235 - A Repeating Tragedy with Lazaros Filippidis

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Hello everybody, welcome to the Fire Science Show.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>When I was recording the last episode of the last year on the New Year's Eve discussing the Hong Kong uh fire, I thought this is gonna be something that we will keep talking for weeks and weeks because that was obviously uh a very huge tragedy and a very medial fire.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And then on the New Year's night uh the Swiss Cranz Montana nightclub fire happened and the whole media attention of the world has shifted towards that one.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It's horrible how quickly uh we replace one horrible tragedy with another and how quickly those things shift.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I've commented some on the Cranz Montana fire on LinkedIn.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I'm not really used to comment on recent events, I'm not really that much seeking attention, falling to comment on the freshest and the biggest fires and don't feel the urge to be the first one to post about that.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I rather have my my thoughts made up and provide you with some clean things I have processed in my head that actually can help us strive to be better.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And so I have planned for this episode to prepare an episode that actually brings some value to the fire safety engineering community.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And uh yeah, I've invited a nice guest, uh Lazaros Filippidis from the Fire Safety Engineering Group at the Greenwich University.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Lazaros is a part of um Professor Ed Galea's group uh for ages.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh I I've I remember he was helping me with building Exodus like 15 years ago.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's how long I've been professionally exposed to Lazaros.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And it and since forever I know Lazaros was involved in evacuation modeling and uh and then his group is developing fire modeling software.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So definitely that's a nice person to talk about this uh particular family of fires in the nightclubs.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And yeah, what's kind of unfortunate, there's absolutely nothing new in this episode.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like in our discussion we are having with Lazaros, we just reiterate through some obvious elements that are not a surprise to anyone.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>They should have not been a surprise to anyone.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And uh that that's perhaps the most horrible aspect of those nightclub fires, that there is nothing new in that.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like we know almost everything.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>We know 99% of stuff that should prevent us from you know having such a tragedy is happening, and yet they occur every few months somewhere in the world, uh, which is the horrible part of this story.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So today's episode, not necessarily about the Kranz Montana fire, is not that we're gonna, you know, uh dissect the uh recent fire into smallest pieces and analyze what happened there.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>No, we we are trying to present you with a broader context of how fires in such venues look throughout the history and give you some ideas about how to think about uh the scenarios, the design scenarios, the evacuation scenarios in such venues in such a way that we strive to be better fire engineers and provide better fire engineering in the future.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Not an easy episode, but I think an important one.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I hope you enjoy it.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Let's spin the intro and jump into the episode.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Welcome to the Firest Show.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>My name is Wojciech Wegrzynski, and I will be your host.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The Fire science Show podcast is brought to you in partnership with OFR Consultants.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>OFR is the UK's leading independent multi-award-winning fire engineering consultancy with a reputation for delivering innovative safety-driven solutions.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>We've been on this journey together for three years so far, and here it begins the fourth year of collaboration between the Fire Science Show and the OFR.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So far, we've brought through more than 150 episodes which translate into nearly 150 hours of educational content available, free, accessible all over the planet without any paywalls, advertisements, or hidden agendas.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This makes me very proud and I am super thankful to OFR for this long-lasting partnership.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And now let's head back to the episode.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Hello everybody, I am joined today uh by Lazaros Filippidis from University of Greenwich.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Hello, Lazaros, good to have you in the podcast.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Hello, Wojciech.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh thank you for uh inviting me to your um forest science show.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Thanks, man.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh when I was uh going through email uh prepping for this, I found our correspondence from 2012.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's how long I know you.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>You've helped me massively with Exodus.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh more than 10 years ago, you know.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Thank you very much for that.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh I appreciate that.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It was always uh reaching to you for the support was always great, and I'm really happy we can interact on a different note today.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Indeed.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>And I think we've only met uh in person once.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah, probably exchange like versions once.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, we'll exchange lots of emails and messages.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is hilarious.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But uh anyway, the the topic I've invited you for is is not not as funny as our interactions because we're gonna talk about, I guess, a family of fires, and obviously the attention of the world was on the Kranz Montana fire just after the New Years, and uh this to some extent triggered this discussion.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But there was another one, right?

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, there are the many incidents that um follow the same kind of pattern, and uh there are lots of uh near misses that uh probably don't take up immediate time.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>The latest one that I've heard about was in uh Madrid in a restaurant where uh again fireworks ignited curtains.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Fortunately, in that incident, uh they used the fire extinguishers and they put out the fire within seconds.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>So that was uh, as I said, a near miss.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Nothing really happened.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>But it's the same kind of incident.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>You have fireworks in an enclosed environment with flammable materials that puts people at great risk.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>People that go to a place to have fun and not to be vigilant.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>They're not going they they're not entering, you know, um a chemical facility or nuclear plant where they know that okay, they have to be careful.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>They enter a restaurant, uh discotheque, a nightclub, so they forget about the problems.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah, I mean when they see you know fires like the one that happened in Hong Kong, which obviously was a huge tragedy.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>When when I look at it, there are things that were not obvious.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>There is some interesting fire physics out there, there are things that I probably have never seen uh happen.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>When I even when I see things like uh King's Cross, that's that's some new physics, there's interesting interactions, like it's complicated.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I mean, fire science is complicated, and many of those fires are very, very complicated.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and you know, the specific uh set of physical conditions that promote those fires are not that easy.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and so when I look at those you know, nightclub fires, there's no interesting fire physics to me.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It's like a brutal compartment fire within in a compartment with a lot of people and most likely insufficient means of escape.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It devastates me, really, because like I I I'm hopeless.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like I I I I don't know how what what more a fire engineer could do to to prevent those at large.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, indeed.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean uh the examples you gave initially actually did provide new physics and new type there were new types of incidents.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh but what we see with uh discotheques and nightclubs, it's a recurring pattern.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Again and again we see the same thing.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh small spaces, typically overpopulated, typically with uh limited escape routes.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh sometimes they're even locked the escape routes.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>So to prevent people, you know, for uh getting out without paying uh what they bought, with uh typically badly installed uh flammable material and fire sources that shouldn't really exist within those venues, pyrotechnics and fireworks.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Let's try and go back in time.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Um because it's not also a uh a new thing.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like those those fires happened throughout the history.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Going back, like what will be the worst one?

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The coconut groove?

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Coconut groove, I think, is the worst one uh in 1942, with just under 500 uh fatalities and a few hundred injured people.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>I I think this was the deadliest, uh deadliest uh uh incident in history for a club.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Maybe maybe let's try to unwrap that one.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like do you do you know what happened there again?

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, there was ignition again of flammable uh decorations.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh there were obstructed exits, locked exits.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>The incident actually led to the adoption of uh new fire safety measures.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>So based on that, the authorities designed new regulations.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Um panic hardware to doors was uh uh became a requirement after that incident.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Illuminated uh signs, I believe, became uh requirement after that incident.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>And uh there was I think a ban on uh some uh materials within within these establishments.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>But we see though with we see flammable materials appearing all the time.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So I guess there was like a small uh well quite large actually, space, because you have to have space for for a lot of people, uh, with uh most likely insufficient insufficient exit capacity.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I mean, if you think about it, the architectural features uh of a nightclub or or a venue uh kind of promote this environment because you like you most likely want it to be dark, that's that's a theme.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>You want to have a control over uh who comes in, who comes out, and as you as you mentioned, they they pay.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So this pathway is kind of closed.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Um you probably don't want to have alternative pathways inside and outside.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So people sneak around or and and do some perhaps ill illegal activities, uh which in uh well-refreshed venues sometimes happen.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And at the same time, I think the ratio of height to the volume, I don't know even know if that metric exists, but they all seem not very not very high, not very huge venues, but just l large in space, right?

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Indeed, normally they would have low ceiling.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I guess acoustics to some extent must promote that, right?

