crossed the

1073
00:40:45,961 --> 00:40:47,813
world. It that we... That we get away

1074
00:40:47,813 --> 00:40:50,849
from that siloed use of of our different

1075
00:40:50,849 --> 00:40:54,066
assets, especially our public assets, so that our

1076
00:40:54,205 --> 00:40:54,980
transportation asset

1077
00:40:55,337 --> 00:40:59,074
could actually be, a, benefit to our... In

1078
00:40:59,074 --> 00:41:01,458
in our energy assets or in our communication.

1079
00:41:01,617 --> 00:41:03,619
We we do see that where you'll have

1080
00:41:03,619 --> 00:41:05,366
a bridge that will carry a water line

1081
00:41:05,366 --> 00:41:07,375
or it carries power lines or it carries

1082
00:41:07,827 --> 00:41:08,804
Dsl lines

1083
00:41:09,495 --> 00:41:12,478
from there. So really, that... That more intense

1084
00:41:12,858 --> 00:41:15,894
integration that actually happens not as an after,

1085
00:41:16,134 --> 00:41:17,433
kind of an aftermarket

1086
00:41:17,972 --> 00:41:20,210
integration, but something that happens during the planning

1087
00:41:20,210 --> 00:41:20,610
stages.

1088
00:41:21,104 --> 00:41:21,923
And that's

1089
00:41:22,460 --> 00:41:24,716
where this particular bridge, we were

1090
00:41:25,094 --> 00:41:28,047
we were aware. The the designer was aware

1091
00:41:28,047 --> 00:41:30,695
of our intent, but because the bridge was

1092
00:41:30,695 --> 00:41:31,732
AAA

1093
00:41:31,732 --> 00:41:35,321
replacement due to structural deficiency, the they... The

1094
00:41:35,321 --> 00:41:37,395
original bridge had been closed to structural deficiency,

1095
00:41:37,554 --> 00:41:40,358
So it was a very fast paste project

1096
00:41:40,358 --> 00:41:41,471
for its replacement.

1097
00:41:42,107 --> 00:41:44,891
We didn't have the opportunity to actually integrate

1098
00:41:44,891 --> 00:41:47,927
this turbine idea into the design to but

1099
00:41:48,086 --> 00:41:50,733
I think as Martin mentioned, if we are

1100
00:41:50,790 --> 00:41:53,732
integrating into the design, there's an opportunity that

1101
00:41:53,732 --> 00:41:55,560
it's not an add on to appear that

1102
00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:58,041
is. Actually integrated into the peer design,

1103
00:41:58,916 --> 00:42:01,700
so that if we're investing these this money

1104
00:42:01,700 --> 00:42:02,710
that we need to invest

1105
00:42:03,307 --> 00:42:06,099
because our our population needs to be able

1106
00:42:06,099 --> 00:42:08,572
to travel to have access to goods and

1107
00:42:08,572 --> 00:42:09,072
services

1108
00:42:09,449 --> 00:42:09,768
and,

1109
00:42:10,406 --> 00:42:12,320
work and school and all of those things.

1110
00:42:12,973 --> 00:42:15,202
That looking at those elements that are not

1111
00:42:15,202 --> 00:42:16,260
only a huge

1112
00:42:16,715 --> 00:42:20,161
resource in terms of dollars, but also environmental

1113
00:42:20,457 --> 00:42:20,909
impact

1114
00:42:21,269 --> 00:42:24,305
and have those those assets actually do more.

1115
00:42:24,785 --> 00:42:26,623
And I think 1 of the things is

1116
00:42:26,623 --> 00:42:29,155
being a support for a renewable energy installation

1117
00:42:29,274 --> 00:42:31,101
1 of the other things that, Martin and

1118
00:42:31,180 --> 00:42:32,928
I do with this project is this is

1119
00:42:32,928 --> 00:42:33,643
the only,

1120
00:42:34,040 --> 00:42:36,979
bridge across that particular river connecting Ports smith

1121
00:42:36,979 --> 00:42:40,107
and Kin. That has pedestrian access. So we've

1122
00:42:40,107 --> 00:42:42,424
done a lot of outreach with local schools.