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Probably uh normally you'd see low ceiling venues.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh but as you said, normally and typically what you have is you'll you'll get um a managed ingress of people because they have to pay to get in.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh and also because it takes uh this the this process takes over a long period of time, it takes maybe a couple of hours for everybody to get in.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>They don't arrive all at the same time.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>So for ingress, the the means of getting into the venues are sufficient.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Then for security reasons, as you said, they do many times uh restrict quick ingress.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>But of course, uh in an emergency that's exactly what you want.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>You want you want to have access to appropriate number of uh escape routes.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>These escape routes must not be locked.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>In many cases, we we know that uh the windows were closed with uh and locked with uh metal grids so people couldn't escape.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>So, yes, while they are designed for a good flow of ingress, they're not definitely not designed for um efficient uh evacuation during an emergency.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and another thing is the um acoustics, because like okay, people do those choices, a lot of those design choices, for a reason.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And there there is actually a good reason why you want to have uh insulation on uh on your uh ceiling in in such a venue for the same reason why I have an insulated wall in the space where I'm sitting in here.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Absolutely, uh reverbation and acoustical effects in because it's quite a large space.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like engineers should should understand that.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>If you have a space that has 30-40 meters length, that's uh the sound takes uh 0.1 seconds to travel that that length.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The sound is not that fast, and and that creates a very annoying reverbation and acoustic effects that will be very obvious in a setting where people enjoy music.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And this means that a space that is not acoustically insulated if you have a low ceiling, there's a lot of space to bounce from the sound.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And if you don't have that insulation, the space will not fulfill its primary goal of delivering uh music to people as a a way of operating.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I mean, because a lot of uh blame after those fires is of course that you can make this type of insulation without flammable materials and will reach the flammable materials in a second.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But the point is like you need that, and and and the engineers and everyone around should should respect the fact that this is actually a quite important feature of such a facility.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>It's actually a requirement.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean this is true.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh you you need to have some type of acoustic uh insulation in these uh establishments that goes without saying.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>However, they have to choose appropriate materials that are fire retardant.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>And uh we know that in many cases this was not the case.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>For example, in the Station Night Club and the KISS Club, uh these materials were highly flammable, and they they ignited through pyrotechnics and fireworks.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Um But yes, the engineer does do that uh you need to have you need to install acoustic insulating materials to enhance the experience of uh the patrons.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>That's why they go there.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>They go there to have fun, they go there to hear to listen to their music, listen to their favorite band, and of course all this adds up to the experience.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and another uh aspect that that is quite typical for such a facility is and that that actually I think is outside of the engineer's ability to act, is is how the internal furniture is distributed among the places.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I mean where the tables are, where the seats are, and and and how the venue operates every day.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Because I also feel this is something out of control of engineering.

00:14:58.960 --> 00:15:03.759
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I design walls, I may design the main area, I may design the staircase.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I can tell them where you can put tables, and I will most likely receive some kind of uh you know drawings that will show me the table layout.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, but you never know what's gonna happen.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, in in many cases, again, you can have a compliant uh structure, you can have a compliant building.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>But how the operators will actually furnish the venue, it's out of the control of uh the engineer.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>And in many cases, they do put tables that block the exits or restrict the effective width of the exits or the corridors.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, they they want to make money at the end of the day, so they try to allow as many people in as possible.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>That is another issue.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Let's perhaps talk about bottlenecks and how bottlenecks work uh from the perspective of crowds and and uh evacuation.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Because if you put too many elements in front of that or nearby the exit, you may not even block the exit, but if you create you know like a narrow corridor leading to an exit, you dramatically reduce the amount of people who can move towards the exit, etc.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And I I think this bottlenecking problem is also a massive.

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<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Maybe you can comment on on how women the um exits lose their desired uh capacity, perhaps.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, it all depends on uh the number of people you have in in the venue.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>So normally there are guidelines that uh d dictate the maximum number of people that you can have within a building.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>But of course, uh the behavior of the people plays a significant role.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Now, when uh you have an urgent emergency situation and uh everybody urgently needs to evacuate, then obviously most of the people will try to go towards the exits.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Now we know from re past research and literature that most people will try and escape through the entrances that they're most familiar with, and that's typically the entrance to the building.

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<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh in many cases they ignore the emergency exits.

00:16:58.960 --> 00:17:02.159
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They may not be aware where these emergency exits are.

00:17:02.159 --> 00:17:11.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Maybe they want they maybe the emergency exits are behind or within other rooms, which they don't have access to anyway, so they wouldn't know about them.

00:17:11.119 --> 00:17:22.720
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So when you have a certain uh rush of people going to towards the same escape route, same exit, we have observed that uh the capacity is not enough.

00:17:22.720 --> 00:17:26.880
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And we're not talking about um here we're not talking about drills.

00:17:26.880 --> 00:17:29.599
<v Lazaros Filippidis>During a drill, people are more relaxed.

00:17:29.599 --> 00:17:35.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>The capacity seems to be uh appropriate for the population you have in your building.

00:17:35.119 --> 00:17:43.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But during uh an emergency where you have fire products affecting you and you need to escape as quickly as possible, this creates bottlenecks.

00:17:43.519 --> 00:17:48.799
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh usually creates bottlenecks at the exits because they're they're they're not they're not wide enough.

00:17:48.799 --> 00:17:53.279
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And you have a rush of people of people that are trying to escape as quickly as possible.

00:17:54.240 --> 00:17:59.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Does the capacity of exit decrease when the when the density of population increases?

00:17:59.039 --> 00:18:02.240
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I think that's the part of the fundamental diagram for doors, right?

00:18:02.559 --> 00:18:04.640
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, I mean you could you could you could say that.

00:18:04.640 --> 00:18:05.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>You could say that.

00:18:05.519 --> 00:18:12.160
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean the greater the density, the uh the the more difficulty the people have to are able to move.

00:18:12.160 --> 00:18:18.240
<v Lazaros Filippidis>The more difficulty they have to they can't move as easily as obviously as when the density is not as high.

00:18:18.559 --> 00:18:25.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and and especially tragical when you have uh another bottleneck like a few meters ahead where where there's another group of people.

00:18:25.519 --> 00:18:27.680
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And I think we've we've seen those horrible images.

00:18:27.680 --> 00:18:31.359
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I think it was station nights that were something where people were trying to the station, yes.

00:18:31.359 --> 00:18:35.759
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>They they were literally in the doors and they were just stuck in the doors and then you were unable to exit.

00:18:35.759 --> 00:18:37.279
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is like really, really horrible.

00:18:37.599 --> 00:18:42.480
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, it it is because uh the the people are affected by uh the fire products.

00:18:42.480 --> 00:18:51.599
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean uh all this insulating material, uh the acoustic form generates uh hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide, uh carbon dioxide.

00:18:51.599 --> 00:18:54.240
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Hydrogen cyanide is extremely toxic.

00:18:54.240 --> 00:19:00.319
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And we're talking about sometimes seconds make uh the difference between uh life and death.

00:19:00.319 --> 00:19:07.839
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So in many cases, uh unfortunately people reach the exit but they uh they become incapacitated at that location.

00:19:07.839 --> 00:19:19.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And of course, then the next person that comes has difficulty to get out, then the next one has a greater difficulty to get out, and that's a cascating effect taking place at those locations.

00:19:19.119 --> 00:19:27.279
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And and and letting me just add something else, and it's not just that, in some cases, outside the exit, there are barriers as well.

00:19:27.279 --> 00:19:35.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And and I think in the station uh nightclub it was also elevated, so there were staircases on that elevated platform outside the exit.

00:19:35.519 --> 00:19:41.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh that can cause extra problems as well, because that's another element that you have to get away from.

00:19:41.119 --> 00:19:43.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And you're restricted there as well.

00:19:43.039 --> 00:19:48.319
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It's not just you know uh level surface that you just get out and you can go away from the building.

00:19:48.319 --> 00:19:50.079
<v Lazaros Filippidis>You have another obstacle to overcome.

00:19:50.079 --> 00:19:54.880
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And I think it's the same uh in the in the recent uh Swiss uh club as well.

00:19:54.880 --> 00:19:56.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yeah, it's actually exactly the same.

00:19:56.960 --> 00:19:59.839
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, we had uh a staircase going downwards a bit.

00:19:59.839 --> 00:20:02.559
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Once they exited from uh the building itself.

00:20:02.960 --> 00:20:05.279
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>At this point, I like struggle with one thing.

00:20:05.279 --> 00:20:09.359
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like, what would be a sufficient size of those doors?

00:20:09.359 --> 00:20:20.400
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Because I I I you know I it's hard for me to imagine that I have a door of, let's say, whatever width one and a half meter, let's say I had, and that promoted um a catastrophe.

00:20:20.400 --> 00:20:25.599
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Would this additional half a meter of the door width like really solve the case?

00:20:25.599 --> 00:20:30.319
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Or I would need it like multiples of that.

00:20:30.319 --> 00:20:32.079
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Is there a safe target?

00:20:32.400 --> 00:20:39.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I think the idea is to have multiple escape routes as well, not just uh wider exits and unobstructed exits.

00:20:39.200 --> 00:20:41.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh you need to have multiple escape routes.

00:20:41.519 --> 00:20:45.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And further to that, the exits have to open outwards.

00:20:45.119 --> 00:20:45.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah.

00:20:45.440 --> 00:20:46.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Not inwards.

00:20:46.640 --> 00:20:49.200
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is a very, very important point.

00:20:49.519 --> 00:20:56.640
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, I mean that is actually a a door that opens indoors will prevent uh efficient evacuation.

00:20:56.640 --> 00:20:59.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It will actually be part of a problem.

00:21:00.640 --> 00:21:12.720
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is something uh that that especially in the tunnel space is quite challenging for us because we will always want to have uh doors opening outwards, but we have two tunnels to evacuate from each other.

00:21:12.720 --> 00:21:17.359
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So uh and you cannot pick the lucky tunnel uh that has the correct one.

00:21:17.359 --> 00:21:21.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So you have to basically have a full redundancy of all evacuation doors.

00:21:21.519 --> 00:21:24.880
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So each tunnel has a main door that opens outwards to the another one.

00:21:24.880 --> 00:21:31.839
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's quite a big design struggle, but we we believe that this is uh this is necessary to promote good good evacuation.

00:21:31.839 --> 00:22:00.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>When I was I I I'm not aware how it works around the world, but I remember uh one day I've done um analysis for the Polish uh regulations because the Polish regulations connect the number of people in a room with uh with uh capacity that is expected, and we do that in 0.6 meter increments, so perhaps per every like you have a basic minimum, like let's say 1.2 meter, and then you add 0.6 meters for every every another 100 people.

00:22:00.960 --> 00:22:05.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And what's interesting when you do the math, it converges at 180 seconds, you know.

00:22:05.519 --> 00:22:16.079
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So uh you basically get up to a 180 seconds time that you need to evacuate this space, you add uh another meter, so it drops to let's say 150 and then then goes up all the way to 180 again.

00:22:16.079 --> 00:22:17.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah, yeah.

00:22:17.519 --> 00:22:21.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So so I in in some way, yeah, in three minutes.

00:22:21.119 --> 00:22:37.680
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So in some way, this three minutes is my hidden but explicit target for evacuation time, because when I design my means of escape, three minutes is what I'm gonna get at fully uh uh like used up uh capacity of the venue.

00:22:37.680 --> 00:22:42.319
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But this is my minimum, and I don't feel like three minutes that's quite a lot actually.

00:22:42.640 --> 00:22:43.440
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It's quite a lot.

00:22:43.440 --> 00:23:01.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, if you consider that uh the response time of the of the people, once they realize that something is going on, or once they hear the alarm, um you can expect um response times in the range of 30 seconds, which may sound uh a little, but sometimes it can be longer than that.

00:23:01.119 --> 00:23:02.880
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Many times it's longer than that.

00:23:02.880 --> 00:23:09.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But then for establishments like the ones we're talking about, nightclubs, there is the issue of uh fire.

00:23:09.519 --> 00:23:18.079
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So it's not just you know you have uh how quickly the people respond, but what happens with the fire physics as well and the fire dynamics.

00:23:18.079 --> 00:23:26.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>In some of the uh examples, uh I think the station uh club, the kiss club, uh flushover occurred within uh a minute and a half.

00:23:26.960 --> 00:23:33.680
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So that is way, way, way below the three-minute mark like you just mentioned.

00:23:34.000 --> 00:23:55.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And three minutes would be just you know, just the time to exit minus the the detection, the pre-evacuation time, exactly, decision making, arrival to the exit, like all the other all the other like I I I I seriously wonder, like in fire engineering we we tend to do uh it as a part of acid arson analysis.

00:23:55.039 --> 00:23:57.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is the paradigm that we have in fire safety engineering.

00:23:57.920 --> 00:24:03.279
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Well, do you have uh more time to escape than you potentially uh need?

00:24:03.279 --> 00:24:14.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I wonder in in such a difficult setting, can you actually achieve that without using hyperoptimistic assumptions?

00:24:14.640 --> 00:24:31.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Because if you use hyper-optimistic assumptions like uh let's say 50% occupation or like medium fire growth, what that you you'll get your acid acid, yes, you you you will have your engineering analysis, you'll clear the project, you it will go for for go.

00:24:31.039 --> 00:24:38.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But as you set flashover in one and a half minutes and explicit targeting low three minutes for evacuation, yes.

00:24:38.640 --> 00:24:41.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is failure by design.

00:24:41.359 --> 00:24:42.319
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Indeed, exactly.

00:24:42.319 --> 00:24:47.680
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And as you said, I mean yes, ASET and RSAT studies are conducted uh uh habitually.

00:24:47.680 --> 00:24:52.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>The issue the issue with that is that uh the pro the the these two processes are not independent.

00:24:52.960 --> 00:25:03.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, A set you calculated using a fire model, RSAT using an evacuation model, or other other kinds of tools that you may have, but uh these two processes are not independent.

00:25:03.200 --> 00:25:06.880
<v Lazaros Filippidis>In in reality, both are affected uh they interact.

00:25:06.880 --> 00:25:19.759
<v Lazaros Filippidis>A set may be affected by what people do, by opening fire doors or by using fire mitigation uh systems, which is a positive thing, of course, um if you're using fire mitigation uh systems.

00:25:19.759 --> 00:25:23.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But RSAT is usually affected by the fire.

00:25:23.200 --> 00:25:32.240
<v Lazaros Filippidis>People are affected by the presence of uh fire products, narcotic gases, irritant gases, uh high temperatures, and RSAT becomes much, much longer.

00:25:32.240 --> 00:25:41.279
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So when conducting uh an ASAT-R set uh calculation where these two processes are independent, you're actually getting an optimistic result.

00:25:41.279 --> 00:25:49.839
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But if you couple them, if you couple, for example, a fire model and evacuation model, then you'll get more representative uh results.

00:25:49.839 --> 00:25:53.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Your asset pol your asset will definitely increase.

00:25:53.839 --> 00:25:56.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>You're developing uh an evacuation model.

00:25:56.960 --> 00:26:01.680
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Do you explicitly account for that in Exodus through some uh means?

00:26:01.680 --> 00:26:08.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I guess uh the the fundamental diagram uh addresses that in terms of walking speed, but any other way?

00:26:09.039 --> 00:26:10.400
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, yes, actually, yeah.

00:26:10.400 --> 00:26:19.759
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, I'm part of the team that develops uh the Exodus evacuation model, and some of my colleagues are also uh developing uh the smart fire uh fire model.

00:26:19.759 --> 00:26:28.799
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And what we can do within within uh the model is we can couple the evacuation side with um fire modeling results.

00:26:28.799 --> 00:26:45.839
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And we can determine as uh as the simulation is running, as the model is running, and uh you see the you see the simulated agents evacuating from a structure, uh you can see how the fire products can affect them, how they slow down due to the presence of narcotic gases or etern gases.

00:26:45.839 --> 00:26:49.680
<v Lazaros Filippidis>You can see how their uh behavior makes them to stagger.

00:26:49.680 --> 00:27:01.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And instead of you know following straight lines towards uh the target, they actually stagger and they they work um uh less efficiently, they can crawl to escape uh the hot upper layer.

00:27:01.519 --> 00:27:12.160
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And uh depending on the level of the narcotic gases, you can actually calculate uh well the model, not you, but the model calculates where you get agents incapacitated.

00:27:12.559 --> 00:27:15.200
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>In terms of pathfinding, do you also affect the pathfinding?

00:27:15.200 --> 00:27:21.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like you can close do you consider like uh doors uh not being useful anymore and they will start seeking another one?

00:27:21.119 --> 00:27:31.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Or in the presence of uh fire products, the agents are able to uh decide whether or not to walk within a smoke-filled environment.

00:27:31.200 --> 00:27:33.839
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And they can choose to redirect.

00:27:33.839 --> 00:27:41.759
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And if they are aware, of course, of an alternative escape route, then they can use uh an alternative escape route that doesn't have so much smoke.

00:27:41.759 --> 00:27:49.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But uh also during your scenario setup, you could you can, if you want, you can close doors at specific times if that's what you want to do.

00:27:49.920 --> 00:27:53.599
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But yes, uh agents are able to avoid hazardous environments.

00:27:54.000 --> 00:27:59.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I ask this because this goes to some extent beyond what we would normally do.

00:27:59.440 --> 00:28:14.799
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like I I I guess if you do a classical uh evacuation analysis following the uh published document guidance, I guess you would close uh one evacuation route anyway to simulate some sort of of challenging outcome.