1123
00:42:43,304 --> 00:42:45,861
Next week, we actually have 80 seventh grade

1124
00:42:45,861 --> 00:42:48,926
students coming in and we'll be talking about

1125
00:42:48,983 --> 00:42:51,128
a part of that discussion for them will

1126
00:42:51,128 --> 00:42:53,592
be about the bridge project. We have these

1127
00:42:53,592 --> 00:42:53,990
really,

1128
00:42:54,626 --> 00:42:56,056
great elements that are in,

1129
00:42:56,629 --> 00:42:59,262
our everyday lives. We cross bridges all the

1130
00:42:59,262 --> 00:43:01,736
time and really taking the time to explain

1131
00:43:01,736 --> 00:43:03,992
to that citizen engineer citizen scientists

1132
00:43:04,702 --> 00:43:07,347
what are the advances that are happening there

1133
00:43:07,641 --> 00:43:08,356
to really

1134
00:43:08,992 --> 00:43:12,029
promote that study of math and science? Whether

1135
00:43:12,029 --> 00:43:14,447
you're in middle school or high school or

1136
00:43:14,586 --> 00:43:17,403
becoming either a scientist or engineer as your

1137
00:43:17,463 --> 00:43:19,541
profession. And I think that's something we miss

1138
00:43:19,541 --> 00:43:21,552
out on a little bit, And, I mean,

1139
00:43:21,632 --> 00:43:23,149
who doesn't love bridges, really?

1140
00:43:23,947 --> 00:43:26,182
Well, Aaron Bell, and Martin Was, thank you

1141
00:43:26,182 --> 00:43:28,656
for in sharing your love of bridges and

1142
00:43:28,656 --> 00:43:30,977
and bridges fine, and the things you could

1143
00:43:30,977 --> 00:43:32,168
do with them with our audience. It's been

1144
00:43:32,168 --> 00:43:34,074
a real pleasure. Thank you. You know, Martin

1145
00:43:34,074 --> 00:43:35,663
didn't use to love them. He's learned to

1146
00:43:35,663 --> 00:43:38,894
love them. Yes. Learned got news. Yes. Fine

1147
00:43:39,094 --> 00:43:40,927
It's our pleasure. Thank you very much for

1148
00:43:40,927 --> 00:43:42,361
having. Thank you very much. Yeah.

1149
00:43:49,619 --> 00:43:51,448
I'm afraid that's all the time we have

1150
00:43:51,448 --> 00:43:52,584
for this week's podcast.

1151
00:43:53,038 --> 00:43:54,310
Thanks to Aaron Bell,

1152
00:43:54,946 --> 00:43:58,575
Martin Was. And Margaret Harris for a fascinating

1153
00:43:59,035 --> 00:43:59,355
discussion.

1154
00:44:00,075 --> 00:44:03,035
This podcast was produced by Callum J and

1155
00:44:03,275 --> 00:44:04,175
Fred Isles

1156
00:44:04,488 --> 00:44:06,554
So a special thanks to them both.

1157
00:44:07,190 --> 00:44:09,494
If you're a regular listener to the podcast,

1158
00:44:09,811 --> 00:44:11,957
you've probably noticed that we have a new

1159
00:44:11,957 --> 00:44:12,592
theme tune.

1160
00:44:13,324 --> 00:44:15,161
It's called 137,

1161
00:44:15,561 --> 00:44:18,197
and it was composed and performed by the

1162
00:44:18,197 --> 00:44:18,697
physicist

1163
00:44:19,156 --> 00:44:20,136
Philip Mori.

1164
00:44:21,008 --> 00:44:23,579
He talks about the significance of that number

1165
00:44:23,637 --> 00:44:25,253
and the creative process

1166
00:44:25,629 --> 00:44:27,802
involved in making the music

1167
00:44:28,193 --> 00:44:31,077
over on the Physics World stories podcast,

1168
00:44:31,689 --> 00:44:34,232
which you can listen to on the Physics

1169
00:44:34,232 --> 00:44:37,780
world website or at your favorite podcast

1170
00:44:38,079 --> 00:44:38,400
provider.

1171
00:44:39,039 --> 00:44:40,420
Just look for the headline

1172
00:44:40,960 --> 00:44:41,940
swift earthquakes

1173
00:44:42,320 --> 00:44:43,699
and new podcast

1174
00:44:44,000 --> 00:44:44,500
music

1175
00:44:45,131 --> 00:44:47,754
inspired by the fine structure constant.

1176
00:44:48,310 --> 00:44:52,228
And yes, we are talking about Taylor swift

1177
00:44:52,380 --> 00:44:53,360
and the seismic

1178
00:44:53,739 --> 00:44:54,239
activity

1179
00:44:54,619 --> 00:44:55,920
surrounding her concerts

1180
00:44:56,380 --> 00:44:57,280
with Jacqueline

1181
00:44:57,739 --> 00:45:00,079
Kaplan Hour ba, a s,