00:28:14.799 --> 00:28:16.480
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Challenging conditions, yes.

00:28:16.480 --> 00:28:30.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But in those venues where the where you start with a very limited, you know, choice of exits and a very limited uh amount of possibilities, closing a door is is quite dramatic, right?

00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:33.839
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh that has tremendous effects on the outcomes of the analysis.

00:28:34.160 --> 00:28:36.640
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, it is it is very challenging, of course.

00:28:36.640 --> 00:28:41.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And you can you can use these kind of models even for uh forensic analysis.

00:28:41.039 --> 00:29:01.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>If you have enough uh data to reproduce uh an incident, you can use this kind of uh tools to conduct uh forensic analysis and and and more or less determine what caused uh incapacitation, what kind of um qualitatively and quantitely determine the number of uh fatalities you'll have in the environment, and so on.

00:29:01.440 --> 00:29:06.480
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh let's let's talk occupy and response because you brought that up and then I find it quite interesting.

00:29:06.480 --> 00:29:09.680
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like you mentioned, oh, people could react in 30 seconds.

00:29:09.680 --> 00:29:15.599
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>For me as a fire engine, um yeah, yeah, not exactly 30 seconds, but it it is possible.

00:29:15.599 --> 00:29:25.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like if you if someone mentions to me uh that people could respond in 30 seconds and I'm a fire engineer and I'm using my fire engineer's brain, 30 seconds.

00:29:25.519 --> 00:29:26.720
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Wow, that's a quick response.

00:29:26.720 --> 00:29:37.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's that's like I would call it a fairly quick response to the fire because I'm very used to having one, three minute delay time distributions with a mean of like two and a half or whatever.

00:29:37.119 --> 00:29:38.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like I'm I'm I'm used to minutes.

00:29:38.960 --> 00:29:40.720
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>If you give me seconds, I take it.

00:29:40.720 --> 00:29:42.079
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Any time of the day, I take it.

00:29:42.079 --> 00:29:48.799
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>If you give me seconds, but imagine 30 seconds that's like three TikTok videos nowadays.

00:29:48.799 --> 00:30:02.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like if you have a video and you have people standing for 30 seconds until they reach a decision to evacuate and decide to evacuate, the general feedback would be oh my god, what a bunch of idiots.

00:30:02.960 --> 00:30:08.319
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>They just stood there, they have not moved, they they did not react, you know.

00:30:08.319 --> 00:30:11.359
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and this exactly happened after the the recent fire.

00:30:11.359 --> 00:30:12.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This happens after every fire.

00:30:12.960 --> 00:30:22.559
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It happens all the time, all the time, and and I'm like, wow, that's actually like based on my knowledge and my experience and the data I see.

00:30:22.559 --> 00:30:23.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is not bad.

00:30:23.920 --> 00:30:28.880
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But from the societal point of view, it they're like, these are idiots literally.

00:30:28.880 --> 00:30:31.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And I had yes, it's that's quite the challenge, right?

00:30:32.160 --> 00:30:37.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, unfortunately, we we've read all these uh comments of characterizing these people as idiots.

00:30:37.920 --> 00:30:41.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But uh, let me make uh a step back first.

00:30:41.200 --> 00:30:43.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh uh about these 30 seconds.

00:30:43.119 --> 00:30:46.240
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, 30 seconds is definitely not something that happens all the time.

00:30:46.240 --> 00:30:51.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But um 30 seconds is is obviously it's not a hard number, it's an optimistic number.

00:30:51.519 --> 00:30:55.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But we've seen in videos that sometimes people do respond that quickly.

00:30:55.920 --> 00:31:06.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But in other times, and depending on the environment, sometimes it takes minutes, could it take five minutes, ten minutes, fifteen minutes, it could take 30 minutes, could take half an hour or more to respond to to an alarm.

00:31:06.960 --> 00:31:17.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But uh for the cases we're talking about, generally the response time is generally short because we're talking about a small venue, uh the fire spreads extremely quickly.

00:31:17.920 --> 00:31:23.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>As we mentioned earlier, you could have uh flashover within uh a minute, two minutes, three minutes.

00:31:23.039 --> 00:31:25.839
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean it's it's it does take very quickly.

00:31:25.839 --> 00:31:27.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It happens very quickly.

00:31:27.200 --> 00:31:31.279
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So people will respond relatively quickly.

00:31:31.279 --> 00:31:37.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And then there is a question of how quickly can we reasonably expect people to respond.

00:31:37.119 --> 00:31:51.359
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And then your question about um the use of the phones, the mobile phones, and uh the unfortunate comments that we we saw on um on social media about how stupid these people were that they used mobile phones during the incident.

00:31:51.359 --> 00:31:57.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So what I would say for that to that is that first of all, we cannot blame the victims.

00:31:57.359 --> 00:31:58.240
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah, absolutely.

00:31:58.240 --> 00:31:58.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Absolutely.

00:31:58.640 --> 00:32:00.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It so triggers me.

00:32:00.720 --> 00:32:01.759
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Like you can't explain it.

00:32:01.759 --> 00:32:02.880
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It's it's crazy.

00:32:02.880 --> 00:32:05.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They the the people go there to have fun.

00:32:05.200 --> 00:32:07.759
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They don't get in there to be vigilant and escape.

00:32:07.759 --> 00:32:08.799
<v Lazaros Filippidis>That's not the purpose.

00:32:08.799 --> 00:32:16.400
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Their purpose there is to have fun, drink a bit, talk to other people, be attracted, get attracted, attract others, and so on.

00:32:16.400 --> 00:32:19.680
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They they go there to so um it's a social event.

00:32:19.680 --> 00:32:27.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh making them disengage from their activities quickly enough is something that takes some processes, an alarm.

00:32:27.119 --> 00:32:36.240
<v Lazaros Filippidis>In many cases, in many uh, for example, in the Swiss fire, in the station fire, and in other examples that I've seen, um the music doesn't stop.

00:32:36.240 --> 00:32:42.559
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So you have a fire that has started, it expands very quickly, it spreads quickly, but the music doesn't stop.

00:32:42.559 --> 00:32:45.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So it's very difficult for somebody to disengage.

00:32:45.039 --> 00:32:49.200
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They sometimes people misinterpret what they see and they think it's part of the show.

00:32:49.680 --> 00:32:57.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Especially if you especially if fireworks were just previously used in the venue, which was a part of the show.

00:32:57.039 --> 00:32:58.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>They were the part of the show.

00:32:58.960 --> 00:33:04.720
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>You have to be able to tell in a split second this is a part of the show, this is not the part of the show, right?

00:33:04.960 --> 00:33:05.599
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh exactly.

00:33:05.599 --> 00:33:14.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And you have to have uh the knowledge, you have to be risk-aware, and your risk perception has to be to such a level that you must recognize the threat instantly.

00:33:14.960 --> 00:33:16.400
<v Lazaros Filippidis>How many people can do that?

00:33:16.400 --> 00:33:19.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>How where will they get this knowledge from?

00:33:19.440 --> 00:33:20.400
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I would even go further.

00:33:20.400 --> 00:33:31.680
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I've seen, I I've not participated in such a presentation myself, but I've seen in in many like 5D, 60, 70 cinemas how many dimensions you can fit in a cinema.

00:33:31.680 --> 00:33:33.359
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's another podcast episode.

00:33:33.359 --> 00:33:37.759
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But there were these effects like of uh flames crawling on the ceiling.

00:33:37.759 --> 00:33:50.640
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>They just emit some sort of mist and project uh you know flames on the ceiling to enhance the you know the experience of the user, and you have actually quite realistic flames around you which are not real, which is a part of the show.

00:33:50.640 --> 00:34:03.759
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And you know, uh you you may not even record this, but you subconsciously seen something like that in an internet video, and you could associate this with a part of this being the entourage of the of the event.

00:34:03.759 --> 00:34:16.320
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I mean, it's it you cannot with a hundred percent certainty exclude that someone could use uh a special effect like that to enhance their uh performance, go to any Rammstein concert.

00:34:16.320 --> 00:34:21.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like there's a ton of flames in Rammstein concerts, this is a part of the show.

00:34:21.119 --> 00:34:30.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It's not a hundred percent given that the flame is not a part of the artistic expression during the uh the the event.

00:34:30.800 --> 00:34:43.599
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And if I can take this even further, because like imagine you are in there, you're having fun, you're in a mode of enjoying the show, and suddenly the ceiling ignites.

00:34:43.599 --> 00:34:58.159
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>You are expected within a few seconds, having seen only the beginning of the fire, to project accurately a few minutes into the future, how quick will be the growth of the fire?

00:34:58.159 --> 00:35:00.639
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Is the material flammable or not?

00:35:00.639 --> 00:35:05.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh, how much you have time until the venue fills out with smoke?

00:35:05.119 --> 00:35:07.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>What are my risk capacities?

00:35:07.039 --> 00:35:08.239
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Am I at risk?

00:35:08.239 --> 00:35:11.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Should I evacuate immediately and judge?

00:35:11.119 --> 00:35:19.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh is this did this pass the threshold of it being a hazardous fire or is just you know an unpleasant uh thing?

00:35:19.039 --> 00:35:25.199
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And oh my god, I've paid 200 bucks for these tickets, and now there's this fire destroying my experience.

00:35:25.199 --> 00:35:28.320
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And by the way, it's years even it's super cold outside.

00:35:28.320 --> 00:35:36.320
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And and you are supposed to process all of this information uh before the TikTok video runs out and someone calls you an idiot.

00:35:36.320 --> 00:35:45.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I'm getting I get four weeks to answer most of those questions related to the fire spread, smoke spread, and toxicity.

00:35:45.440 --> 00:35:53.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That I get full for whole four weeks, I get a supercomputer, I I model that, and I can give you an answer.

00:35:53.039 --> 00:35:56.480
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I am not able to give you an answer in five seconds.

00:35:56.480 --> 00:36:00.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>If I have been in that venue, it would also take me 30 seconds.

00:36:00.960 --> 00:36:02.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And if it would take some time, yeah.

00:36:02.800 --> 00:36:07.360
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And if I was uh 20 years old Voyager, I would probably not evacuate at all.

00:36:07.599 --> 00:36:09.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yeah, probably yes, you never know.

00:36:09.119 --> 00:36:09.760
<v Lazaros Filippidis>You never know.

00:36:09.760 --> 00:36:21.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, and and it's also the other thing you have to think about is uh all the things you mentioned, of course, are accurate, and you'll have to assess whether the escape routes are sufficient, and you'll be able to find them as well.

00:36:21.360 --> 00:36:21.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah.

00:36:22.159 --> 00:36:23.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So you know what?

00:36:23.039 --> 00:36:25.440
<v Lazaros Filippidis>What I do, um I have two kids.

00:36:25.440 --> 00:36:26.000
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yeah.

00:36:26.000 --> 00:36:32.480
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So when when incidents like these uh happen, they're they're they're they're 12 and uh 14 years old.

00:36:32.480 --> 00:36:35.840
<v Lazaros Filippidis>When incidents like these happen, I actually show them the video.

00:36:35.840 --> 00:36:39.360
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So I I actually trained them to be vigilant.

00:36:39.360 --> 00:36:41.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I tell them, this is what happened.

00:36:41.039 --> 00:36:43.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Look how quickly the fire spread.

00:36:43.119 --> 00:36:44.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Look where what the people did.

00:36:44.639 --> 00:36:46.800
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Look at all the congestion at the exits.

00:36:46.800 --> 00:36:50.480
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Obviously, some of these videos are not nice to be too graphic.

00:36:50.480 --> 00:36:52.400
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They are too graphic.

00:36:52.400 --> 00:37:05.280
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean I some time ago I analyzed um the Iraq, uh the Iraqi the the Iraqi wedding uh fire incident, and I was going through the videos again and again and again, and it was really, really well, it was very unpleasant for me as well.

00:37:05.280 --> 00:37:13.360
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, obviously for the families it's just a huge tragedy and can't think of what how the families could I don't know, think about that.

00:37:13.360 --> 00:37:14.559
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It's just terrible.

00:37:14.559 --> 00:37:20.800
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But I I do show these things to my kids because you never know what where they will end up later on in life.

00:37:20.800 --> 00:37:23.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Now they're supervised most well, not anymore actually.

00:37:23.920 --> 00:37:29.679
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But up to now they were supervised most of the time with some adult, me, mum, their mum or teachers.

00:37:29.679 --> 00:37:31.840
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But from now on they'll be on their own.

00:37:31.840 --> 00:37:35.280
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They go out, they go to venues, they meet friends.

00:37:35.280 --> 00:37:38.800
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Somehow they need to be aware of the risks.

00:37:39.119 --> 00:37:48.719
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I've never thought about it from this perspective, but if you think about it, the best place to be in a venue is probably the worst place uh from the perspective of evacuation, right?

00:37:48.719 --> 00:37:57.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Because l literally you are the furthest away from the uh exits and and the closest to to the biggest crowd.

00:37:57.679 --> 00:38:04.559
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So you're actively optimizing your position against the evacuation still if you think about it, right?

00:38:05.039 --> 00:38:05.440
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Indeed.

00:38:05.440 --> 00:38:06.400
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh well that's that's it.

00:38:06.400 --> 00:38:09.840
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean you want to be in the action, you want to be where everything happens.

00:38:10.000 --> 00:38:13.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh you you brought up the uh the Al Haitam wedding fire.

00:38:13.119 --> 00:38:17.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I think in in that one, actually, the the occupant response was was quite quick.

00:38:18.000 --> 00:38:19.280
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Um It was very quick.

00:38:19.280 --> 00:38:20.159
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It was very quick.

00:38:20.159 --> 00:38:26.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I actually analyzed that incident because uh somebody commented that uh the people didn't respond uh properly.

00:38:26.960 --> 00:38:28.719
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And I I watched the same video.

00:38:28.719 --> 00:38:30.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>People there responded within seconds.

00:38:30.639 --> 00:38:33.280
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They observed the fire when it was tiny, within seconds.

00:38:33.280 --> 00:38:36.880
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Granted, some of them tried to put it out, which was impossible for us.

00:38:36.880 --> 00:38:38.719
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It was really high, and it's just you can't do it.

00:38:38.719 --> 00:38:41.280
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But it was a rational decision to try and put it out.

00:38:41.280 --> 00:38:43.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Obviously it was futile, but okay, they tried.

00:38:43.920 --> 00:38:51.199
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And then you could see uh you could observe parents gathering the kids and forming groups and getting out as quickly as possible.

00:38:51.199 --> 00:38:53.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But uh the escape routes were very limited.

00:38:53.920 --> 00:38:58.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>In that uh venue, one of the doors was actually opening inside, indoors.

00:38:58.719 --> 00:38:58.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh-huh.

00:38:59.199 --> 00:39:01.199
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It was opening towards uh the inside.

00:39:01.199 --> 00:39:08.159
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I think there was only one main uh entrance and one escape route that wasn't that available eventually.

00:39:08.159 --> 00:39:13.199
<v Lazaros Filippidis>They didn't know the patrons didn't know about it, and the fire spread very quickly.

00:39:13.199 --> 00:39:22.559
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Again, it ignited pyrotechnics ignited decorations in the ceiling, um, the tables, the way that they were organized uh prevented uh quick evacuation.

00:39:22.559 --> 00:39:25.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>There were trolleys, heavy trolleys within the corridors.

00:39:25.519 --> 00:39:27.360
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So that was another obstruction.

00:39:27.360 --> 00:39:29.840
<v Lazaros Filippidis>The people couldn't they had to push it.

00:39:30.159 --> 00:39:36.400
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is the observation because yeah, I like well uh coming back to what I said about furniture and furnishing.

00:39:36.400 --> 00:39:39.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I never had a trolley's uh in my model.

00:39:39.519 --> 00:39:41.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I never ever had trolleys in my model.

00:39:41.920 --> 00:39:44.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Well, you wouldn't normally put it, I guess.

00:39:44.000 --> 00:39:46.719
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>No, I I would not do that as a fire safety engineer.

00:39:46.719 --> 00:39:48.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I I as a fire safety engineer.

00:39:48.800 --> 00:39:53.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>You know, I I do this also because I I wonder if anything more can be done.

00:39:53.760 --> 00:39:59.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I obviously don't design that many nightclubs, but if I ever get one, I uh I would love.

00:39:59.760 --> 00:40:02.639
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>like it to be uh working well.

00:40:02.639 --> 00:40:12.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Actually, I I was designing a nightclub or let's say a venue in in in historical uh Krakow many years ago.

00:40:12.800 --> 00:40:19.199
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And I think this this is the only project in my career I've not signed off after.

00:40:19.199 --> 00:40:32.639
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like after after we exhausted the ability to engineer that project, we just told the guy like, I'm sorry, there is no way I can you know provide you the safety measures I I would be comfortable with.

00:40:32.639 --> 00:40:44.559
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I'll maybe make a podcast episode about it because it's quite an interesting it was painful for me and I've later years later I've developed a way of of smoke control that actually could have worked in that facility.

00:40:44.559 --> 00:41:09.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But but it it's like I I I'm thinking about how can I improve my myself as far engine because look if I I get the the the the architectural drawings of the facility I do a building exodus modeling of that and I have like 30 seconds spare before ACR city I I win 30 seconds is the margin maybe is sufficient maybe not that's another question what margin should be but I I let let's assume I do it.

00:41:09.920 --> 00:41:19.840
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But I have not put in a trolley and I put the trolley in the middle of the you know most congested pathway to the exit and suddenly my three minutes may turn into six.

00:41:19.840 --> 00:43:58.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's an issue is it outside of the realm of of possibility that there's something blocking that pathway absolutely not there's absolutely realistic scenario which uh and I already was thinking I'm doing the worst case one right yeah yeah indeed absolutely well first of all that was a very responsible position that you took in that uh case thank you and that's that's that's but then but to be honest uh Lazaros I mean lucky I I I I don't want to uh sound like morally superior or anything I'm I'm in a position where I can do that because I'm my own boss uh we're a governmental institution if we sign up on really bad things that's not uh leading by example in my country I I can do that but if I am a fire engineer in a small firm and my boss is obsessed with earning money and he insists that could be an issue you can put a stress on you you may not be in the position of comfort where you don't sign off a project really you know and and I could be an issue I I I feel really bad for my colleagues in the profession who who find themselves in such a circumstances and this unfortunately happens yeah so yeah it was a responsible decision in a position of comfort uh unfortunately yeah but still you took the right decision I still do took it yeah yeah you still did the right thing we we just started and we're almost nerving uh uh an hour but uh I I would like to comment now on the the physics of fires as is I know like we we discussed it before the show you you're you're uh evacuation expert uh I try to frame myself as someone who's seen uh a bit of fire physics and there are three elements maybe four elements that for me given the the recent Swiss fire and other fires are very um uh challenging and and I would love for the fire engineers to be aware uh how it works one is the uh heat transfer like if you have and I wrote it on LinkedIn if you have uh a fire that's rolling over your ceiling and you literally have flames on the ceiling this means that the flyer radiates downwards with a view factor of one like you could simplify it to thinking that the receiving end of this radiation is kind of at the same temperature as the fire because the all the radiated heat emitted by the fire is received because the view factor is one and this is like one if you have a a a Christmas tree or a campfire and you you can put your hands in front and the hands are hot and your face is not because with the square of distance that's gonna diminish.

00:43:58.800 --> 00:44:04.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>If you have factor of one it never diminishes it's like super radical heat transfer.

00:44:04.800 --> 00:44:12.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is very very challenging the second thing is how quickly the the conditions will transition from perfect visibility to no visibility.

00:44:12.800 --> 00:47:49.199
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I would recommend people go and Google FSRI videos from their home experiments flashover experiments and you can watch like five minutes of video it's perfect visibility bam 30 seconds and then suddenly yeah it's it's ex it's exponential in fire growth and it's exponential in the way how uh Lambert beer low works it's two exponential factors that are on top of each other so it's really really really ridiculously rapid decline in that and another thing that that I wanted to highlight if you have a venue that is underground and the only exit goes upwards and then you have the exits to the atmosphere at that higher floor by definition by by laws of physics it means that your neutral pressure plane is a floor above like it it creates there is absolute like we love to think about fire dynamics you're gonna have a hot smoke layer you're gonna have a clean air layer below in such a setting no you are gonna have a whole room filled with smoke with the smoke electric smoke yeah like it it's not new physics it's known fire physics but it it's it's a physics that dramatically adds to uh conditions in those in those facilities yes indeed I guess you have seen that you've analyzed all those videos I I guess this is something you you see like very rapidly in the Swiss in in the Swiss tragedy this is what exactly what happened what you described um people had to evacuate offwards and uh the stern well created a chimney effect probably creative chimney effect all the all the toxic gases went the same way the same way as the people tried to evacuate gases toxic gases it's the worst conditions that they could have experienced and I believe most of the fatalities were found on the on the staircase I believe um and then you had two elements of bottlenecks after the stair after the staircase two exits that they had to get out from but those created uh a bottleneck as well so yes what you described is actually the absolutely what what may happen what happened in this uh particular case yeah and uh now on the topic of the the phones the the acoustic phones and fire spread again if someone asks me for those venues with low ceilings it's a difficult uh it's a difficult matter because you know in in Europe we have Euroclass we we you can have uh products of varying degree of flammability it's hard to throw them into the same you know uh bag that they're equivalent but I would just say non-combustible like not fire retarded I would be vigilant about it like completely non-combustible materials on the city yes yes absolutely absolutely because there are too far too many examples where we actually do see that uh they cause a neat problem uh they're they're flammable in so many cases this somehow has to change somehow this has to change plus there should probably a ban on fireworks and pyrotechnics in such uh venues as well that that is that's a that's a challenging point actually for me because while okay I agree that it would be better to ban them you know I I I agree that it would be safer if they were not allowed in such a venue but do I believe we could execute this ban?

00:47:49.199 --> 00:47:51.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Now I'm not so sure very difficult.

00:47:51.440 --> 00:48:06.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah so so you you know while I agree that it should not be allowed to do that yeah no at the same time I do not feel that an engineer should have a presumption that it's never gonna happen in such a venue.

00:48:06.000 --> 00:50:03.119
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>In other words and that this is also something well when I was commenting I I it I don't like to comment on fresh things in in the internet I know you also don't that's why I brought you in here but uh yeah but uh I I I always try to find something uh at least a lesson at least uh you know a strive to be better in the future uh and I I don't like to to to come in and and highlight the obvious oh yeah that people were idiots and and they should have fireworks in their hands having uh enjoying their new years I want to say that we design those spaces for human beings and human beings will do different degrees of smart things from very unsmart things to very extremely smart things right and and I think in a place like that it's it's quite reasonable to assume there in the history because again it is this one even there probably have been a hundred parties in in those clubs and no one died and if if if on the particular night of the disaster the disaster has not happened there could have been a hundred more parties where no one has died right exactly exactly and uh so I I don't like to assess this per case basis but rather the lifetime of the building basis is it's you could expect that during the lifetime of the building someone will bring fireworks in someone will have a birthday cake someone will have a New Year's celebration someone will uh you could have a kid's band trying to do a Rammstein version of the themselves just having fun and then thinking oh maybe I'll blow this bottle of of uh alcohol up with the flame Rammstein does it it's it's it's within the realm of expected scenarios in such venues and such thing and and if if such a thing can happen it should there should not be a single point of failure like ignition of the ceiling 50 fatalities.

00:50:03.119 --> 00:50:12.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>There should not be like such a direct link between a single event and and the and then the catastrophical outcome that that that's what I want the fire safety engineers to do.

00:50:12.000 --> 00:51:43.280
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>No absolutely I mean there have to be uh appropriate uh fire safety measures present in every venue uh the materials have to be appropriate and fire retardant I guess also the inspections have to be more uh rigorous absolutely yeah that that's that's another one that that the thank you for bringing this up this is like if you have I I think a lot of those things should be executed by low the exit capacity the um how clean the exits are etc but it should not just be a requirement I think there should be enforcement I I'm very I very uh rarely agree with Vincent Branagh but he's super right on this one if you don't have enforcement those rules will not provide you what you want them to provide you and I think in in this case actually the the enforcement of those uh rules and and requirements should be absurdly high absurdly exactly I mean people have a tendency to cut corners so this things have to be enforced safety has to be enforced absolutely uh perhaps uh for for because you know we we all we all learn from those tragedies so when they appear in the media we we know about them and they I wonder like there must have been a lot of near misses in those venues right even in our short like reiteration of of of text messages we already uh investigated some of the near misses preparing for this episode I wonder how many near misses are there and what we can learn from them.

00:51:43.599 --> 00:53:04.480
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well what can I say I can't I can't give you a number of course the near misses uh they wouldn't make the news but um I've seen I've seen a video of a near miss in Athens in Greece uh where a waiter was uh holding uh a birthday cake with pyrotechnics on the birthday cake and of course in order to avoid uh other people in the venue he held uh the birthday cake above his head and by doing so he ignited uh unintentionally of course ignited ceiling decorations uh the venue burned down completely but uh thankfully in that case everybody managed to escape with only a few very minor um injuries uh this this took place in um two years ago yeah 2024 in uh a bit earlier than that in in London in another club people were holding um pyrotechnics I think they had something that looked like a bottle with pyrotechnics on it but it wasn't a drink itself they were just holding pyrotechnics and and I think one of them unintentionally again uh lit a Christmas tree and you could see people realizing that uh that was really a bad situation they managed to evacuate with with with no fatalities so I think everybody can assume that these kind of incidents take place all the time we just don't learn about them because then they don't get a chance to be broadcast in the mass media.

00:53:04.880 --> 00:53:32.239
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I think this could be an interesting research project to investigate those I I think that's a huge missed opportunity for fire safety science that we don't pay sufficient attention to near misses like uh you you're from Greenwich Eddie's obviously doing aircraft and he's obviously exposed into the aircraft culture where they are obsessed with near misses like near misses is is investigated just like a catastrophe just like a catastrophe.

00:53:32.239 --> 00:54:00.239
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It would be interesting to know to scientifically run through a bunch of those cases where you had a near miss and investigate how it looked like like if it was a catastrophe and then compare those findings to the ones that you have for for events where they didn't end up so optimistically and perhaps on Ravel what what made the difference because I I would guess it's it's small things that that make a difference.

00:54:00.480 --> 00:54:04.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean one one of the examples I told you the one in Athens they they broke the windows to get out.

00:54:04.639 --> 00:54:05.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Okay.

00:54:05.039 --> 00:54:36.079
<v Lazaros Filippidis>And it was if they could easily break the windows in though in that case uh but we know in other cases the windows are yeah had boards uh nailed on them or they had uh metal grids on them that couldn't be removed or the windows themselves the gas was too thick or yeah or in in new buildings the windows are ridiculously uh rigid you can't break them you can't break them like I remember uh maybe that was not the smartest thing to do but after a fire experiment I had a window that was lying on the on the ground and I was jumping on it and it wouldn't would not crack at all.

00:54:36.239 --> 00:56:01.280
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yeah yeah it don't they don't break like they're very very hard to break so yeah well that the well but this goes into the theme of increasing the means of uh escape capacity and drastically shortening the RC that that's the question I've asked before is a half meter more exit capacity sufficient i I guess not but perhaps an easily breakable window can if you have five of those you suddenly create this uh additional space that is sufficient right but it also creates its own hazard of course of course yeah yeah yeah so that that is you have to be careful of that one last question before we end that the fire is not the only uh thing that that can happen you can also have uh very uh quite severe accidents or incidents related just to evacuation process itself like crowd crash events or I mean if if someone is injured that for me is already a serious event you you you could have those in Poland for example I mean it's fire related but we we had a massive fire in one of the uh concert facilities in Gdańsk and uh there was I I I think 12 fatalities but they were mostly linked to uh they they perished at the evacuation door because it was locked with the chain so so is it it's not always the the the the fire that that kills people you could also have just an evacuation case which ends up very bad on its own.

00:56:01.280 --> 00:56:06.320
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And we are also quite aware of that and measures should be should be put in place right?

00:56:06.320 --> 00:57:40.159
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Yes absolutely I mean you can have crowd collapsing and crowd crushing again as a result of um an urgent evacuation you wouldn't normally see this in a non-urgent evacuation but in an urgent evacuation especially in overpopulated uh conditions even if there's no evacuation and you have you know just an area is overcrowded like in concerts it has happened in concerts where people got crushed and they die uh from uh asphyxiation they can't breathe because they're the they're so much crushed by the the crowd behind them or around them they they they can't move they can't breathe so that's another safety issue not fire related but it's a safety issue oh man it's it's so depressing like never ends yeah it never like it's it just repeats like yeah you just mentioned that there was a fire in Madrid that just follows the same theme and and probably in a few months we'll have another one like every every year we get one at least one and and they are all always like such a massive uh uh loss of life and so many you know I I wish like we we have the superpower today that the humanity is connected like never before like you don't need you don't need to lose a hundred kids in your own country to learn that you shouldn't put flammable insulation in your ceiling or perhaps you should really have different level of vigilance and safety measures when you do pyrotechnics inside the venue or you probably shouldn't do that at all or you maybe should have think about not blocking the evacuation exits.

00:57:40.159 --> 00:59:34.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I just wish that authorities recognize how fairly easy the problem is from the perspective of science administrators realize that their actions have uh immediate consequences and uh and for the society I'm not even like of course we should educate society I just had an episode with George Boosters about making a safety culture I'm full in we should educate the society but we cannot fully rely on just societal education right no you cannot necessarily rely on it but I think it's a good idea especially if you start at young kids it's cool I've seen examples in uh Japan and Korea very very young school children maybe they're um I don't know five years old they're told to how to evacuate from the classroom they're told to you know bend down avoid this the hot upper layer they put uh fake fires yeah they had those cute uh cardboard fires uh I think so but and uh you can also see them uh uh using uh water hoses and fire extinguishers they become familiar with the dangers the risks and they they get familiar with what they have to do in case of an emergency so I'm a strong advocate of educating very young kids on these kind of issues it won't hurt even if you save one it's good enough actually i if you have five more minutes I would like to take five more minutes of your time because one one thought is going on repeat on in my head as I told you I I like to do those podcast episodes so that the engineers take something with them uh because it's the majority of people listening are fire safety engineers I of course welcome everyone to listen to fire science show I know there's one lawyer who's listening to this yeah uh I hope you had a great time listening but um as a fire engineer I get and I want to run an evacuation simulation for such a venue right uh they tell me there's 500 people could be in the venue.

00:59:34.960 --> 00:59:59.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So this scenario 500 people in the venue in this case I don't feel it's my worst scenario like this is the expected use scenario because if you have a venue you basically would like to sell it out you know with tickets like if 500 is the capacity 500 would be the target so so for me that's a normal day use of that facility.

00:59:59.440 --> 01:00:08.559
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I know in in some countries which have extremely strong safety culture, like in Japan, like you would never have 501 people inside, I guess.

01:00:08.559 --> 01:00:15.360
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh, but in many places of the world, and you you have a very nice concert plan, uh, maybe 700 could fit in.

01:00:15.360 --> 01:00:24.639
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like, I mean, I I'm not sure how much I can trust this number as being the absolute possible amount of people in the room.

01:00:24.639 --> 01:00:28.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So, uh how would you approach that as an engineer?

01:00:28.000 --> 01:00:35.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Would you put a safety margin on the number of occupants who could be in the would you investigate the stress scenario?

01:00:36.559 --> 01:00:42.719
<v Lazaros Filippidis>First of all, let me say something that I read on social media from somebody who actually goes to vengeance like this.

01:00:42.719 --> 01:00:55.679
<v Lazaros Filippidis>He actually said he wrote he wrote this that whenever he goes to a club from now on, whenever he goes to a club and uh you know the bouncer tells him that we are at capacity, he'll say, Thank you, I'm not coming in.

01:00:55.679 --> 01:01:03.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Uh so he would he would never try and get in to a place that is near near near or has exceeded his capacity.

01:01:03.519 --> 01:01:08.719
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So that's one of the things that we should do as uh let's say users of users, yeah.

01:01:09.199 --> 01:01:11.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Professional advice for uh for venue users.

01:01:12.239 --> 01:01:14.559
<v Lazaros Filippidis>If somebody tells you it's a near capacity, don't go in.

01:01:14.559 --> 01:01:15.199
<v Lazaros Filippidis>There's no point.

01:01:15.199 --> 01:01:16.480
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yeah, because you never know.

01:01:16.480 --> 01:01:20.159
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But uh to answer your your question, what you would do.

01:01:20.159 --> 01:01:27.679
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, it's obviously it's very difficult to trust uh a single number of five hundred people, for example, for a particular venue.

01:01:27.679 --> 01:01:31.360
<v Lazaros Filippidis>It's just it's a hard number, it's difficult to trust just that.

01:01:31.360 --> 01:01:57.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>But uh as a fire safe engineer, what you can do is you can you can run you can do some risk analysis, you can run a large number of hypothetical cases, and you can include a you can you can include a number of hazards and see what kind of interaction the occupants, the buildings and the hazards over what is the overall interaction between these three elements the occupant, the building, and the hazard, and what kind of outcome you get.

01:01:57.039 --> 01:02:09.519
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Obviously this takes time and resources, but it's it's the kind of study that um you'd have to do if you want to you get a feel of the conditions you may you may you may get in in in the venue.

01:02:10.000 --> 01:02:11.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Kind of like a sensitivity analysis.

01:02:11.760 --> 01:02:15.599
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Does another 50 people completely change my outcome or not?

01:02:15.599 --> 01:02:23.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And perhaps blocking this one blocking an exit exit actually doubles the time, which means this is your distress.

01:02:23.679 --> 01:02:27.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I think I I I wouldn't say I've done it like that in the past.

01:02:27.920 --> 01:02:32.800
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I've there I've definitely followed the guidance of of analyzing at least one blocked exit.

01:02:32.800 --> 01:02:44.559
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's I think a good practice, but I think that's a well-established practice already at this point that that you should design with uh with one uh worst exit, uh which one is worse.

01:02:44.559 --> 01:02:46.719
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>That's a subject of uh of discussion.

01:02:46.719 --> 01:03:05.280
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But I think like introducing those stress scenarios, uh, you you obviously will not know the likelihood of those, or risk would be challenging, but uh you could expose like which ones lead to dramatic decline in the in the safety.

01:03:05.280 --> 01:03:07.920
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And I guess the same would go for the fire growth.

01:03:07.920 --> 01:03:15.599
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like uh if if you're designing for uh a medium curve, perhaps drop a fast one or ultra fast one and see what happens.

01:03:16.159 --> 01:03:19.760
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I mean, this is the benefit of modeling, far modeling or evacuation modeling.

01:03:19.760 --> 01:03:30.079
<v Lazaros Filippidis>You can you have the tools, maybe not the time or the other or other resources, but you have the tools to examine a plora of scenarios and conduct sensitivity analysis, as you mentioned.

01:03:30.079 --> 01:03:32.400
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Well, technically that's the benefit of these things.

01:03:32.719 --> 01:03:38.639
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>In regards of venues like the ones that we discussed today, you could get pretty far with the zone model, to be honest.

01:03:38.639 --> 01:04:01.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Like uh even if you especially if you go something like B-Risk with uh probabilistic aspects of it, that you can uh define input scenarios as a range of of variables and not uh not the single numbers but probabilistic distributions, you could run a thousand scenarios and investigate uh is there one that is absolutely uh really bad.

01:04:01.519 --> 01:04:12.159
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So yeah, I actually if I uh I I'm a fire engineer, if I had uh a venue like this, and I've used that uh before, like my ACE is uh 30 seconds more than R set.

01:04:12.159 --> 01:04:13.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Is this safe enough?

01:04:13.760 --> 01:04:26.320
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I I guess uh like it's just a number, but if I do a sensitivity analysis, it gives me context of that number because if I know with a simple measure I could improve it to two minutes, that's something that's worth pursuing, right?

01:04:26.559 --> 01:04:30.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yeah, and yeah, as you said, do you have some safety margin there?

01:04:30.639 --> 01:04:36.960
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Um I mean the models are models, they're not um they cannot represent reality to the highest possible degree.

01:04:36.960 --> 01:04:39.920
<v Lazaros Filippidis>So you need to add some kind of safety factor there.

01:04:39.920 --> 01:04:40.639
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Fantastic.

01:04:40.639 --> 01:04:41.119
<v Lazaros Filippidis>For sure.

01:04:41.679 --> 01:04:42.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Now I'm now I'm happy.

01:04:42.960 --> 01:04:49.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Now we've provided engineers with tangible advice directed to fire safety engineers because I I felt hopeless.

01:04:49.679 --> 01:04:53.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I didn't feel there's much that fire engineers could do for safety of those venues.

01:04:53.679 --> 01:05:19.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>If you if you have such a project on your desk, try and do sensitivity analysis, understand the bottlenecks and the potential issues that you have, and if you need unfortunate inspiration of how the fires could develop on or what scenarios you could expect, there's unfortunately too many uh videos of those uh fires in the in the internet to pretend that uh no one will ever bring uh fireworks or or any other thing.

01:05:19.760 --> 01:05:20.480
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Exactly, exactly.

01:05:21.039 --> 01:05:26.079
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It's even a birthday cake, like you know, can you imagine like a fire starting from a birthday cake?

01:05:26.079 --> 01:05:28.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is like this or or that weather.

01:05:28.000 --> 01:05:30.079
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is so yeah, it's a tragedy.

01:05:30.079 --> 01:05:30.719
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This is terrible.

01:05:30.719 --> 01:05:31.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So sad.

01:05:31.760 --> 01:05:36.320
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Well, anyway, uh thank you, thank you for for coming to Fire Science Schulazaros.

01:05:36.320 --> 01:05:46.159
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I wish that the occasion was uh a nicer one, and I hope there won't be that many occasions like this to discuss matters like this in the future is always devastating.

01:05:46.159 --> 01:05:53.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>But yeah, we uh gave engineers some food for thought and and let's strive to be better as a foreign engineering society.

01:05:53.519 --> 01:05:54.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Thanks.

01:05:54.239 --> 01:05:55.360
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Yes, thank you very much.

01:05:55.360 --> 01:05:57.039
<v Lazaros Filippidis>I enjoyed uh our talk.

01:05:57.039 --> 01:05:57.599
<v Lazaros Filippidis>Thank you.

01:05:58.000 --> 01:05:59.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And that's it, thank you for listening.

01:05:59.440 --> 01:06:02.239
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>This was not an easy episode to prep and record.

01:06:02.239 --> 01:06:21.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh we wanted to avoid, you know, this uh sensational attention-building habit of uh of the modern world that uh a thing happens and uh you know it's all about commenting as fast as you can and getting clicks and uh some kind of online respect tokens.

01:06:21.039 --> 01:06:41.199
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>At the same time, everyone speaks about this horrible fire in Krasmontana in Switzerland, and uh obviously it's an opportunity to highlight some people uh non-fire experts or fire experts who may not be that active in that subject on their everyday basis.

01:06:41.199 --> 01:06:45.280
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Opportunity to actually highlight something good.

01:06:45.280 --> 01:06:48.159
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I hope we we we got something good out of this episode.

01:06:48.159 --> 01:06:57.679
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The most terrifying thing is that uh we could have spent the entire episodes talking about the recent fire in Switzerland and not bring it up even once.

01:06:57.679 --> 01:07:11.519
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Because we could just talk about Coconut Groove or the station or the Kiss Club or the Iraqi wedding or there were so many of those fires and they all are so unfortunately similar to each other.

01:07:11.519 --> 01:07:14.719
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The issue cannot be solved by the fire safety engineers.

01:07:14.719 --> 01:07:17.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Unfortunately, we're not the solution for this.

01:07:17.440 --> 01:07:19.440
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The solutions are well known.

01:07:19.440 --> 01:07:20.960
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>The solutions exist.

01:07:20.960 --> 01:07:31.039
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>It's the governments, the enforcement, the authorities, the local authorities, the club owners and the participants who with our support can solve the issue.

01:07:31.039 --> 01:07:34.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>We are part of the solution, but we're not the complete solution.

01:07:34.000 --> 01:07:45.280
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>And I hope we all understand our role in this and uh with this in mind, well, we should act and we should help finding the solution to prevent the next event like this.

01:07:45.280 --> 01:07:52.159
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh but uh I'm just disappointed at our ability to act as a society, uh frankly speaking.

01:07:52.159 --> 01:08:19.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Nevertheless, uh for the practicing fire engineers, I think those sensitivity studies mentioned at the end this is exactly the practical, tangible outcome of this episode that I was looking for the entire 60 minutes of interviewing Lazaros, and I'm super happy that we got to that one at the end because it's something that I feel I can improve my own professional judgment of fires in such venues, and I will definitely go like that, and I hope some of you will do as well.

01:08:19.760 --> 01:08:21.199
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Uh what more to say?

01:08:21.199 --> 01:08:26.399
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I just wish us all uh having less and less opportunities to you know discuss fires like that.

01:08:26.399 --> 01:08:31.600
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>I just hope they don't really happen at all, or at least that often.

01:08:31.600 --> 01:08:35.760
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Anyways, uh that would be it for today's episode of Fire Science Show next week.

01:08:35.760 --> 01:08:38.399
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Another dose of fire science going your way.

01:08:38.399 --> 01:08:42.000
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>So stick up with us and see you here next Wednesday.

01:08:42.000 --> 01:08:42.560
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Thank you.

01:08:42.560 --> 01:08:43.439
<v Wojciech Wegrzynski>Bye.